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INTRODUCTION
In March of 2005, the manager of a Dunkin' Donuts in Yonkers, New
York, stirred some local controversy when he posted a sign inviting cus-
tomers to complain if they heard employees behind the counter speaking a
language other than English.' A day later, the manager removed the sign,
responding to vociferous complaints that it amounted to discrimination.
While the mini-drama was not itself an unusual event-English-only rules
have become increasingly common in the American workplace-the epi-
sode did not follow the predictable script. The manager, who acted on his
own, was himself a native Spanish speaker-an immigrant from Ecuador.
He claimed he had posted the sign in response to customer complaints
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about employees behind the counter acting disrespectfully by speaking
Spanish in the presence of customers. But the outcry that prompted the
manager to remove the sign came not from the employees whose speech
had been curtailed, nor from groups representing their interests, but from
the very clientele the manager thought he had been serving. The people of
the neighborhood immediately denounced the policy as discriminatory,
coming to the defense of the Latino, Egyptian, and Filipino employees.
And while Dunkin' Brands, Inc. requires employees who interact with the
public to be fluent in English, the company immediately issued a statement
distancing itself from the manager's action, emphasizing that "having em-
ployees that speak the languages of the local neighborhood ... can be a key
element in creating a hospitable environment." The company took no dis-
ciplinary action against the manager, and the episode ended looking like
nothing more than a big misunderstanding.
Though the Dunkin' Donuts affair came to a quick resolution, the
event was part of a larger trend that has emerged in recent years in work-
places across the country. It has become increasingly common for employ-
ers to adopt English-only rules that prohibit workers from speaking
languages other than English under certain circumstances. Such rules rep-
resent, in many ways, the private sector versions of the official English laws
on the books of states across the country. But whereas the official English
movement traffics largely in the rhetorical and symbolic, the emergence of
the English-only workplace rule suggests that the language debate in the
United States has very practical implications for the ways millions of peo-
ple interact with others in certain public spaces, such as the workplace. The
existence of private language regulation also underscores that lofty concepts
like the definition of national identity are worked out not only through high-
profile oratory and grandstanding, but also through everyday interpersonal
interactions.
English-only rules in the workplace have taken a variety of forms.2
Some rules govern only official work time; others cover any and all conver-
sations in the workplace. Some rules are set by formal corporate policies,
but, more often than not, they are informally adopted by managers in the
workplace itself. They appear most often in the consumer services sector,
but they also have appeared in other workplaces, such as hospitals, offices,
and on assembly lines. The nature of the English-only rule differs from
workplace to workplace, but even a minor and informal incident like the
one in Yonkers suggests that regulation in the form of an English-only rule
amounts to more than an ordinary behavior code for the workplace. Rules
regulating language use implicate a complex web of social relationships
that intersect in society's workplaces: relationships between individual cus-
tomers and workers, to be sure, but also relationships among workers, be-
2 For a more detailed discussion of the various types of English-only policies employers have
adopted, see infra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
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tween workers and their communities, and between the public and the
commercial settings in which a community's life is lived out. In a multi-
ethnic environment, an English-only imperative offers employers a simple
mechanism for mediating these many relationships. But, as I contend
throughout this Article, this mechanism imposes significant social costs that
justify resisting the English-only impulse.
In this Article, I treat the English-only workplace rule as a manifesta-
tion of the desire by certain parties-employers, employees, and segments
of the public-to control the social dynamics of the workplace. Through
my analysis, I seek two kinds of understanding? First, how might we char-
acterize the consequences of these rules? Understanding their effects and
responding accordingly will contribute not only to debates concerning the
rules that employers adopt to govern the workplace, but also to the devel-
opment of a conceptual framework for understanding the cultural conse-
quences of immigration generally. This Article thus represents part of a
larger attempt on my part to understand how the multilingualism fueled by
immigration is reshaping our social and political spaces.4 Second, what
does a study of the English-only workplace rule reveal about Title VII as a
source for governing workplace relations in an increasingly pluralistic soci-
ety? By illuminating the cultural dimension of the immigration debate, this
study will shed light on how dilemmas generated by our pluralistic demog-
raphy, other than language conflict, might be resolved.
In brief, I argue that the consequences of the English-only rule with
which we should be most concerned are social, not individual, in nature.
The interest we should focus on protecting in the workplace is not the indi-
vidual worker's freedom of expression-the interest courts routinely dis-
miss in rejecting challenges to English-only rules-but his or her interest in
free association and social bonding, both with fellow workers and with the
community beyond the workplace. Securing this freedom will require pro-
tecting the individual characteristics or behaviors that facilitate association,
which will include establishing a legal presumption against English-only
rules. Such a presumption ultimately will promote the social objective that
3 In discussing the English-only rule phenomenon, I am concerned not with the employer's setting
of English fluency or proficiency as a condition of employment in the first place-it would be an uphill
battle to demonstrate that an English-language requirement, in the majority of cases, is anything but a
legitimate job requirement, or a bona fide occupational qualification. Cf Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,
269 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that it may be unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire a worker who does
not speak English if the job for which he or she would be hired does not require the ability to communi-
cate in English). Few, if any, cases challenging English-language proficiency requirements appear to
have been brought, suggesting either that they are few and far between; that the EEOC does not view
such cases as likely to succeed and therefore does not pursue them; or that the people who would have
standing to bring such claims have little, if any, awareness of their legal rights or little, if any, ability to
access the legal system. Moreover, the fact that this country's workplaces are full of immigrants who do
not speak English suggests that employers often subordinate any reluctance they might have to hiring
such workers to their need for labor.
4 See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language and Participation, 94 CAL. L. REV. 687 (2006).
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animates this Article-the idea that the cultural burdens of immigration and
pluralism must be shared by all members of the population.
Title VII has been the primary framework through which advocates
and courts have assessed the validity of English-only rules. But a close
consideration of how the federal courts have resolved English-only work-
place disputes underscores that Title VII provides workers with no realistic
mechanism for articulating their social interests, or their interests in associa-
tion. At the same time, through the business necessity justification, the
statute does allow employers to express their own conceptions of the social
interests at stake in the workplace. Though Title VII's inadequacy as a
framework for assessing English-only rules may be lamentable, it would be
misguided to attempt to reorient Title VII jurisprudence or to attempt to
amend the statute itself to address language rules directly. Other actors,
particularly state and local lawmakers, are in a better position to deal with
the salient associational concerns that arise from English-only and other
similar forms of regulation.
More specifically, in identifying social impact as the more serious con-
sequence of the English-only rule, I mean social in three senses of the word.
First, the rules interfere with important associative dynamics in the work-
place itself, or the process of social bonding that takes place among work-
ers.' Second, they create a rift between the workplace and the community,
detaching the important public space of the workplace from the identity of
the community in which it is situated. Third, rules of this kind compromise
the ability of minority language communities to sustain themselves, because
they force the use of non-English languages out of public spaces and into
the familial sphere. The English-only phenomenon thus highlights that em-
ployer regulation of certain behaviors interferes not just with employees'
expressive interests, or their interests in displaying individuality through
certain behavior, but also with their associative interests, or their interests in
social bonding, both in and out of the workplace. Protecting the individual
worker's freedom to speak non-English is not just a matter of personal iden-
tity, but of communal identity.
While the individual's expressive interests certainly deserve recogni-
tion in some contexts, 6 protecting the associative dimension of practices
5 To be clear, in using the terms "association" and "solidarity," I am not referring to or commenting
on the freedom to associate or build solidarity in order to form a union that will engage in collective
bargaining, as understood in the context of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§
151-169 (2006). Instead, I am referring to a more interpersonal process of forming social ties, friend-
ships, and esprit de corps among employees. For a discussion of association and solidarity with refer-
ence to the purposes of the NLRA, see infra notes 62-63, 66-70 and accompanying text.
6 For instance, workers' speech rights are clearly protected in chapter 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §
157 (2006), which provides that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection."
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typically characterized as personal has a clear social value that justifies in-
terfering with the employer's prerogatives. The worker's associative inter-
ests should be protected, because the workplace functions not just as a
commercial setting, but as a social institution. It is the site where we spend
most of our waking hours and develop many of our salient relationships.
Workplaces constitute spaces within, not apart from, communities; not only
does a given workplace itself have a relationship to the community in which
it is located, but the relationships formed within the workplace are inter-
laced with those that exist outside of it. What is more, employers in the
English-only cases invoke harmony among workers and the interests of cus-
tomers to justify their practices, in effect standing in for the public to regu-
late the social phenomenon of bilingualism. Employers thus control the
behavior of their employees in a manner that has external social conse-
quences. Though the employer, in expressing these interests, is also articu-
lating what he has determined is best for the bottom line of his business, the
bottom line is inextricable from social assumptions about the propriety and
desirability of non-English in public spaces.
But requiring employers, customers, and workers to tolerate a certain
amount of linguistic cacophony in the workplace would do more than pro-
mote workers' associative interests. Requiring all people to embrace some
level of linguistic dissonance in the workplace would require the public at
large to reorder its expectations with respect to the linguistic dynamics of
the workplace, thus spreading the cultural burden of immigration across the
population with some degree of evenness. Put slightly differently, there is a
widespread and reasonable social expectation that immigrants will learn
English in order to become productive members of society. But treating
English-only rules with skepticism would be a way of requiring all people,
not just the immigrant and his descendants, to share in facing the cultural
consequences of immigration, including multilingualism. This claim is not
a call for surrender to demographic forces, but a simple expression of the
need to adapt our principles of integration to reflect who we are becoming
as a people-to alter our expectations of our aesthetic and linguistic sur-
roundings in light of an evolving population. Understanding what is at
stake in the controversy over the English-only workplace rule thus will give
content to the debate over how best to absorb the cultural effects of large-
scale immigration, a debate that rages at a high level of abstraction in popu-
lar and political discourse.7
I frame this issue within the broader context of immigration for two
reasons. First, though the three-generation pattern of linguistic assimilation
7 See infra notes 257-65 and accompanying text (discussing how congressional debates over the
cultural dimension of immigration tend to feature a great deal of abstract rhetoric concerning American
national identity). See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO
AMERICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY 18-19 (2004) (discussing the crisis of identity facing the United States
in this century as a result of the arrival of large numbers of Spanish-speaking immigrants).
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still fairly describes language assimilation today,' the constant influx of
immigrants ensures that non-English speakers will continue to be prevalent
in the United States, even as particular family lines assimilate.9 Second,
language difference represents perhaps the starkest cultural consequence of
immigration.'0 Hearing a language one cannot understand immediately and
viscerally calls one's attention to difference and the possibility of separation
from others. As immigrants themselves well know, entering a world where
all transactions occur through an unfamiliar medium can be disorienting,
leaving the linguistic outsider with a sense of powerlessness."'
As studies of the workplace have underscored, linguistically complex
workplaces create pressure to "suppress linguistic differences,"' 2 because
language, an obvious marker of changes brought on by immigration, "crys-
tallizes resentment and anxiety."' 3 Because of the characteristics described
above, the workplace represents a space where we are likely to see a sig-
nificant amount of sorting of the cultural effects of immigration. In other
words, it is in workplaces and commercial spaces that people come into
contact with the human dimension of immigration, both as workers and as
patrons. Understanding language conflict in the workplace, therefore, will
contribute to our understanding of the cultural meaning of immigration, and
vice versa.
In devising the appropriate law reform response to the English-only
phenomenon, the basic objective should be to erect a presumption of inva-
lidity. The primary framework employees have relied on to challenge Eng-
lish-only rules has been Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' 4 -a
framework that has given rise to a very different way of thinking about
English-only rules than the conception I advance. In assessing these rules,
courts have focused primarily on the rules' impacts on the rights of individ-
ual workers. The resulting caselaw has produced an anemic understanding
8 According to this pattern, the first generation is dominant in non-English, the second generation is
bilingual with a preference for English, and the third generation is English dominant. See RICHARD
ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM: ASSIMILATION AND CONTEMPORARY
IMMIGRATION 219 (2003).
9 For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Rodriguez, supra note 4, at 690-92.
10 Ultimately, while immigration is not the only source of language difference in the United States,
it is the primary source. Language diversity in the United States today also comes from domestic, or
citizen, sources-namely Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians, and Native Americans. Historically, language di-
versity in the Southwest also has stemmed from sources other than immigration; the Mexican-American
population has ties to the territory that pre-date statehood.
II For a discussion of the use of English-only rules to ameliorate these effects as they are felt by
employees who are native speakers of English, see infra notes 309-16.
12 Michael Lichter & Roger Waldinger, Producing Conflict: Immigration and the Management of
Diversity in the Multiethnic Metropolis, in COLOR LINES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION, AND
CIVIL RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR AMERICA 147, 163 (John David Skrentny ed., 2001) [hereinafter COLOR
LINES].
'" Id. at 164.
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
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of the social significance of English-only rules in the workplace. While Ti-
tle VII grants the employer leeway through the business necessity defense
to defend one particular set of social interests, the statute provides employ-
ees with no comparable avenue to articulate the social concerns as they see
them. Though it may be possible to shift the legal presumption regarding
these rules by pushing for a shift in Title VII analysis, or for an amendment
to Title VII itself, better strategic and conceptual options exist. Our focus
should be on how states and municipalities, through legislation, might limit
the authority of employers to impose English-only rules, as well as on how
other organizations and institutions involved in advising employers about
how to manage personnel, such as the Society for Human Resource Man-
agement, might urge a shift in presumption. 5
Finally, emphasizing the distinction between associative and expres-
sive interests highlighted by the English-only cases also could prove to be
of instrumental value in resolving disputes over the accommodation of
other, non-immigration-related personal characteristics in the workplace.
Today, other than language, religion is the interest or characteristic that
generates the most friction in the workplace. Believers may seek to pray or
proselytize in the workplace, or they may seek exemptions from performing
a job function that interferes with their religious commitments, as the much-
reported-on Christian pharmacists who refuse to dispense birth control have
done. Focusing on the employees' associative interests might help chart a
course through this minefield of claims. The distinction between associa-
tion and expression will help clarify what is at stake with employers' regu-
lation of different employee behaviors. In addition, it can serve as a guide
to state and local lawmakers, who seem increasingly willing to protect cer-
tain personal interests in the workplace-a willingness reflected in recent
legislation banning English-only rules and protecting certain religious prac-
tices in the workplace.16
To develop these claims, this Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I,
I establish what I call the social case for a multilingual workplace. I con-
sider the effects of English-only rules on various forms of social bonding
and establish the normative basis for restraining employers from imposing
such rules. In the process, I explore the meaning of bilingualism as a both
personal and social phenomenon, and spell out the associative versus ex-
pressive distinction as a mechanism for resolving disputes surrounding cul-
tural traits in the workplace. In Part II, I assess the Title VII litigation that
has grown up around English-only workplace rules over the last two dec-
15 Both California and Illinois have passed laws prohibiting employers from imposing English-only
rules absent an overriding business necessity. The Texas legislature also has considered adopting simi-
lar legislation. For discussion of this legislation, see infra notes 271-83 and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., National Council of State Legislatures, Pharmacist Conscience Clauses: Laws and Leg-
islation (May 2006), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/conscienceclauses.htm (listing
the variety of state laws that regulate the rights of pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions or provide
services for ethical, moral, and religious reasons).
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ades and lay out the flaws in the federal courts' understanding of the impact
of English-only rules. In Part III, I consider whether Title VII should play
any role at all in managing debates over pluralism in the workplace, and es-
tablish why state and local legislation would be more consistent with the
conceptual framework I develop in Parts I and II than a reinvigorated Title
VII.
I. THE SOCIAL CASE FOR THE MULTILINGUAL WORKPLACE
In this Part, after explaining the English-only phenomenon in some
more detail, I establish the shape that the language rules of the workplace
ought to take. Through this extended consideration of how to manage lin-
guistic diversity in the workplace, I identify the values and interests that
employers and lawmakers should take into account when making decisions
about how best to manage pluralism in the workplace. I begin by consider-
ing the status of the workplace as a social institution and why that status
justifies constraining the employer's ability to control the dynamics of his
workplace. I then consider the interests of employees and employers impli-
cated by linguistic diversity. Exploring the English-only rule phenomenon
offers a good starting point for the larger project of grappling with work-
place pluralism, because language diversity presents a particularly challeng-
ing case. Linguistic pluralism, after all, affects the processes of
communication in a direct and profound way.
In adopting their English-only workplace rules, employers arguably
express a fundamental human impulse. Scholars of language conflict have
identified, in many different contexts, a seemingly inexorable drive toward
linguistic homogeneity: "We generally respond to the Babel of languages
in the world by seeking to carve out a space in which only 'our' language is
spoken."" In other words, attempts to create safe spaces where mutual in-
telligibility is always possible, even if not required, reflect a common hu-
man dynamic) t The problem with this impulse, of course, is that linguistic
homogeneity is not naturally occurring. Particularly in multiethnic socie-
ties, such homogeneity must often be engineered.
17 Marc Shell, Language Wars, 1 NEW CENTENNIAL REV. 1 (2001). As Shell notes,
the academic discussion of language and international politics has been dominated by responses to
a single sort of "space," the territory of the nation-state. And, since the early nineteenth century,
that national space or territory has been defined by the ideal of linguistic nationalism: the idea that
peace and justice demand that all speakers of a given language secure a national homeland where
that language is supreme.
Id. at2.
18 This impulse manifests itself in a wide variety of ways, including in the assumptions people make
about what the law requires. A recent letter to Slate magazine's advice columnist highlighted not only
the assumption that the speaking of non-English is rude, but also the belief that the law, or the powers-
that-be, should have something to say about it. The letter complains about Filipino co-workers speaking
Tagalog and then queries whether a law exists prohibiting such behavior in federal buildings. See Dear
Prudence, SLATE, July 28, 2005, http://slate.msn.com/id/2123487.
1696
HeinOnline  -- 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1696 2006
Language Diversity in the Workplace
The English-only impulse long has been present in commercial set-
tings. One of the first cases to consider the civil rights implications of Eng-
lish-only rules actually concerned a rule applied to customers, rather than
workers. In the 1973 case Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, several Chicano pa-
trons brought suit against the owners of a tavern in a small Oregon town,
challenging their policy of prohibiting patrons from speaking languages
other than English while seated at the bar. 9 The house rule directed bar-
tenders to escort non-compliant customers to one of the establishment's
back booths, and to raise the volume on the juke box to drown out their
conversation. According to the tavern owners, they devised the English-
only rule in response to "fear on the part of the white clientele that the Chi-
canos [were] talking about them."2 The rule thus "served everyone's inter-
ests"" by keeping the peace in a public place frequented by both of the
town's ethnic groups. The federal district court, however, found this justi-
fication unpersuasive, holding that the plaintiffs' civil rights, protected by
§ 1982, had been violated. In the court's view, the English-only rule "de-
prive[d] Spanish-speaking persons of their rights to buy, drink and enjoy
what the tavern has to offer on an equal footing with English-speaking con-
sumers.
22
Today, legal and market pressures have made attempts to regulate the
linguistic behavior of customers largely a thing of the past.23 But the claim
that keeping the peace requires controlling the speaking of non-English in
19 368 F. Supp. 752 (D. Or. 1973).
20 Id. at 754.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 755. The court found that the rule violated the customers' § 1981 rights "to make and en-
force contracts ... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of per-
sons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens," as well as their § 1982 rights to "have the same right
... to ... purchase... personal property." Id. The court further noted that, just as these statutes prohib-
ited the relegation of black citizens to the back seats of busses, they restrained business owners from or-
dering Spanish speakers out of the earshot of English-speaking customers. Id.
23 Note, however, that the current and vigorous debate over immigration reform has emboldened at
least one business owner, who has received some media attention, to demand that even his customers
speak English. The Philadelphia Inquirer reported recently on the decision by a famous local
cheesesteak vendor to post a sign in his shop informing customers: "This is America. When Ordering,
Speak English." See Gaiutra Bahadur, An Old Struggle to Adapt to a New Country's Ways, PHILA.
INQUIRER, May 30, 2006, available at
http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/loca/14697552.htm?template=contentModules/print.story.jsp.
The vendor's motivation appears to include resistance to the expectation that he adapt to the presence of
immigrants in his community. See id. (quoting business owner's comment: "They want us to adapt to
these people. What do you mean, 'Press 1 for Spanish'? English period. Case closed. End of discus-
sion. You better make it the official language."). It is certainly possible that the current climate of high
anxiety over immigration has given rise to other similar incidents around the country. But since Her-
nandez, and for the moment, cases litigating business owners' attempts to regulate the language spoken
by their customers do not appear to have arisen. What is more, the employers in some of the English-
only workplace cases discussed below do not appear to impose language restrictions on customers, even
as they impose them on employees, whom they also permit to speak in languages other than English to
customers. See, e.g., Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 939 (E.D. Va. 1995).
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the commercial sphere is alive and well. Thirty years after Hernandez v.
Erlenbusch, the sentiment that foreign languages spoken in commercial
spaces are invasive-that they upset the peaceful pursuit of commerce by
irritating English-speaking clientele-is expressed.24 But rather than target
customers, most house English-only rules regulate the behavior of employ-
ees. Like the Oregon tavern owners, employers who adopt English-only
rules cite the need to promote cooperation in the workplace and to protect
customers and workers alike from the anxiety that they are being talked
about in languages they cannot understand.
Contemporary English-only rules run the gamut from formal to infor-
mal. 5 In at least one case, the rule has come down to franchise managers as
corporate policy. According to a 2003 complaint filed by the EEOC in fed-
eral court in New York City, the Sephora Corporation, which sells cosmet-
ics, maintains an English-only policy prohibiting employees from speaking
non-English during working time.26 In other instances, managers (like the
manager of the Yonkers Dunkin' Donuts) issue mini-workplace codes, or
English-only edicts, of their own volition, giving notice in the form of a
sign in the break room, or somewhere else in the workplace. In still other
cases, the "rules" emerge as workplace norms enforced through informal
reprimands by supervisors and fellow employees to "speak English,
please."
The adoption of English-only rules has not been limited to a particular
industry, nor have the rules been applied only to particular types of work-
ers. But the cases that have come into public view, either as the result of
EEOC enforcement and litigation efforts or through investigative reporting,
have a few characteristics in common. First, with the exception of the
Sephora Corporation's alleged corporate policy, English-only rules tend to
appear in relatively small settings. Second, with the exception of a few
cases involving assembly line workers,27 the cases tend to arise in work-
places where employees interact with the public in some way. Many of the
cases implicate settings where the public and the employees of the work-
place come into regular and close contact-workplaces such as a New York
hotel,28 a Colorado casino,29 a Chicago hair salon,3" a Virginia bank,3' and
24 See infra notes 309-25 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which employers justified
English-only rules as responses to claims by employees or customers that the speaking of languages they
did not understand made them uncomfortable).
25 For a detailed discussion of various different types of English-only rules, see infra Part II.
26 See Miriam Jordan, Testing 'English Only' Rules: Employers Who Require Workers to Speak
English Can Face Discrimination Suits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2005, at BI (reporting that Sephora con-
siders the EEOC's claims to be groundless and denies that it ever had an English-only rule).
27 See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993) (involving English-only rule
in meatpacking plant); see also infra note 187 (citing settlement in case involving assembly line workers
in manufacturing plant in Illinois).
28 Complaint, EEOC v. Melrose Hotel Co., No. 04 CV 7514 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2004).
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the Yonkers franchise of Dunkin' Donuts. But English-only rules also have
appeared in workplaces where less consumer-oriented activity takes place-
a radio station32 and a hospital33 in California, a local church in Pennsyl-
vania,34 and the offices of a Dallas-based long-distance service provider35
and of a medical services company in the Bronx. 6 And employers in set-
tings that are not primarily workplaces, but where employees have regular
contact with non-employees, also have imposed English-only requirements
on their workers, such as the management company of a New York City co-
op building that ordered its porters to speak only English.3"
Finally, the English-only rules adopted by employers have been
broadly restrictive, as well as narrowly targeted. Like the state laws declar-
ing English the official language of government, some employers' rules re-
strain more behavior than others. In the most restrictive instances, workers
are prohibited from speaking non-English during every facet of the work-
day. In other cases, workplace regulations permit employees to communi-
cate with one another during breaks or mealtimes as they please, but
nonetheless require the speaking of English while employees are on the
clock, regardless of whether they are engaged in a work-related conversa-
tion. The least restrictive rules require only that actual business-related
communication be conducted in English, permitting employees to speak
other languages in non-business-related conversation. Still other employers
carve out exceptions to their rules for those workers unable to speak Eng-
lish at all.38
English-only rules appear to have emerged initially in significant num-
ber in the early 1980s,39 and the number of complaints about such rules has
increased since then. From 1996 to 2000, complaints lodged with the
29 Colorado Casino to Pay $1.5 Million to Settle EEOC National Origin Bias Case, DAILY LABOR,
July 21, 2003, at A- 10 [hereinafter Colorado Casino to Pay].
30 See EEOC Alleges Chicago Hair Salon Violated Title VII with English-Only Rule, DAILY LABOR,
Dec. 21, 1999, at A-8 [hereinafter EEOC Alleges].
31 See Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., No. 95-1986, 1996 WL 281954, at *1 n.3 (4th Cir. May 29,
1996).
32 Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987).
33 Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 775 F. Supp. 338 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
34 Kania v. Archdiocese of Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
35 EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
36 Settlement Resolves Sexual Harassment, Retaliation, 'English-Only' Policy Complaints, DAILY
LABOR, Nov. 20, 1998, at A-7.
37 English Only, Par Favor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at 14-15 (describing management com-
pany's English-only rule and the residents' outrage over the policy).
38 For examples of these different types of policies, see discussion infra notes 142-99 of court cases
and settlements in which various English-only policies have been at issue.
39 The Fifth Circuit appears to have been the first Court of Appeals to address the legality of Eng-
lish-only rules. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
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EEOC concerning English-only rules quintupled." National origin-related
complaints, which often include a challenge to an English-only rule, today
represent the fastest growing source of complaints to the EEOC. Com-
plaints concerning English-only rules have not appeared uniformly across
the country, however. The six states that accumulated the highest number
of complaints between 1995 and 2005 were New Mexico, Delaware, Flor-
ida, Colorado, Arizona, and Texas.4 2 The trends in each of these states fol-
lowed a similar pattern in these years.43 The number of complaints reached
its peak between 2002 and 2004, except in Texas, where the peak was
reached right at the turn of the century. And, with the exception of Florida,
the number of complaints has declined in the last one to two years. As a
general matter, the number of complaints filed appears to have correlated
with the size of the state's Latino population, with the outlying exception of
Delaware.'
Media accounts document this phenomenon and suggest that ever-
increasing immigration to this country continues to prompt the proliferation
40 See, e.g., Carlos R. Soltero & Keith Strama, English-Only Rules in the Workplace in Texas, 64
TEX. B.J. 130 (2001) (noting the increasing commonality of English-only workplace rules in Texas);
Maria Shim, English-Only Cases Multiply, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23, 2000, at BI (noting the increase in com-
plaints to the EEOC and attributing the rise to a number of factors, including EEOC outreach to employ-
ees and employers' attempts to resolve tensions among groups of workers by responding to workers'
complaints concerning fellow employees' speaking of non-English).
41 See Colorado Casino to Pay, supra note 29 (noting that national origin charges increased by 28%
from 1995 to 2002); see also Karyn-Siobhan Robinson, English-Only Rule Costs Casino $1.5 Million in
EEOC Settlement (2003), http://www.shrm.org/hmewspublished/archives/CMS_005129.asp (noting
that national origin filings based on English-only rules climbed from 32 in 1996 to 228 in 2002).
42 1 have drawn the conclusions detailed in this paragraph based on data acquired from the EEOC
through a Freedom of Information Act request made on July 20, 2005, and data from the 2000 Census
recording total and Latino population numbers by state. To calculate the number of complaints per cap-
ita, I divided the total number of complaints filed in each state between 1995 and 2005, either with the
EEOC or a state or local employment law agency, with the total population of the state as recorded in
the 2000 Census. For state-by-state population data, see http://www.census.gov.
43 I charted the trend in each state by dividing the number of complaints filed with federal, state, and
local agencies in each year between 1995 and 2000 with the state's total population as recorded in the
2000 Census.
44 This conclusion represents a very preliminary assessment of the data available. I have compared
the number of per capita complaints per state with the percentage of each state's population that is La-
tino, as recorded in the 2000 Census, and found a correlation. Of course, California, whose population
has the second highest proportion of Latinos in the country, has not had a high number of complaints per
capita, though the raw numbers of complaints filed in California is the highest in the nation. But New
Mexico, the state with the highest proportion of Latinos in its population, also has the highest number of
English-only complaints per capita. Though conclusions about why this correlation might exist are be-
yond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that New Mexico is perhaps the only state to have given
languages other than English public and official status. See Rodriguez, supra note 4, at 747-48 (dis-
cussing decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court requiring accommodation of jurors who do not
speak English based on the recognition of the rights of English and Spanish speakers in the state consti-
tution).
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of English-only regulation by employers. 5 In recent years, the EEOC, in
addition to promulgating rules that define what constitutes a legitimate Eng-
lish-only policy,46 has made challenging restrictive language requirements a
litigation priority. 7 And human resource organizations, such as the Society
for Human Resource Management, also have taken note of the increasing
use of English-only rules, and responded by developing model English-only
policies to conform to EEOC Guidelines.48
But at the same time that the English-only rule is becoming a common
feature of workplace culture, employment and management journals docu-
ment employers' increasingly aggressive recruitment of bilingual employ-
ees.49 While the demand for bilingual employees exists at the managerial
and executive levels due to the increasingly global reach of many American
companies, the need for such employees in the United States has become
most apparent in the consumer-services sector-the sector where English-
only rules are most likely to appear." Indeed, in some markets, such as
South Florida, employers treat bilingual ability less as an added plus than as
45 See infra notes 187-99 and accompanying text (discussing reports of suit filings and settlements
in English-only cases).
46 See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC regulation).
47 See Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Court Speaks: English Only
Rule Unlawful; Awards EEOC $700,000 for Hispanic Workers (Sept. 19, 2000), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/9-19-00.html (noting that cases involving English-only rules, restrictive lan-
guage policies, and language or accent discrimination are litigation priorities for the Commission).
48 See English-Only Language Policy, http://www.shrm.org/hrtools/policiespublished/
CMS 01 3464.asp; see also Joan M. Canny, Managing Language Diversity Essential in South Florida,
21 S. FLA. Bus. J. 42 (2001) (offering employers suggestions on how to handle language diversity in the
workplace and observing that, while having a common language for work-related communications
would be helpful, the language used need not always be English and could vary between different de-
partments, shifts, or work crews); Ross L. Fink, American Firms Lash out at Foreign Tongues, 83 Bus.
& SOC'Y REV. 24 (1992) (observing that growing linguistic diversity is having a major impact on the
delivery of health care services and encouraging healthcare organizations that ultimately adopt English-
only rules to show concern for employees' free speech rights, as well as their interests in being free from
harassment in the workplace); Gillian Flynn, English-Only Rules Can Cause Legal Tongue Ties, 74
PERSONNEL J. 87 (1995) (urging employers to examine their English-only rules closely); S. Craig
Moore, English-Only Rules in the Workplace, 15 LAB. LAW. 295, 307 (1999) (providing guidelines for
framing English-only rules in the workplace).
49 These sources suggest anecdotally that employers of various kinds actively recruit bilingual
workers. See, e.g., Julian Teixeira, More Companies Recruit Bilingual Employees, EMP. MGMT.
TODAY, Fall 2004, available at http://www.shrm.org/ema/EMT/articles/2004/Fall04teixeira.asp (dis-
cussing language-based recruitment efforts by employers). That said, a recent survey conducted by the
Pew Hispanic Center found that "there are no strong economic payoffs in the U.S., on average, from
proficiency in Spanish" and that "there are no economic returns to fluency in non-English languages in
the U.S." PEW HISPANIC CTR., SURVEY BRIEF: BILINGUALISM 5 (2004), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/15.9.pdf. Whether speaking a non-English language boosts bilin-
guals' economic prospects does not, of course, bear directly on whether the speaking of non-English
should be permitted in the workplace, and the study also did not indicate that bilingual ability under-
mines employment opportunities.
50 See infra notes 138, 189-99 and accompanying text.
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a job requirement." And the demand is not just for Spanish speakers, but
for speakers of Chinese and Vietnamese on the West Coast, and French and
Portuguese on the East Coast."
Of course, these two parallel trends are less in ironic tension with one
another than they are of a piece. While it is by no means clear that the same
employers systematically and simultaneously adopt bilingual hiring re-
quirements and English-only workplace rules (though there have been some
reported cases of overlap53), both the expansion of bilingual recruiting and
English-only workplace rules reflect that a demographic reordering is oc-
curring in this country. This reordering is the result both of the high levels
of immigration that have characterized the last two decades54 and of the in-
creasingly global character of business. Changing demography has made
language ability a business necessity and given rise to language conflict at
the same time. Workplace culture, like popular and political culture, is be-
ing transformed as a result. Though these two trends in the treatment of
multilingualism by American employers may appear to pull in opposite di-
rections, they are both confirmations that the workplace, like any other so-
cial institution, will simultaneously embrace and resist changes in its
underlying structure.
51 See Colorado Casino to Pay, supra note 29.
52 See Teixeira, supra note 49. Teixeira describes the creative recruiting techniques that some em-
ployers have employed to find bilingual workers, including participating in local Hispanic organizations
and holding "open houses" for bilinguals in order to target specific groups for their language skills. Id.
53 See, e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Long
v. First Union Corp. of Va., No. 95-1986, 1996 WL 281954, at *1 n.3 (4th Cir. May 29, 1996).
54 Recent studies of immigration and assimilation document the phenomenon that has created these
new linguistic circumstances. The foreign born and their children now constitute approximately 20% of
the population in the United States. It has been estimated that 36% of the residents of New York City
were born outside the United States. See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING, THE NEWEST
NEW YORKERS 2000: IMMIGRANT NEW YORK IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM xi (2004) (discussing the for-
eign-born population of New York City as of the year 2000) (an executive summary of the report is
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/nny exec-sum.shtml).
The fact that immigrant groups live mostly in large states-namely California, Florida, New York,
Texas, and llinois--"magniflies] the regional impacts of immigration," meaning that the cultural con-
sequences of immigration are felt that much more acutely, because the immigration is concentrated. See
ALBA & NEE, supra note 8, at 9; see also Marcelo Suhrez-Orozco, Everything You Ever Wanted to
Know About Assimilation but Were Afraid to Ask, in THE NEW IMMIGRATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
READER 67, 74 (Marcelo Sudrez-Orozco et al. eds., 2005) ("While immigrants have always concentrated
in specific neighborhoods, we are witnessing today an extraordinary concentration of large numbers of
immigrants in a handful of states in large urban areas polarized by racial tensions."). Though this re-
gional concentration is inescapable, it is also the case that a statistically significant number of immi-
grants have been bypassing the traditional gateway cities and states to settle in suburban and rural
communities, as well as in states that have not received much immigration historically-one of the
unique characteristics of the wave of immigration that began in the early 1990s. See Mary C. Waters &
Tomis R. Jim~nez, Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges, 31
ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 105, 107, 109 (2005). Though the regional impact of immigration is still quite pro-
nounced, I explore in Part Ill, below, the implications of this new feature of immigration to the United
States.
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A. Language and Association in the Workplace
To understand how employees' interests in association and social
bonding play out in the workplace, it is essential to consider what it means
to have relationships in a workplace. What is it about the workplace that
makes it a common site for conflict among society's different groups?
Which features of the workplace should guide us in determining how to re-
solve those conflicts? Which features of bilingualism should we keep in
mind as we attempt to understand how language rules might interfere with
association? In this section, I offer a conception of the workplace as a so-
cial institution and argue that permitting linguistic and cultural fragmenta-
tion to be seen and experienced in that setting is essential. Throughout this
section, I assume English-only rules take the form of blanket prohibitions
on the speaking of non-English. In Part III, when discussing the employer's
interest in some form of language regulation, I complicate the picture by
discussing the various shapes English-only rules have taken and could take.
1. The Workplace as Social Institution.-As I have explained in
other work, I conceive of the workplace as a critical site of public participa-
tion in social life. 5 Life in the workplace consists of much more than the
one-on-one economic transaction. The conceptual separation of the public,
political realm from the private, commercial realm obscures the fact that
most people's daily lives, as they are lived out in public, are lived out in the
workplace. And in this dimension of the public sphere, individuals and
communities engage in self definition.
In her work on sexual harassment law, Vicki Schultz has emphasized
the importance of the workplace to human development. She has written:
For most people, working isn't just a way to earn a livelihood. It's a way to
contribute something to the larger society, to struggle against their limits, to
make friends and form communities, to leave their imprint on the world, and to
know themselves and others in a deep way .... [W]ork isn't simply a sphere
of production. It is also a source of citizenship, community, and self-
understanding.
56
Work and the workplace constitute significant parts of the lives and identi-
ties of individuals. The workplace offers us a venue not only for giving
meaning to our lives, but also for forming important personal relationships
that complement our existing social networks based on ties to family and
friends.57
Workplaces also often stand as fixtures in communities. Many em-
ployers have presence in the communities in which they are located: From
55 Rodriguez, supra note 4, at 720-21, 755-56.
56 Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2069-70 (2003).
57 See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER 129 (2003) ("Workplace relationships may begin
as 'the most attenuated of personal attachments,' but they often yield bonds of empathy and affection
that transcend family, neighborhood, racial, and ethnic identities.").
1703
100:1689 (2006)
HeinOnline  -- 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1703 2006
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the employer in the company town, to the managers of major social institu-
tions such as hospitals, to the local franchise of a large company, to the
small business owner, employers occupy significant social spaces. Em-
ployers, therefore, are not just profit seekers, but managers of social interac-
tion. Workplaces are not just sites of economic exchange, but places where
the members of a community relate to one another, acting out social mores
and developing community values.
Cynthia Estlund's important recent work on the dynamics of the work-
place further underscores the social and, hence, participatory nature of the
workplace.56 She demonstrates that today's workplace is likely to be the
primary and perhaps only place where people of diverse backgrounds meet
and form meaningful relationships. 9 Though workplaces are "only moder-
ately integrated," they nonetheless represent the site of the most likely in-
teraction among groups in the United States today.6" This process of
integration happens less and less in other community spaces, such as
schools, churches, and civic associations,6' and may actually provide a par-
tial explanation for the rise of English-only rules. The emergence of these
rules highlights that many workplaces in this country are likely to be lin-
guistically diverse and suggests that the workplace is often a site for the ne-
gotiation of social differences.
Given these features of the workplace, it is important to be attentive to
the ways in which the rules that govern the workplace impact relationships
among workers, as well as social relationships more generally. In fact, this
very insight informs the variety of regulatory regimes that already govern
the workplace. The fact that economic and social relations, as they play out
in the workplace, affect the socioeconomic interests of individuals, as well
as social structures and inter-group relations, helps justify regulation of the
employer's prerogatives. Along with general public health and safety regu-
lation, various civil rights statutes at the local, state, and federal levels regu-
late the employer's decisionmaking authority, with respect both to hiring
and to how the employer treats his employees and constructs his workplace.
Similarly, the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")6 2 gives workers an
opportunity for self-government in the workplace. The statute protects their
freedom of expression and association, enabling them to engage in collec-
59 See generally id.
59 See id. at 10. As Professor Estlund has noted:
The single most promising arena of racial integration, at least for adults-is the workplace. This is
not to say that the typical workplace is genuinely integrated, but that even the partial demographic
integration that does exist in the workplace yields far more social integration-actual interracial
interaction and friendship--than any other domain of American society.
Id.
60 See id. at 9.
61 See id. at 8-9 (noting the persistence of residential segregation, the racial separation of public
schools, and the homogeneity of churches and synagogues, particularly among blacks and whites).
62 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
1704
HeinOnline  -- 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1704 2006
Language Diversity in the Workplace
tive bargaining and exercise a level of control over the terms of their em-
ployment.63 In short, each of these regimes, in their conception and subse-
quent elaboration, embodies particular social objectives, which the law
strives to balance against employer sovereignty, or the presumption against
government intervention that protects private property and private contrac-
tual relations.
To translate my concern for the potential anti-social consequences of
English-only rules into a set of legal presumptions, I tap into the normative
underpinnings of this legal framework. In particular, though I advocate
primary reliance on state and local forms of regulation,64 the public over-
sight I propose in this Article has important presuppositions in common
with the civil rights goals embodied in Title VII, as well as with the solidar-
ity building aims of the NLRA. The authors of Title VII, for instance,
sought to ensure basic equality of economic opportunity for all by prohibit-
ing employers from discriminating against members of particular socially
salient groups. Out of a concern that people not be denied opportunities on
the basis of race, gender, and other related characteristics, Title VII limits
the employer's authority to decide who to hire and constrains the em-
ployer's ability to adopt employment practices that treat employees from
protected groups worse than others. As scholars have emphasized, the ap-
plication of this basic principle to the private sector has "assigned the
workplace an important integrative function that no other major societal in-
stitution can perform well."65 For reasons I explain in Parts II and III, I dis-
courage turning to Title VII as the vehicle through which to express
opposition to English-only rules. But the statute's overarching civil rights
objectives and its pursuit of those objectives through restraints on employ-
ers' governance of their workplaces is of a piece with my objectives: pro-
tecting employees' associative interests and promoting burden shifting in
those institutions where our society's diverse groups come into contact with
one another.
The NLRA also advances social objectives I share. Section 7 of the
Act protects the rights of employees to "self organization" and to "engage
in ... concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection."66 The law thus holds out the promise of protect-
ing workers' efforts to associate and cooperate with one another to defend
their interests. To this end, the law protects employees' expressive inter-
63 See ESTLUND, supra note 57, at 135.
64 I emphasize in Part II that Title VII does not provide an adequate framework for channeling the
English-only issue and argue in Part III that state and local regulation of the particular practice with
which I am concerned would be more appropriate.
65 ESTLUND, supra note 57, at 129.
66 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
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ests, including their right to distribute and post union literature67 and discuss
work-related issues in certain areas of the workplace.68 These rights to ex-
pression and association are, of course, granted to enable workers to engage
in the particular act of collective bargaining, not to associate in the more
general terms I lay out in this Article. The NLRA's actual legal framework
is thus inapposite for my purposes (though to the extent that an employer
adopts an English-only rule to prevent workers from organizing, section 7
might provide an actual doctrinal hook for a legal challenge).69 But, more
importantly, the labor law embodies principles of employee agency, or the
idea that employees should have some control over the terms of their em-
ployment-a basic value that runs throughout my examination of the Eng-
lish-only practice. It also aims to protect employees' capacity to build
solidarity with one another for collective ends, a principle that dovetails
with my interest in allowing employees to decide the terms, including the
linguistic terms, of their relationships with one another."
Of course, if we regard the workplace as a public social institution
where important relationships are formed, we might consequently under-
stand the English-only rule as a defensible outcome of the negotiation of
social difference that occurs within the workplace. Diversity in the work-
place underscores the need for mechanisms that reduce friction and build
solidarity among different groups. To build this solidarity, it might make
sense to search for points of commonality, and a logical point in an English-
dominant society is the English language. Even if individuals in a given
workplace come from wildly diverse ethnic, religious, or class back-
grounds, they nonetheless can connect with one another through communi-
cation and, hence, through language. Indeed, though critical of English-
only rules,7 Estlund suggests that the existence of a common language
among workers can enhance sociability and cooperation.72
67 See, e.g., NLRB v. Pratt & Whitney Air Craft Div., 789 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that a
ban on distribution of literature that promoted the union and used derisive language to describe "scabs"
violated NLRA).
68 See ESTLUND, supra note 57, at 163 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793
(1945)).
69 See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing how union organizers effectively use
languages other than English to communicate with and organize immigrant workers).
70 Cf ESTLUND, supra note 57, at 163-64 (discussing the law's protection of collective voice as a
starting point for enabling employees to "secure for themselves outlets for sociability," and observing
that "empowerment of employees should nudge managers toward greater reliance on trust and coopera-
tion and away from intensive monitoring by threat").
71 See id. at 97. Estlund points out that because language is closely linked to ethnicity and national
origin, English-only workplace rules are suspect under Title VII. She also emphasizes that they "burden
already disadvantaged minorities" in the workplace and interfere with the "freedom of workers to com-
municate with each other within language groups." Id.
72 See id. ("Where language differences make conversation difficult or impossible, one of the main
engines of social connectedness is stalled. And where language differences dictate social interactions-
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Some employers strive for this cooperation by encouraging English-
language acquisition by employees who do not speak English-a growing
practice in some sectors.73 This impulse is laudable, though probably costly
for most employers.74 Because of ease of administrability, more employers
choose to address multilingualism in their workplaces by adopting a bright-
line English-only rule, which may well seem like the perfect solution to the
communication problem, at least in workplaces where most employees
speak some English.
But, in my view, restrictive as opposed to accommodating rules are ul-
timately inconsistent with solidarity building in a diverse public institution.
In the sections that follow, I offer a distinct conception of how to build soli-
darity in a diverse workplace. My conception depends both on an apprecia-
tion of the relationship between bilingualism and socialization, as well as
on a more complex understanding of interpersonal dynamics in the work-
place than the worldview that informs the English-only impulse.
2. The Social Dimension of Bilingualism.-To more fully understand
the relationship between language use and solidarity building, or why the
English-only rule interferes with that process, it helps to understand some-
thing about the nature of bilingualism and language contact. As an initial
matter, it is reductive to talk about language diversity in the workplace in
terms of a dichotomy between monolinguals and bilinguals. Language abil-
ity exists on a spectrum. Because linguistic assimilation is a gradual proc-
ess, the ability to speak English is a matter of degree.
Some individuals who have the capacity to speak English in some con-
texts may not be effective communicators in English in others. And many
immigrants who have developed the capacity to speak and understand Eng-
lish may nonetheless remain much more effective communicators in their
native languages. Adults who enter the United States after a certain age
may become functional in English but never achieve fluency. The ability to
for example, if Spanish-speaking workers socialize only with each other-those differences may re-
create ethnic 'segregation' within an integrated workforce.").
73 See, e.g., Miriam Jordan, Employers Provide Language Aid; Hot New Gadget Helps Teach Em-
ployees English Using Recording and Playback, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2005, at B13 (describing the in-
terest of employers in the hotel and fast-food sectors in helping employees learn English, and describing
new "gadgets" designed to help non-English speaking workers learn English and English-speaking man-
agers learn Spanish).
74 Estlund suggests that fostering intergroup ties in the workplace depends not just on measures
taken by employers themselves, but also on the input of other social actors-namely, the public schools.
She writes, "[T]he importance of intergroup ties in the workplace raises the stakes in [the bilingual edu-
cation] debate. One of the things schools should be doing is building the language skills that students
will need to communicate with their eventual co-workers in diverse workplaces." ESTLUND, supra note
57, at 97-98. Consistent with the burden shifting framework I propose below, those skills include not
only English-speaking ability on the part of non-native English speakers, but also ability in languages
other than English on the part of native English speakers. For a discussion of how schools can contrib-
ute to these broader social objectives through the design of their language education programs, see
Rodriguez, supra note 4, at 764-65.
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speak English thus does not always signify preference for or comfort in
English. And, even for those who grow up or arrive at an early age in the
United States and for whom English is a native or primary language, there
may nonetheless be contexts in which the ability to express oneself depends
on the ability to code switch, or engage in the practice whereby speakers of
more than one language alternate between them. Though widespread non-
English usage may be rare among fully bilingual employees,75 the existence
of a broad range of English-language ability among employees means that
non-English will be used to varying degrees in the workplace. In other
words, language diversity in the American workplace is not just the result
of the diversity of actual languages, but also of the diversity of language
abilities and preferences.
But what does bilingualism signify? At least three features of bilin-
gualism, as articulated in the linguistics literature on the subject, are rele-
vant to our consideration of the English-only rule. First, while its extent is
not altogether clear, it is safe to assume that bilingualism has an effect on
the formation of the individual's personality. In the literature, it is not
firmly established whether bilinguals possess two personalities in two dif-
ferent languages, or a single, integrated personality that finds expression in
two languages.76 But some linguists have suggested that the bilingual does
not develop two parallel identities, but rather integrates his two cultures into
a single identity, within which aspects of both cultures closely interrelate."
At the same time, evidence exists suggesting that choice of language may
implicate different aspects of one's personality; i.e., it may well be the case
that bilinguals present themselves differently in different contexts to em-
phasize different sides of themselves.7" Quite apart from the phenomenon
of code switching, then, we can assume that the regulation of bilingualism
is tantamount to the regulation of personality-something I take to be more
fundamental in a psychological sense than regulation of mere personal pref-
erences.
Second, being bilingual means belonging to two different speech
communities.79 The non-English speech community thus forms part of the
75 See PEW HISPANIC CTR., supra note 49, at 2 (stating that, "English is far and away the dominant
language of U.S. commerce and trade, and dominates U.S. workplaces. English/Spanish bilingual Lati-
nos report that they largely speak English in the workplace. About 60% of bilingual Hispanic workers
usually speak more English than Spanish at work (29%), or use only English at work (33%). Wide-
spread Spanish language usage at work is relatively rare among bilingual workers. About one in ten re-
port speaking 'more Spanish than English' or 'only Spanish' at work ... ").
76 See John Edwards, The Importance of Being Bilingual, in BILINGUALISM: BEYOND BASIC
PRINCIPLES 30 (Jean-Marc Dewaele et al. eds., 2003).
77 See JOSIANNE F. HAMERS & MICHAEL H.A. BLANC, BILINGUALITY AND BILINGUALISM 239
(2000); see also id. at 220 (noting that bilinguals develop a different cultural identity than monolinguals
and that bilingualism does not lead to any perceived contradiction between membership in the two
groups).
78 See Edwards, supra note 76, at 32.
79 Id. at 29.
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social context in which one's individual personality is embedded."0 While it
is difficult to isolate the particular role that language, as opposed to other
community characteristics, plays in forming this context, linguists note that
"language tends to link personalities and operate on their socially overlap-
ping spheres."'" Bilingualism does not simply produce "idiosyncratic dis-
positions."" The condition of being bilingual is not just personal, but
social. 3
Of course, the importance of language relative to other factors will
vary from group to group, as some groups define themselves with reference
to other points of commonality, such as shared history, religion, or other
ethnic characteristics. 4 But this variation does not diminish the social ele-
ment of the bilingual identity. This community-based conception of bilin-
gualism is supported by evidence that bilinguals have a more acute sense of
cultural sensitivity than those in the linguistic "heartland."" The common
sense intuition that bilinguals straddle two communities 6 is heightened by
the linguist's observation that bilinguals are "borderers" who possess a
heightened sense of tolerance by virtue of their ability to interact with dif-
ferent speech communities. 7
Complicating this reality is the fact that, in a multilingual society, the
different speech communities to which one might belong are not discrete or
easily separable. Instead, they are overlapping. They meet in what literary
scholar Mary Louise Pratt has called contact zones, or the "social spaces
where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of
highly asymmetrical relations of power. '"88 The workplace, as one of the
few remaining social spaces where people of different races and ethnicities
come into meaningful contact with one another, represents a natural contact
zone-particularly those workplaces in the services sector where workers
interact with the public at large.
The English-only workplace rule represents a product of the inevitable
clash in the contact zone-a first attempt to grapple with a growing cultural
pluralism by declaring that the workplace belongs to one particular speech
community. The English-only rule constructs a common community where
everyone speaks the same language. But this community, which theoreti-
80 Id. at 30.
81 Id. at 31.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 30.
84 See HAMERS & BLANC, supra note 77, at 202.
85 See id. at 239.
86 Cf Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 370-72 (1991) (observing that bilinguals serve to
bring two communities together but ultimately holding that prosecutors could strike potential jurors
based on their ability to speak another language).
87 See HAMERS & BLANC, supra note 77, at 239.
88 See Mary Louise Pratt, Arts of the Contact Zone, in WAYS OF READING 527, 530 (David Bar-
tholome & Anthony Petrosky eds., 1999).
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cally overlaps and connects most others, is not necessarily the community
where communication is the most robust, because everyone in it does not
speak English with the same level of facility or enthusiasm. More impor-
tantly, the idea that a public space could be reserved for one particular type
of interaction resists the reality that, in a pluralistic society, speech commu-
nities bleed into one another. Because linguistic communities do not have
discrete boundaries and are made up of people who travel in and out of
them, trying to rid public institutions of their linguistic complexity by con-
structing an overlapping speech community that does not otherwise exist is
probably an exercise in futility.
Finally, it seems clear that bilingualism can create tensions or contra-
dictions for the bilingual individual. The individual bilingual is himself a
contact zone, where two different speech communities have a foothold.
Each of the languages that a bilingual speaks is thus a necessary part of the
resources he uses to socialize, making it difficult to separate one from the
other. But in a society with an overwhelmingly dominant common lan-
guage, the bilingual is nonetheless forced to "split" his language in ways
monolinguals find difficult to understand. Language has both an obvious
functional significance and an emotional significance, which stems from the
kinship attachments it creates. The so-called "monolingual-majority-group
speakers in their own mainstream" never experience a split between the in-
strumentality and symbolism of language, but minorities experience that
split on a daily basis when forced to choose between the languages they
speak, using English most often at work and in public life and a mix of
English and their minority language on more private occasions.89
Though this split might seem to threaten emotional strain or anomie for
the bilingual, some linguists are quick to point out that low self-esteem is
not the necessary outcome of a bicultural experience. It emerges instead
when the process of socialization takes place under social and cultural con-
ditions hostile to bilingualism and biculturalism. ° In other words, to the ex-
tent that bilingualism has negative effects on bilingual individuals, those
effects may well be functions of the social conditions that channel the bilin-
gualism.9 The literature suggests that though "the bilingual develops a
unique identity different from the monolingual, [that identity] can nonethe-
less be harmoniously adjusted if society allows it."92 These concerns are
likely to be the most poignant for children who confront ambivalence to-
ward their emerging bilingualism in the public schools. But English-only
t9 See Edwards, supra note 76, at 40-41.
90 See HAMERS & BLANC, supra note 77, at 213.
91 A recent study by the Pew Hispanic Center suggests that bilingual individuals fare as well as their
native-English-speaking counterparts in the workforce, suggesting that while the inability to speak Eng-
lish has serious economic consequences, being bilingual is not itself a barrier to economic success. See
PEW HISPANIC CTR., supra note 49, at 5 ("The economic outcomes of bilingual speaking adult Latinos
are very similar to their Latino counterparts who only have a strong command of English.").
92 HAMERS & BLANC, supra note 77, at 239.
1710
HeinOnline  -- 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1710 2006
Language Diversity in the Workplace
workplace rules can also be characterized as part of the process of socializa-
tion that determines how a bilingual individual adjusts to his bilingualism.
The English-only rule disrupts the harmonious adjustment by taking away
one of the important tools of socialization.
All of these observations about the nature of bilingualism suggest that
bilinguals experience language and, hence, language regulation differently
than monolinguals. The employers who devise the English-only rules, the
employees and the customers who demand them, and the courts that have
concluded that English-only rules have no meaningful impact on bilinguals
are probably more likely to be monolingual than the workers the rules regu-
late.93 The imposition and approval of these rules can thus be described un-
controversially as a form of cultural discrimination by the majority. In
these cases, it seems clear that the decisionmakers and the public at large
value certain behaviors (monolingualism) and devalue others (bilingualism)
in a manner that reflects their own cultural predispositions. In other words,
these decisionmakers "may fail to respect or even to recognize the ways the
behavior of others is part of a different cultural value system."94 Of course,
whether we make the leap from simply identifying certain practices as em-
bodying cultural discrimination as a sociological matter to declaring the
same practices to be discrimination as a legal matter presents its own ques-
tion. The point to keep in mind here is that language positions people so-
cially, but in a way that may be difficult to see, particularly when a single
language is as dominant as English is in the United States.
B. Diversity, Burden Sharing, and Solidarity in the Workplace
Counterintuitively, the insights elaborated above suggest that the best
way to approach diversity in the workplace, even when the goal is to pro-
mote solidarity and cross-group understanding, is to permit and enable
fragmentation. To justify this claim, I develop an argument for what I call
93 According to the 2000 U.S. Census, one in five residents in the United States speaks a language
other than English. James Crawford, National Association for Bilingual Education, Making Sense of
Census 2000 (2005), http://www.nabe.org/research/demography.html; see also Hyron B. Shin et al.,
Language Use and English Speaking Ability: 2000, in CENSUS 2000 BRIEF (U.S. Census Bureau 2003),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf (presenting language data from the
2000 U.S. Census). While that 20% figure is substantial, approximately 80% of the population is there-
fore monolingual. Even if we do not assume that positions of power-judgeships and management-are
likely to include fewer speakers of non-English than the public at large, the decisionmakers behind Eng-
lish-only rules will be drawn from a population that is 80% monolingual in English.
94 Richard Lempert & Karl Monsma, Cultural Differences and Discrimination: Samoans Before a
Public Housing Eviction Board, 59 AM. Soc. REv. 890, 891 (1994). Lempert and Monsma studied in-
stances of Samoan tenants arguing before the Hawaii Housing Authority over various infractions, in-
cluding late payment of rent. They found that whereas the housing authority often credited the excuses
of non-Samoans for late payment (such as having to pay for emergency room visits or unexpected car
repairs), the board regularly rejected the excuses of Samoans, which typically involved the fulfillment of
their cultural obligations (sending money to relatives in Samoa and paying for funerals and other family
events in Samoa). Id.
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cultural burden sharing. Burden sharing takes seriously the idea of the
workplace as a social institution and expects participants in the workplace
to make certain accommodations for one another's forms of socialization.
1. Sharing the Cultural Burden.-I begin with the premise, articu-
lated by Charles Black in a canonical essay on Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, that we must associate in public with those who are there. 5 The very
basic obligations of citizenship include acknowledging and dealing on re-
spectful terms with those we encounter in the public sphere. I would extend
this principle to hold that it means associating with people in a way that
takes them as they are. After all, to set conditions on one's willingness to
interact with others would be to escape the obligations that attend the inhab-
iting and using of public spaces. Such conditions are, for all intents and
purposes, excuses for either excluding or ignoring those who cannot or will
not meet those conditions. In other words, for any one person or group to
demand that others conform to a predetermined script of appropriate behav-
iors before interaction will be permitted amounts to a rejection of the fact
that we live in society. Put slightly differently, to expect that one can enter
the public sphere without having to encounter and manage people of differ-
ent cultures is unreasonable and impractical. As a pragmatic matter, getting
on with the work of any one institution will be easier if we abandon the
ephemeral goal of molding our environment into the space of our dreams.
The perfectionist impulse, or the demand that people be other than who they
are, stands in the way of actually doing business with the terms that we
have, rather than those we wish we had.
In taking this approach, I understand and embrace the fact that a certain
amount of friction will result, for the simple reason that, in a diverse soci-
ety, people are different. But the inevitability of friction does not absolve
participants in the public sphere of the obligation to help diminish this fric-
tion. With respect to language rules, speakers of non-English have an obli-
gation to communicate with their English-speaking colleagues in a mutually
intelligible manner, i.e., in English, even when that communication might
prove difficult. But the reciprocal obligation requires monolingual English
speakers to engage in a bit of personal accommodation of their own-to
tolerate the speaking of non-English in their presence.
95 See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J, 421, 429
(1960). In this classic essay, Black defends the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 349
U.S. 294 (1955), by arguing that common sense alone would have suggested to anyone at the time that
Jim Crow was intended to subordinate blacks, eschewing as laughable the notion that segregation was a
neutral practice, as well as the conclusion, enshrined in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), that
the harms of segregation were subjective. Black, supra, at 429. He introduces the compelling idea that
there is no freedom in the public sphere "not to associate." Id. He emphasizes that individuals have an
obligation to interact with one another, suggesting that classes of citizens cannot be rendered invisible
by being separated from the more powerful majority. Id.
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English-only rules in the workplace are sometimes motivated by an ab-
sence of this type of reciprocal tolerance. One of the common rationales
given for the imposition of English-only workplace rules is that they en-
courage civility in the workplace by preventing the rude practice of speak-
ing a language others in the vicinity do not understand.96 Employers adopt
English-only rules in an effort to harmonize the workplace by removing a
personal characteristic deemed alienating to others. A recent case in Penn-
sylvania highlights this practice. In defending its English-only rule against
a challenge brought by its Polish-speaking housekeeper, a church parish
contended that it adopted the rule because speaking a language others do
not understand is "offensive and derisive" behavior." The district court, in
turn, characterized the rule as enforcing civility in the workplace." For the
plaintiff to speak a language other employees and church members could
not understand, in their presence, would have been alienating to them.99
Good social relations in the multilingual setting required the enforcement of
an English-only policy.
In thinking about this standard of civility, it is worth noting that no
court appears to have assumed the inverse of the civility claim-that it
would be offensive to a non-English speaker to be surrounded by people
speaking English. Both the court's conclusion and the more general as-
sumption that people in the workplace will come to understand one another
better if the workplace is structured around certain commonalities reflect
the social dominance of English. This asymmetry in expectations reflects a
sense of entitlement based on this social dominance of English. It also re-
veals a belief on the part of the court and the parish that the burden to ame-
liorate the cognitive dissonance felt by monolingual English speakers when
they hear an unfamiliar language falls on the speaker of non-English. The
English-only rule thus exemplifies the assumption that our public spaces
should be English speaking.
On the one hand, there is arguably nothing objectionable about behav-
ing in accordance with this social reality. But it is also true that the concep-
tion of civility expressed in cases like the suit against the Pennsylvania
church is based on nothing more than a sociological fact, and that a second
sociological fact-the presence of languages other than English in commu-
nities across the country--could just as easily be used to justify a different
96 See, e.g., Kania v. Archdiocese of Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
97 Id. The employer's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was denied on the ground that, although the plain-
tiff did not present a prima facie case of national origin discrimination under Title VII, her claim of re-
taliatory discharge would still be valid if she could prove that she reasonably believed the English-only
rule was discriminatory at the time she challenged it. Id at 737.
98 See id. at 736.
99 Id.; cf. Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., No. 95-1986, 1996 WL 281954, at *1 n.3 (4th Cir. May
29, 1996) (quoting bank manager's memo detailing English-only policy: "This all boils down to com-
mon courtesy. How would you feel if everyone around you were speaking and laughing aloud in a lan-
guage that you could not understand.").
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expectation: namely, that the presence of languages other than English be
tolerated. While a burden is appropriately placed on the bilingual speaker
when he or she interacts with others who speak only English, the basic
premise that we must associate with people, in public, as we find them also
requires the acceptance of certain disharmonies.
We can then move from this idea of burden sharing on the interper-
sonal level to a broader conception of social burden shifting. The process
of absorbing the cultural consequences of immigration must involve shared
burdens, both for fairness reasons and because the process of assimilation
will be facilitated by the majority's willingness to accept some of the costs
of the process °° The cultural burden borne by the immigrant is heavy and
inescapable. Members of the receiving society, who are themselves direct
participants in the processes of migration, must also be willing to take on
certain cultural responsibilities. Framed slightly differently, we might think
of legal requirements that protect people's ability to use languages other
than English in the public sphere as ensuring that certain matters of public
concern are articulated. Permitting languages other than English to be spo-
ken in the public sphere allows speakers of non-English to announce their
presence publicly. This public presence, in turn, gives speakers of different
languages status and thus the ability to counteract efforts to demean their
origins.'
In defending fragmentation in the workplace, I do not mean to dismiss
the possibility that striving to identify and privilege points of commonality
might have benefits, nor do I reject the idea that building and sustaining
homogeneous communities could be appropriate in some circumstances. °2
But the workplace, because it is part of a public sphere where different sec-
tors of society not only interact, but also seek economic opportunities, dif-
fers dramatically from a private association, club, or familial setting, in
which the desire for homogeneity is more legitimately expressed. The
100 1 use the word "assimilation" to describe the process by which immigrants adjust to living in a
new society, not to convey a belief that immigrants should shed the cultural characteristics of their coun-
tries of origin to become American. This usage is consistent with the terms used by social scientists
who study immigrants in the United States. See, e.g., PEW HISPANIC CTR., SURVEY BRIEF:
ASSIMILATION AND LANGUAGE 1 (2004), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/I5.10.pdf.
101 In Maldonado v. City ofAltus, the plaintiffs, city employees, made a similar claim (ultimately re-
jected by the court) in their challenge to the city's English-only policy: that their speaking of Spanish
was a matter of public concern protected by the First Amendment. See 433 F.3d 1294, 1310-11 (10th
Cir. 2006) (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment, in part, and permitting employees' Ti-
tle VII claims against city's English-only policy to go forward).
102 See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
39 (1983) ("The distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure and, without it, cannot be
conceived as a stable feature of human life. If this distinctiveness is a value, as most people ... seem to
believe, then closure must be permitted somewhere.").
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paradigm for the workplace, therefore, should be one of open borders and
shared burdens, not one of closed communities and cultural comfort. 3
The debate over English-only workplace rules represents one site
where some of this burden shifting should occur. The dissonance or alien-
ation associated with hearing an unfamiliar language is precisely the cost
that the monolingual English-speaking majority should be expected to bear
in a society that depends upon and encourages immigration and claims to
value tolerance."° Requiring people to accept this cost will give effect to
the idea that people's expectations of their institutional surroundings should
change as their demographic surroundings evolve."5
People eventually will assimilate this cost into their aesthetic sense of
what constitutes normal life on the job. In other words, permitting the
cracks in the social dominance of English to be seen and experienced will
have learning effects, transforming linguistic cacophony from an anxiety-
producing phenomenon into the familiar. This intuition finds support in the
growing literature discussing the ways in which antidiscrimination law
helps reduce the implicit biases people hold against members of different
groups." 6 One insight, supported by considerable social science evidence,
states that "simply by increasing the level of population diversity in work-
places, educational institutions, and organizations, existing antidiscrimina-
tion law almost certainly tends to reduce the level of implicit bias in these
environments."'0 7 This theory suggests that, over time, permitting linguistic
diversity in the workplace will help dissipate some of the concerns employ-
ers address when they adopt English-only rules. This learning process,
which the law can be used to encourage, is itself part and parcel of the phe-
103 Cf Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251, 267-
68 (1987) ("Drawing a line between public and private is often problematic, but it is clear that clubs are
normally at one end of the scale and states at the other. So, the fact that private clubs may admit or ex-
clude whomever they choose says nothing about the appropriate admission standards for states.").
104 Cf Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1104 (2005) (arguing
that, in certain contexts, we should "turn[] the tables" on the majority, ensuring that "members of the
majority experience what it is like to be deprived of the comfort-and power-associated with their ma-
jority status," which presumably will foster tolerance and fairness).
105 Cf Garcia v. Spun Steak, 13 F.3d 296, 296 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial
of reh'g en banc) (emphasizing that Ninth Circuit, "with its enormous immigrant population," had be-
come only circuit in the country in which an employer could adopt a discriminatory English-only rule
without even advancing a business necessity to justify rule).
106 For a discussion of the literature on unconscious bias, see generally Christine Jolls & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstractid=897553. To be sure, the English-only rules I discuss are very much the
product of openly admitted trepidation monolingual English speakers feel about the speaking of lan-
guages other than English. But the insights of this literature are nonetheless on point.
107 See id. at 19; cf ESTLUND, supra note 57, at 19 (observing that the mandate of gender equality
"means that men and women increasingly find themselves working together as peers or in roles that re-
verse the traditional gender hierarchy," and that "[t]hat experience is bound to spill over into gender re-
lations in the society and even within the family").
1715
100:1689 (2006)
HeinOnline  -- 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1715 2006
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
nomenon of assimilation, and it is a necessary part of managing diversity in
a society that receives high levels of immigration.
In calling for burden shifting as a way of dealing with the cultural con-
flict generated by immigration, it should thus be clear that I advocate more
than assisting recently arrived immigrants who are in the process of acquir-
ing English-language skills. Most reported English-only cases involve bi-
lingual workers, or workers who do not require accommodation to
communicate. In other words, the debate is not simply about helping indi-
viduals overcome barriers to entry; it is about accommodating those with
the capacity to participate largely unaided." 8
To be sure, the non-English-speaking immigrant presents us with the
easier case for accommodation. The normative justification for policies that
help non-English speaking immigrants deal with language barriers stems
from the basic American creed of equal opportunity. Elaborate federal,
state, and local regulatory networks require agencies and public employers
to provide a wide array of language-access services, including courtroom
translation and interpretation," 9 English language education programs in the
public schools,"' translation of essential government services,"' and lan-
guage assistance on the job."2  Such policies make it possible for non-
108 Of course, to point to the accommodation of immigrants as an easy theoretical case is not to
deny that people with limited English-proficiency too often lack the services they need to navigate an
unintelligible English-speaking world. In addition to the standard resource constraints and institutional
decisionmaking that render the provision of language services to immigrants a low priority, some states
have attempted, through their public laws, deliberately to inhibit access to important governmental ser-
vices, thereby severely complicating the lives of non-English speakers. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 197
F.3d 484 (1 lth Cir. 1999) (noting that Alabama Department of Public Safety's decision to stop giving
driver's license exams in languages other than English, in light of the English-only amendment to the
state constitution, significantly impaired non-English speaker's ability to engage in activities basic to
daily life), rev'd on other grounds sub noma. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285, 293 (2001)
(holding that Title VI does not create a freestanding private right of action to enforce disparate-impact
regulations and making clear Court's rejection of its prior interpretation in Laou v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563
(1974), with respect to reach of Title VI); Yfliguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th
Cir. 1995) (emphasizing severe effects Arizona's restrictive English-only amendment would have on
state's ability to serve significant swaths of the public while striking the amendment down on grounds
that it violated First Amendment rights of state employees), vacated as moot, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). But
the normative case against these measures is strong. Basic principles of fairness, compassion, and inte-
grationism are easily invoked to justify accommodationist measures.
09 See, e.g., Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b)(1) (2006).
110 See, e.g., Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(0 (2006) (making unlawful
"the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that im-
pede equal participation by its students in its instructional programs").
III See, e.g., New York, N.Y., Local Law No. 73, ch. 10, § 8-1003 (2003) (amending the city's ad-
ministrative code to require city agencies and their contractors to provide free language-assistance ser-
vices to limited English proficient individuals).
112 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug. 16, 2000) (setting forth Depart-
ment of Labor guidelines from the Clinton era instructing recipients of federal financial assistance to
accommodate "persons with limited English proficiency" in the workplace).
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English speaking immigrants to live and to have a fighting chance in the
marketplace.
But the employer's regulation of workers fully fluent in English poses
theoretically different and more difficult questions than the legal rules and
practices that deny immigrants language access services. Individuals with
the capacity to speak English have the ability to engage in self-help, or the
ability to comply with language restrictions, making accommodationist
practices more difficult to justify. Accommodation simply does not follow
as logically from the bilingual's social position as it does from the non-
English speaker's. The debate over English-only rules thus requires us to
consider not just whether the mainstream should be open to all, but also
whether Americans are right to resist the reshaping of so-called mainstream
culture that bilingualism represents.
Understanding the effects of English-only rules, then, is about defining
what the American cultural mainstream should look like. Precisely for this
reason, a focused consideration of the English-only workplace rule will il-
luminate the broader question of how to deal with other forms of behavior
that stem from deeply held cultural and personal affiliations. How far
should the law go in policing the ways in which social actors, such as em-
ployers, construct the mainstream through their formal and informal poli-
cies governing the spaces and people under their control?
2. The Costs of Burden Sharing.-In calling for this shift in people's
expectations, I recognize two particularly significant arguments in favor of
the claim that English-only rules offer sensible tools for promoting coopera-
tion in the workplace. First, bilinguals are uniquely positioned to reduce
tensions in the workplace by speaking English, so perhaps they should have
a duty to mitigate. Leaving aside the fact that many English-speakers prefer
or are more comfortable in other languages, bilinguals with the capacity to
speak English are equipped to adapt to a monolingual environment, or to
conform to the linguistic practices that are common to the largest group of
people in the workplace.
Second, limiting employers' discretion to use English-only rules as one
mechanism for managing a diverse workforce will sometimes be in tension
with other objectives of the civil rights laws. As the Title VII cases on the
subject reveal, employers often claim that English-only rules are necessary
to prevent employees from using non-English languages to intimidate fel-
low workers.113 In other words, an English-only rule might help prevent
race-based or sexual harassment from taking a particular form-the form of
a hostile, non-English-speaking environment. In addition, in an environ-
ment made up of speakers of multiple languages, the English-only rule puts
all minorities on a kind of equal footing, ensuring that the language most
113 See infra notes 311-16 (discussing employers' claim that English-only rules are necessary to
promote harmony in workplace).
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likely to be common to everyone in the workplace is the common language
of the workplace itself. Some workplaces will be diverse not just in a bi-
nary sense, with English and one other language being present, but also in a
multivalent sense, with a variety of languages present. In many of these in-
stances, one minority may be dominant and therefore capable of isolating
another minority.
But perhaps the most serious potential civil rights implication that
could result from linguistic diversity in the workplace is the possibility that
it will intensify the competition immigrants create for English-dominant
minorities, such as linguistically assimilated Hispanics or Asians, or Afri-
can Americans." 4 The use of non-English languages in the workplace could
keep employees who do not speak that language out of in-groups in the
workplace, or force them out of the workplace altogether."5 Both of these
consequences would thwart the integrative function a multiethnic workplace
might otherwise perform. They might also exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions
by heightening the sense that immigrants are taking away Americans'
jobs."
16
With respect to the first cost, it simply underscores what I already have
emphasized-that this debate implicates our understanding of what our
mainstream institutions ought to look like. The burden sharing I advocate,
which would require tolerance of the non-English languages spoken by bi-
linguals, despite their capacity to mitigate, would introduce into the debate
over language regulation the concept developed by linguists known as the
"communicative burden.""' The idea of the communicative burden cap-
tures the fact that all people, including speakers of the majority language,
bear a responsibility for helping to facilitate mutual understanding in situa-
tions where factors such as different accents or the speaking of different
languages introduce friction into interpersonal interaction.
The English-only rule places the communicative burden entirely on
one party. Indeed, we typically assume that the burden of communication
falls on the speaker with the non-dominant accent or language, who bears
the responsibility for making himself understood."8 Naturally, the non-
114 See Lichter & Waldinger, supra note 12, at 163 (noting that network recruiting in immigrant-
dense industries, such as furniture manufacturing and hospitality, has produced a monolingual, Spanish-
speaking workforce, which "impedes access to anyone who doesn't speak Spanish"); cf Hugh Davis
Graham, Affirmative Action for Immigrants? The Unintended Consequences of Reform, in COLOR
LINES, supra note 12, at 53-54 (exploring the conflict between "traditional" civil rights concerns and
immigration by discussing the ways in which the benefits of affirmative action have accrued to the for-
eign born, as opposed to native-born minorities).
115 See Lichter & Waldinger, supra note 12, at 157.
116 See, e.g., id. at 157 (recording the observation that African Americans do not last very long in
the furniture industry in Southern California because "[tihey don't want to be a minority").
117 See ROSINA LIPPI-GREEN, ENGLISH WITH AN ACCENT: LANGUAGE, IDEOLOGY, AND
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1997).
118 See Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence
for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991), for a discussion of the categorization of accents
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English-speaker should attempt to learn English. Bilinguals should be will-
ing to use English in linguistically mixed situations and refrain from using
their ability to speak a non-English language to separate themselves from
their co-workers. But the communicative burden runs both ways. At the
very least, monolingual English speakers should tolerate the speaking of
languages other than English in their presence. In a multilingual society,
the concept of the communicative burden must include acceptance of the
fact that one may not always understand what is happening in one's envi-
ronment. Everyone, including the bilingual, will find him or herself in this
position at some point, because of the multilingual character of our popula-
tion; a Spanish-speaking bilingual, while able to understand conversations
in English and Spanish, may also find himself in the presence of Korean, or
Polish, or Tagalog. And there is no principled reason (only a hegemonic
one) for monolingual English speakers to never have the sense of being in
the linguistic minority.
In fact, introducing the idea of the communicative burden into the
workplace setting could help address the problem of inter-group aversion
more generally. Studies of multi-ethnic workplaces sometimes suggest that
aversion to and anxiety over difference is common to all groups: Though
immigrants display some of the same aversions to working with African
Americans as native-born whites do, native-born whites and blacks also
share an aversion to their immigrant counterparts, particularly when it
comes to the question of language use.' But overcoming this aversion re-
quires two-way compromise. Employers should be permitted to require
employees who speak languages other than English to engage their co-
workers across linguistic lines, through English, when engaged in common
tasks. At the same time, native English speakers, whether white, black, La-
tino, or Asian, should be required to suppress some of their aversion as
well-a requirement that can be expressed through the rejection of blanket
English-only rules.
As for the issue of competing civil rights objectives, whether such con-
flicts arise will depend, in part, on whether the industry in question is made
up of a workforce that includes multiple minority groups. 2° But to the ex-
tent that such workplaces exist, it is not clear why an English-only rule
would resolve the conflicts that arise within them. The first and most obvi-
ous response to the claim that such rules are necessary to prevent harass-
ment is that blanket language restrictions offer a dramatically overinclusive
mechanism for dealing with abusive uses of language. It may be more dif-
ficult for supervisors who speak only English to police for harassment if
into the comprehensible and the non-comprehensible, and the failure of members of the majority to open
themselves up to comprehension.
"19 See Lichter & Waldinger, supra note 12, at 148.
120 See id. at 155-56 (noting that linguistic and educational differences, as well as the phenomenon
of network hiring, tend to separate blacks and Latinos, but noting that "in larger organizations, such as
hospitals or department stores," contact tends to occur).
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employees are speaking in a language other than English. But for the use of
non-English to work as a form of harassment, it must be accompanied by
tone or body language that actually makes it comprehensible as harassment
to the individual being targeted and, hence, to anyone in charge of prevent-
ing harassment. Second, it is by no means clear that an English-only rule
actually would make the workplace more harmonious. Particularly if the
larger minority's preference is for non-English, English-only rules are
likely to foster inter-group resentment.
Finally, the notion that the speaking of languages other than English
drives native-born minorities out of the workplace parallels the commonly
heard argument that immigration is to blame for the low wages and limited
opportunities of Americans at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. But
just as immigration represents but one of the forces that affect the opportu-
nities of low-wage workers, 2' the barriers that language difference might
create are but one of the factors that affect employment opportunities for
minorities in the labor markets of population centers to which immigrants
gravitate.' Allowing employers to adopt English-only rules is simply
unlikely to have much effect on broader trends in hiring. Language differ-
ence may sometimes be the catalyst for conflict in the workplace itself, but
it is not the underlying structural cause of interethnic competition in the
workforce more generally. In the end, it seems unlikely that expecting Eng-
lish-dominant minorities to bear some of the cost of the burden shifting de-
scribed above would contribute significantly to the reduction of other
minorities' employment opportunities.
3. Building Solidarity In and Out of the Workplace.-The justifica-
tion for an English-only rule is not limited to the reduction of friction in the
workplace. Establishing points of commonality within a diverse workforce
also serves the goal of generating solidarity among workers, a particularly
important objective in an institution where diverse groups come together
and significant relationships take shape. To justify a presumption against
English-only rules, it is not enough to establish that such a presumption en-
forces important norms of tolerance and burden sharing. It is also important
to explore the value that the ability to use non-English has to bilingual em-
ployees and to a multilingual public.
In a general sense, the idea that solidarity in the workplace depends on
all people speaking the same language at all times implies that everyone in
121 See Eduardo Porter, Cost of Illegal Immigration May Be Less Than Meets the Eye, N.Y. TIMES,
April 16, 2006, at 33 ("Even economists striving hardest to find evidence of immigration's effect on
domestic workers are finding that, at most, the surge of illegal immigrants probably had only a small
impact on wages of the least educated Americans-an effect that was likely swamped by all the other
things that hit the economy, from the revolution in technology to the erosion of the minimum wage's
buying power.").
122 See generally Lichter & Waldinger, supra note 12 (discussing network versus bureaucratic hir-
ing).
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the workforce is engaged in a simultaneous conversation. To be sure, re-
quiring employees to engage each other and the workplace's clientele
through a common language, which more often than not will be English,
always will be necessary to ensuring communication across linguistic lines.
But the claim that mutual intelligibility is always necessary and desirable
elides the fact that interactions in the workplace tend to be layered.
In reality, life in the workplace, like life elsewhere in a diverse and de-
centralized society, consists of a multitude of overlapping social interac-
tions, where multiple linguistic transactions occur simultaneously,
sometimes involving the same person or people. Imagine the hair or nail
salon, where employees simultaneously converse with each other and the
customer-the conversational equivalent of code switching; or the doctor's
lounge in a hospital where many different social conversations, as well as
conferences about shared patients, or other clinical matters, take place at the
same time; or the department store in any American city, where shoppers
communicate privately with one another in one language, at the same time
that they seek assistance from clerks in English, who may at the same time
be carrying on conversations with each other in yet another language. All
of these conversations can happen at once, and in multiple languages, with-
out everyone in the workplace space needing to understand what has been
said by every speaker.
If we understand the workplace in this multilayered sense, then the
contribution of the English-only rule to the building of solidarity seems
much less obvious. The multilayered insight makes clear that bonding can
happen through different means among different assortments of people-
that co-worker bonding is not a monolithic process. And if we understand
solidarity broadly and not in terms of fostering a single conversation, we
begin to see how the use of non-English in the workplace can actually fa-
cilitate the development of solidarity by allowing subgroups of workers to
communicate with one another in the manner that is most comfortable,
natural, and efficient. In fact, this multilayered conception of the workplace
makes English-only rules start to appear disruptive. Fear of discipline or
surveillance will restrain the bilingual worker in his interactions with cer-
tain fellow employees and the public.'23 Moreover, the trend toward lan-
guage regulation reflects the impulse, identified by Vicki Schultz, to
sanitize the workplace---or to scrub out the elements of affective life from
work life, for fear that the former might disrupt the latter.'24 But employees
123 See, e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Tex. 2000) ("On
a daily basis, the Hispanic employees of Premier were faced with the very real risk of being reprimanded
or even losing their jobs if they violated the English-only rule, even if such non-compliance were to be
inadvertent. There was no comparable risk posed by the policy for defendant's non-Hispanic employ-
ees.").
124 See Schultz, supra note 56, at 2069 ("Even more is at stake than whether or not people can form
close friendships at work: The larger question is whether we as a society can value the workplace as a
realm alive with personal intimacy, sexual energy, and 'humanness' more broadly. The same impulse
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have an interest in bringing aspects of their affective life into the workplace,
in large part because it facilitates the process of bonding with co-workers.
Interestingly, sensitivity to linguistic differences among employees has
had solidarity building effects of the more traditional, union-building type
in some contexts. In her study of union organizing among hotel workers in
San Francisco, for example, anthropologist Miriam Wells explored how
cultural and national diversity in the workforce has transformed organizing
efforts by unions. 2 ' To advance their solidarity building and collective ac-
tion promoting goals, organizers have adjusted their techniques based on
the ways in which ethnicity "structures the social relations within different
hotel occupations."1"6 In sectors such as housekeeping, where workers' re-
lationships revolve around a common language or background, organizers
speak those workers' native languages, and identify leaders within each of
the social subgroups that makes up the sector. Organizers then rely on
these leaders to facilitate communication between the union and the mem-
bers of each social subgroup, and encourage these leaders to work together
to develop a set of concerns shared by the sector as a whole.27
In other words, taking account of salient social groupings in the work-
place and then relying on the forms of socialization important to those
workers, such as their language, can facilitate the creation of common cause
across ethnic groups.'28 This study's conclusions thus help illuminate the
multilayered nature of interaction that characterizes most work settings.
They also underscore that making an effort to respect the way individuals
group themselves socially, whether through language or other characteris-
that would banish sexuality from the workplace also seeks to suppress other 'irrational' life experiences
such as birth and death, sickness and disability, aging and emotion of every kind.").
125 Miriam J. Wells, Immigration and Unionization in the San Francisco Hotel Industry, in
ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 109, 122
(Ruth Milkman ed., 2000).
126 Id. at 124.
127 See id. at 123. In other sectors, such as food service, where affiliations among workers cut
across ethnic lines and where workers all speak English, organizing efforts do not take ethnicity into ac-
count. See id And in still other sectors, such as dishwashing, a pan-ethnic social grouping that centers
around the Spanish language has emerged, such that even non-Latinos speak Spanish, and all organizing
occurs in Spanish. See id. at 124.
128 This salience is reflected in the phenomenon Wells describes whereby union contracts have
moved beyond "the narrow conditions of work" to address the social situations of particular groups. In
the case of immigrant workers, this shift has included acknowledgment of their limited ability to speak
English, as well as their "multilinguality." Id. at 129. Indeed, the importance workers place on being
permitted to speak their native languages is reflected in a clause negotiated by the union Wells studied in
its 1986-89 contract. The contract provided that "in cases where it is appropriate to a particular job and
where it is advantageous to the Hotel to have a position staffed by a multilingual employee, the Hotel
recognizes this as an asset." Id. at 126. Wells refers to this provision as "highly valued by workers,"
and suggests that it was negotiated in response to supervisors insisting that employees speak only Eng-
lish on the job, which workers experienced as "gratuitous and belittling, as well as dishonest, since,
given the substantial share of foreign-born guests, employers benefited from their multilinguality." Id.
at 126-27.
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tics, can produce genuine solidarity over issues of common concern. As
Wells puts it, "to ground union solidarity in the natural relations of ac-
quaintanceship and trust among workers ... organizers will need to attend
to the varied ways that immigrant backgrounds affect social relations at
work."' 29
Of course, if we set solidarity building, in and out of the workplace, as
our goal, a conception of the workplace that perpetuates subgroups is sub-
ject to the critique that it promotes self segregation in the workplace. Such
segregation makes it less likely that cross-cultural relationships will form in
and out of the workplace. The cost of such segregation in the workplace, in
particular, seems all the more serious in light of Estlund's work, discussed
above. Under this view, employers who impose English-only rules are not
simply acting in their perceived self interests, but arguably in the social in-
terest as well, by facilitating cross-group relationships through the require-
ment that everyone speak the same language.
But while the apprehension over self-segregation reflects legitimate
concerns, there are at least two reasons to reject it as a basis for imposing an
English-only requirement on the workplace. On the one hand, there are in-
tuitive reasons to believe that the assumption of self-segregation is over-
blown. Whether or not employees of different groups enter the workplace
with the intention of forming social relationships with their co-workers, re-
lationships will form naturally through the process of actually working to-
gether. Working together will give rise to a desire to cross linguistic
boundaries in the non-job-related contexts of the workplace. 3 ° What is
more, given that many workplaces consist of workers with various degrees
of English language ability, prohibiting the speaking of other languages
may actually interfere with communication between those who speak little
or no English and those who speak only English; without the bilingual as a
facilitator, a significant bridge between two groups of people in the work-
place is lost.
On the other hand, people also should be free to develop the social re-
lationships of their choosing in the workplace. Speaking the same language
is no guarantee of affinity. Indeed, one study of workplaces in Southern
California revealed that tension among Latino immigrants from different
parts of Latin America pervaded the workplace-a phenomenon that comes
as a surprise to many non-Latino managers.1' Nor is there any guarantee
that people will not still affiliate with their own group, regardless of
whether they are forced to speak English even when another language
129 Id. at 128.
130 See, e.g., PEW HISPANIC CTR., supra note 49, at 2 (noting the dominance of English-language
usage by bilingual Latinos in the workplace, suggesting that Latino bilinguals either prefer to speak Eng-
lish or speak English in order to communicate with their monolingual colleagues, indicating that Latino
bilinguals do not tend to separate themselves from their colleagues through linguistic means).
131 Lichter & Waldinger, supra note 12, at 158.
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would be more natural. People tend to seek out others with similar interests
or backgrounds, and two major determining factors of commonality are race
and culture. As noted above, resisting this tendency through regulation may
be counterproductive; prohibiting workers from speaking the language that
is most natural to them seems likely to engender resentment, or a sense of
second class status. Language regulation is also coercive and infantilizing.
Employees in a given workplace may ultimately decide to cross cultural
boundaries, or they may form relationships primarily within their own cul-
tural spheres. But resistance of the sort I advocate to regulation of language
usage places confidence in the good will of employees, rather than in the ex
ante judgments of the employer, to make this decision.
And by enabling freedom of association in the workplace, my frame-
work also promotes important associative interests outside the workplace.
English-only rules have several consequences that extend beyond the inter-
ests of employees qua employees--consequences that can be prevented by
restraining employers from adopting English-only rules. First, ridding the
workplace of characteristics such as multilingualism creates a structural
mismatch between the workplace and the community in which it is located
and in which it may have a significant presence. Second, by not allowing
speakers of non-English to use their language in the workplace setting, em-
ployers make it that much more difficult for communities in which non-
English is spoken to sustain the linguistic ties that give them their particular
character. In other words, by eliminating a sphere of life in which non-
English operates as a functional language, employers speed the process of
linguistic assimilation.
For many observers, these potential consequences of English-only
rules may seem like welcome ones. But for reasons I explain in detail
elsewhere, this possibility is one we should lament and strive to avoid.'32
The existence of vital linguistic subcommunities and bilingual individuals
who can cross between those communities and other sectors of society is
important to facilitating the process of immigrant assimilation. In addition,
linguistic subcommunities enrich the lives of their members and add to the
associative options available to individuals. We therefore should attend to
how the rules governing important institutions like the workplace affect
communities outside the workplace-something employers are unlikely to
take into consideration, given that their focus will be on how to maximize
t32 In Language and Participation, supra note 4, 1 make pragmatic as well as identity-based argu-
ments against rules that speed assimilation through coercion. In brief, maintaining bilingual capacity, in
individuals and in communities, is essential to ensuring that immigrant communities integrate into
American society. Bilinguals perform an essential bridging function between non-English speaking
communities, which immigration will keep replenishing, and society at large. See id. Indeed, this ca-
pacity for bridging is reflected in the account of union organizing in San Francisco discussed above.
What is more, maintaining a diversity of linguistic communities gives the United States an advantage
abroad in both business and in international relations, and the persistence of vital linguistic communities
makes our cultural life and the lives of individuals richer, not poorer.
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workplace output without regard to spheres that are only ancillary to the
workplace. 33
Transforming resistance to language regulation into a set of best prac-
tices for employers would not preclude leaving employers with the discre-
tion to take disciplinary action against employees who use language
difference to harass other workers, or to exacerbate social tensions in the
workplace. Within the framework I articulate, employers would remain
free to apply English-only rules to particular workers who have displayed a
pattern of aggressive behavior, using a language other workers do not un-
derstand in order to isolate or intimidate, or to particular work settings
where such behavior has been observed. The framework would make
room, for example, for the outcome in cases such as Dimaranan v. Pomona
Valley Hospital Medical Center, in which a district court in the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected the challenge of a Tagalog-speaking nurse to a no-Tagalog re-
quirement, finding that the head of the ward where she worked had adopted
the rule in response to the plaintiff's abusive behavior toward the other
nurses in the ward.'34 My framework, instead, rejects prophylactic rules
through which employers enshrine a general discomfort with the unfamiliar,
thereby imposing anti-social constraints on the workplace.
II. MOVING BEYOND THE TITLE VII PARADIGM
As befits the distinctively American transformation of the workplace
described above, civil rights litigation has become an important mechanism
for evaluating language rules in the workplace. Many workers who have
been affected by English-only rules have turned to Title VII to challenge
them, and it has been through Title VII litigation that the social significance
of these rules has begun to be understood, at least by lawyers. Any consid-
eration of English-only workplace rules must therefore explore how this
body of law has shaped our understanding of the meaning and legitimacy of
English-only rules in the workplace.
For the most part, plaintiffs have challenged English-only workplace
rules under Title VII's disparate-impact theory of liability. Plaintiffs typi-
cally contend that English-only rules have a disparate impact on national
origin minorities-one of the classes singled out by Title VII for protection.
At the end of the day, most plaintiffs in lawsuits involving English-only
rules articulate the harm they have experienced as Title VII requires them to
133 It may be the case that community-minded employers will have altruistic tendencies to respect
the interests of the communities they serve, and some employers, in adopting English-only rules, may
well believe they are serving the interests of the community by promoting the use of English (though no
employer in the Title VII cases that have been litigated has come forward with this type of justification).
It is nonetheless reasonable to assume that preserving linguistic subcommunities is unlikely to rise to the
top of most employers' lists of objectives.
134 775 F. Supp. 338 (C.D. Cal. 1991), withdrawn, No. 89 4299 ER (JRX), 1993 WL 326559 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 17, 1993).
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do-in dignitary terms and citing the language of harassment and oppres-
sion to describe the impact of workplace language policies.'35
I do not doubt the sincerity of most such claims; it is not hard to imag-
ine feeling demeaned or disadvantaged by an order to cease using one's na-
tive language because of the stress it causes others.'36 But my aim in the
preceding Part was to demonstrate that the dignitary effects of the English-
only rule are not the sole, or even the primary, consequence of language
rules. Even if the dignitary harms such rules cause are not severe enough to
motivate any single individual to seek employment in a workplace without
language rules, the rules nonetheless threaten alienation in a manner that
has social consequence. With their fixation on the dignitary interests of the
individual, the federal courts in Title VII cases have missed what is perhaps
the most serious consequence of the English-only workplace rule: the crea-
tion of a social space that is both less fluid than and less reflective of the
social dynamics of the world that surrounds it. But a consideration of the
Title VII litigation that has been pursued nonetheless will be instructive.
An analysis of the reported cases will sharpen our sense of what is at stake
for the employer, employees, immigrant communities, and an American so-
ciety at large struggling to make sense of diversity in the workplace.
A. The Parameters Set by Title VII
For decades, courts have been categorizing English-only cases with
suits that allege trait-based discrimination, or discrimination on the basis of
characteristics that correlate with race or sex, such as hair and dress
styles.'37 As early as 1973, the Hernandez v. Erlenbusch court framed the
English-only question as a kind of second-generation antidiscrimination
problem. The court observed that while the more "overt forms of racial dis-
crimination" had been cast aside, racially discriminatory attitudes remained
135 Indeed, opponents of such rules have made the dignitary claim in various forms. See, e.g., Lisa
L. Behm, Protecting Linguistic Minorities Under Title VII. The Need for Judicial Deference to the
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 569 (1998) (calling
for the amendment of Title VII to include language); Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluat-
ing "National Origin" Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1994) (arguing
that Title VII should be amended to include traits associated with ethnicity); Matsuda, supra note 118
(detailing the harms caused by accent-based discrimination).
136 At the same time, it seems quite likely that for any given individual who has the capacity to
speak English, a language restriction in the workplace might not be experienced as a significant digni-
tary harm. Many individuals may well regard such rules as standard operating procedure in an English-
dominant society-a cost they are obligated to accept, and certainly not a cost high enough to motivate
them to seek alternative employment. For other individuals, other sorts of behavioral restrictions, such
as the requirements that one wear a funny uniform, or refrain from making personal phone calls, may
seem far more demeaning. In other words, the fact that language restrictions restrain individual self-
expression or demean those who speak other languages does not necessarily distinguish them from many
other types of behavior restrictions in the workplace.
137 See infra notes 142-50 (discussing Title VII cases in which courts have dealt with language in
terms of national origin).
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and were embodied in the sentiments of the tavern owners and the custom-
ers they claimed to represent.'38 The court emphasized that the civil rights
laws were limited tools with which to handle social attitudes concerning ra-
cial minorities,'39 but nonetheless concluded that such laws have a role to
play in determining whether, when, and how race-based or cultural traits
should be regulated or protected. Though the § 1982 matter at issue in Her-
nandez appears to be settled, the underlying question with which that court
struggled-how to deal with the racial discrimination that may lurk behind
policies that regulate personal characteristics-still vexes courts and schol-
ars. 1
40
Among scholars, exploring the assimilationist expectations the law im-
poses on bearers of cultural traits-particularly traits over which individuals
are thought to have control, such as language usage by a bilingual-has be-
come central to understanding how law and society encourage or require as-
similation. As Kenji Yoshino has argued,
[T]he contemporary forms of discrimination to which racial minorities and
women are most vulnerable often take the guise of enforced covering. A
member of a racial minority cannot be sanctioned for failing to convert or to
pass without having a Title VII employment discrimination claim. But he can
be sanctioned for failing to cover-for wearing comrows, for lapsing into
Spanish, or for speaking with an accent.
141
Whether one believes that all, most, or few assimilationist expectations are
legitimate, the need to make sense of the social status of salient cultural
traits remains a critical civil rights issue, particularly in light of the immi-
gration trends I discussed at the outset of this Article.
Of course, any such discussion necessarily will run up against the dif-
ficulty of determining which traits should be protected. Should we protect
all, some, or none of the traits that might be correlated to race or ethnicity?
Should we focus on how pervasively a personal characteristic is held or
claimed by particular communities? Language may be a characteristic more
universally held by national origin or racial minorities than particular hair
or dress styles. But, then, should we consider with what level of regard par-
ticular individuals hold their various personal characteristics? Language
usage may be critical to one worker, whereas another might consider his or
138 Hemandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752, 753 (D. Or. 1973).
139 Id. at 754 ("[T]his case illustrates the difficulty inherent in judicial responses to the subtleties of
racial attitudes when confined to the crude statutory implement of a damage award.").
140 See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002). In his identification and analysis of
the phenomenon of "covering," the version of assimilation whereby a person neither hides nor alters his
underlying identity, but rather downplays it, Yoshino explores the pressures law and society place on
women, minorities, and gays to suppress characteristics correlated with their identities. See id. But see
RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE (2005) (criticizing theories of antidiscrimi-
nation law that treat race as culture and therefore focus protection on so-called "cultural traits," such as
grooming practices).
141 Yoshino, supra note 140, at 781.
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her manner of dress, or self-presentation, to be at the core of his or her iden-
tity. And should we also be concerned with the effects of certain personal-
ity characteristics on the workplace?
1. Failed Legal Challenges.-As the following discussion will make
clear, courts have answered these questions by invoking the concept of im-
mutability. Courts are more likely to treat traits over which the bearer has
no control as protected by Title VII than traits individuals can alter or sup-
press. Perhaps this immutability standard offers the best way through these
thorny issues-a way that keeps a lid on what otherwise would be an end-
less litany of trait-based complaints. As I explain below, however, not only
does the immutability standard not really address the core problem with
English-only rules, but the English-only cases offer an alternative means of
sorting through the cultural trait cases that will offset some of the arbitrari-
ness of the courts' focus on immutability.
Two courts of appeals cases, by and large, have set the parameters of
the debate in the language context. The Fifth Circuit had the first say in its
1980 decision, Garcia v. Gloor.'42 The court made clear its view that Title
VII was not intended to protect employees against all arbitrary employment
practices, noting that Title VII "does not forbid employers to hire only per-
sons born under a certain sign of the zodiac."'43 The court went on to em-
phasize that Title VII's prohibitions are directed only at certain forms of
discrimination, or discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin."'" In defining national origin, the court noted that it was not
to be confused with "ethnic or sociocultural traits."'45 According to the
court, with the exception of religion:
[T]he discriminations on which the Act focuses its laser of prohibition are
those that are either beyond the victim's power to alter ... or that impose a
burden on an employee on one of the prohibited bases .... Equal employment
opportunity may be secured only when employers are barred from discriminat-
ing against employees on the basis of immutable characteristics, such as race
and national origin .... But a hiring policy that distinguishes on some other
ground, such as grooming codes or length of hair, is related more closely to the
employer's choice of how to run his business than to equality of employment
opportunity. 14
In other words, because an employee (at least a nominally bilingual one)
has control over the language she speaks, an employer's rule prohibiting
that employee from speaking non-English does not fall within the category
of employment practices Congress intended Title VII to prohibit.
142 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
143 Id. at 269.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. (quotation omitted).
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The Ninth Circuit's analysis in its 1993 case, Garcia v. Spun Steak
Co.,47 solidified the conventional legal wisdom on the subject. The Spun
Steak court acknowledged that English-only rules could have a disparate
impact on national origin minorities when applied to workers unable to
speak English, or workers unable to comply with the rules. 4' But, the court
concluded, workers with the capacity to comply with English-only rules,
i.e., bilinguals, cannot rely on the existence of such rules to establish the
prima facie case necessary for carrying forward with a disparate impact
claim.'49 Put slightly differently, such rules may well have a disparate im-
pact on national origin minorities, but only when the minorities in question
lack the capacity to speak English at all. Bilinguals, on the other hand, will
not make it past the prima facie case stage of their Title VII case by citing
the mere existence of an English-only policy.
Of course, the effects of English-only rules, when applied to bilinguals,
are almost as likely to be felt disproportionately by national origin minori-
ties as when the rules are applied to non-English speakers. And so the
court's distinction between monolinguals and bilinguals makes little ana-
lytical sense, unless we understand the impact on each of the two groups as
distinct. Some courts' willingness to understand the impact on non-English
speakers as a legally cognizable one arguably reflects the intuition that dis-
abling an employee from speaking altogether would be inhumane-that it
would effectively force his or her complete withdrawal inward. When the
courts perceive that employees have the capacity to adjust to an English-
only regime however, the connection between the harm felt by the plaintiff
and the objectives of the civil rights laws is severed. As the Fifth Circuit
concluded in Gloor, there can be "no disparate impact if the rule" is one
that employees can readily observe; non-observance becomes "a matter of
individual preference."'50 The ability to comply-to engage in self-help, as
discussed in Part I-renders the effects of such rules mere inconveniences.
The disparate-impact theory of liability, under this view, does not protect
workers against asymmetrical burdens of all kinds; mere inconveniences,
no matter whom they affect, are simply not legally cognizable.
Before we consider why this individualized conception of harm is mis-
guided, it is worth pausing on the courts' reasoning in the English-only
cases to come to a clear understanding of what that individualized concep-
tion is. The Ninth Circuit's split decision in Spun Steak is particularly help-
ful in unwrapping what the courts understand to be at stake, as it lays out
147 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
148 See id. at 1488 ("As applied '[t]o a person who speaks only one tongue or to a person who has
difficulty using another language than the one spoken in his home,' an English-only rule might well
have an adverse impact." (quoting Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270)); see also Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270 (noting
that language might be an immutable characteristic for those who are not multilingual, suggesting that
such individuals might be able to demonstrate the impact required for liability under Title VII).
149 See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487-88.
150 618 F.2d at 270.
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and rejects various theories of legal harm. The plaintiffs in the case-
Spanish-speaking, bilingual workers at a meatpacking plant'5l-claimed
that the company's rule, which prohibited them from speaking Spanish ex-
cept during their free time, imposed a burdensome term of employment
"and denie[d] them a privilege of employment that non-Spanish-speaking
workers enjoy[ed]."'52 The court began by explaining the disparate impact
theory of liability. According to the court, workplace rules that impose
harsher burdens on certain groups, regardless of whether those burdens re-
flect the intent to treat the group differently, "may operate as barriers to
equality in the workplace."'53 At the same time, in constructing his prima
facie case, a plaintiff must show that the employer's policy had a discerni-
ble impact on the terms and conditions of employment and then prove that
the impact was actually significant.'54
In the panel majority's view, none of the theories of harm offered by
the plaintiffs rose to the requisite level of significance. First, Title VII does
not protect the worker's ability "to express [his] cultural heritage" on the
job.'55 The plaintiffs' claims to this effect, under the court's analysis, re-
flected an unfounded expectation that Title VII protect his purely expressive
interests. The substance of both the claim and the court's rejection of it was
that speaking a language other than English is intended to signify a kind of
ethnic solidarity. Leaving aside for the moment that the speaking of Eng-
lish is never characterized as an expression of culture, the court easily dis-
pensed with the plaintiffs' claim to celebrate his identity.
Second, though the court recognized that the ability to converse in the
workplace constitutes a privilege of employment, and a particularly signifi-
cant one in an assembly line job, the plaintiffs' ability to speak English, in
the court's view, was sufficient to guarantee the privilege.'56 Just as an em-
ployer can ban the discussion of inappropriate topics, he can regulate the
language in which conversation takes place. 57 Here, again, the court recog-
nized the employer's authority to regulate the manner of expression on the
151 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488. One of the original plaintiffs was a monolingual Spanish speaker
who stated in her deposition that she was not bothered by the rule "because she preferred not to make
small talk on the job." Id. The Court found, given this and other evidence, that the district court's grant
of summary judgment for the plaintiffs was inappropriate and that remand was necessary to determine
whether the policy adversely affected her. See id. In addition, the employer permitted the clean-up
crew, which included one employee who spoke no English, to communicate in Spanish while on the job
and authorized the foreman to speak Spanish, as well. Id. at 1483.
152 Id. at 1485.
153 Id. ("[Title VII's] phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congres-
sional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment .... " (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1985)) (suggesting that the disparate impact theory of liability was intended to
be far reaching)).
154 See id. at 1486-88.
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job and then assumed that the speaking of another language is analogous to
the expression of ideas or opinions. The court's only linguistic or expres-
sive concern seemed to be whether the employer effectively had silenced
the worker. Nothing short of a constructive gag order could have legal im-
plications for the purposes of Title VII.
Finally, in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim that the rule gave rise to an
isolating and intimidating environment, the court rejected the EEOC's
guideline that presumes such rules to be discriminatory.158 The court rea-
soned that whether such rules infected the workplace to the point of creating
a hostile environment represents an entirely factual question, not a conclu-
sion that can simply be presumed.'59 In the court's estimation, because the
Spanish speakers at the Spun Steak company had the ability to comply with
the rule, its enforcement did not threaten to exacerbate workplace tensions
or to isolate the affected workers. 60
By and large, the district courts in other circuits have followed the
Gloor and Spun Steak lines of analysis.' 6' In Kania v. Archdiocese of
Philadelphia, for example, the court rejected a challenge brought by a
church's Polish-speaking housekeeper to the church's English-only policy,
foregrounding her ability to speak English.'62 Though the policy applied "at
lunch, on break, and in non-public areas" of the workplace,'63 the court
hewed closely to the volition theory of impact.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See id; cf Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., No. 95-1986, 1996 WL 281954 (4th Cir. May 29,
1996). The appellants in Long alleged that the manager of the bank where they were employed told
them they were forbidden from speaking Spanish, except when assisting Spanish-speaking customers.
1996 WL 281954, at *1. After orally reiterating the prohibition, the bank manager issued a memo to all
bank employees outlining the rule as "bank policy." When one of the Spanish-speaking employees re-
fused to sign the memo, she was subjected to disciplinary action. The district court rejected the employ-
ees' claims, and the Fourth Circuit found that there was no direct evidence of retaliation against the
worker and granted summary judgment to the employer. Id.
161 See, e.g., Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Va. 1995). The district court
in this case rejected plaintiffs' challenge, citing the employer's claim that it adopted the policy because
the Spanish-speaking employees were creating a hostile environment through the speaking of Spanish.
Following the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove the ex-
istence of adverse effects from the policy and rejected the notion that the plaintiffs had the right to ex-
press their cultural heritage on the job. For the court, the fact that the bank sought to hire Spanish
speakers for their language ability was evidence that the employer's benign explanation for its rule was
credible. See id.; see also Tran v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Kan. 1998) (re-
jecting plaintiffs claims on grounds that there was no evidence of a hostile work environment because
the rules were not strictly enforced (some employees were still able to speak Vietnamese openly) and
accepting employer's claim that rule was necessary to ensure that all employees understood each other,
to prevent injury through effective communication, and to prevent workers from feeling they were being
talked about by others).
162 14 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (dismissing Title VII challenge to English-only rule on a
12(b)(6) motion, in light of plaintiffs failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, given the
absence of unlawful disparate impact).
163 Id. at 731.
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Two instructive asymmetries emerged from the court's analysis in
Kania. First, though the court's holding that the plaintiff had failed to make
out a prima facie case of discrimination obviated the need for an analysis of
the employer's business justification, the court nonetheless criticized the
worker for thinking it would be permissible to speak Polish on the job, ob-
serving that the employer had the authority to prohibit the speaking of non-
English on the grounds that it is offensive to speak a language others in the
parish could not understand."6 Here, again, the idea of self-help looms
large, for the court does not entertain the flipside of the rationale it ac-
cepts-that it would be offensive to speak English around a non-English
speaking member of the parish. The asymmetry implicit in the court's rea-
soning either reflects a sense of entitlement based on the social dominance
of English (which would clearly and sensibly justify speaking English in the
presence of those who do not understand English), or a belief that the bur-
den to ameliorate the cognitive dissonance that arises when more than one
language is spoken in a single space falls on the bilingual speaker.
Second, the court notes that the plaintiff did not come forward with
evidence that the rule created a hostile environment,'65 which certainly begs
the question of what evidence, other than self-serving statements on the part
of the plaintiff, could be expected of her."6 At the same time, the court as-
sumed that the speaking of languages other than English would cause
harm-that the non-Polish speakers of the parish would take offense at or
be alienated by hearing the church housekeeper speak in her native lan-
guage. For this court, the intrusiveness of the non-English language was
self-evident, whereas the hostility of a rule that prohibited one from using
non-English had to meet undefined but apparently exacting standards of
proof. Indeed, courts such as this one have turned the hostile work envi-
ronment theory of discrimination on its head by using the very same theory
to amplify the employer's authority to regulate the workplace for the sake
of the monolingual English speaker.
2. The EEOC's Successes.-At the same time that Spun Steak seems
to stand as the preeminent authority in this area, in recent years, some dis-
agreement over the legality of English-only rules has emerged in the courts,
and the EEOC has settled a number of high-profile suits challenging the
English-only practice. One court, for example, has taken issue with other
courts' rejection of the EEOC guideline, which provides that an English-
only rule creates an "inference" that national origin minority employees
164 See id. at 736; cf Long, 1996 WL 281954. As noted above, see supra note 99 and accompany-
ing text, the memo outlining the bank's policy expressed a similar sentiment: "This all boils down to
common courtesy. How would you feel if everyone around you were speaking and laughing aloud in a
language that you could not understand." Id. at * I n.3.
165 Kania, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 735-36.
166 See, e.g., EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911,914 (N.D. Il. 1999).
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have been disadvantaged. In EEOC v. Synchro-Start Products,16 7 the court
heard a Title VII suit brought by Spanish- and Polish-speaking workers
challenging a rule that required employees to speak only English during the
workday. On the employer's motion to dismiss, the court began its analysis
by taking note of the overwhelming weight of authority in the federal courts
on the subject)68 But the court then made clear that it was "writing on a
clean slate."'69 It could go beyond the easy case of the non-English speak-
ing employee and find it possible to impose liability "across a broader spec-
trum," perhaps even protecting those workers who could readily comply
with the company's English-only policy. 7' In reaching this conclusion, the
court ultimately credited the EEOC's guideline and ordered the employer to
answer the EEOC's complaint. 7 '
Another court has expressed skepticism of the dominant view that bi-
linguals are not harmed by English-only rules. In 2000, a magistrate judge
in Dallas awarded thirteen Latino employees $700,000 in damages after
finding the English-only rule of Premier Operator Services, a long distance
service, unlawful.'72 The rule, which the employer primarily applied to
Mexican-American employees it had hired because of their Spanish speak-
ing ability, banned the speaking of languages other than English at all
times, including during lunch and other breaks.
173
167 Id.
168 Id. at 912-13.
169 Id. at 913.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 914-915. In crediting the EEOC's guideline, the court took issue with the Ninth Circuit's
rejection of the guideline, Id. (citing Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993)). This differ-
ence of approach implicates an important subtext of these decisions: the scope of the EEOC's authority
to define what constitutes national origin discrimination. The Ninth Circuit's view in Spun Steak was
that the EEOC, by presuming that an English-only rule creates a hostile environment, had shifted the
burden of proof, which Title VII places on the plaintiff, onto the employer. See 998 F.2d 1480. Accord-
ing to the court in Synchro-Start, however, the rule merely moves the inquiry to the second step pre-
scribed by Title VIl-to the inquiry into the employer's business necessity justification. See 29 F. Supp.
2d at 914. The court noted that the EEOC's guideline makes sense, for the only way an employee can
prove the negative effects of an English-only rule would be through conclusory and self-serving state-
ments. The guideline, in the court's view, represents a reasonable way of expressing this reality. Id.
172 EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (N.D. Tex. 2000); see also Rivera
v. Baccarat, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 9478 MBM JCF, 1997 WL 777887 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (order denying de-
fendant's motion to exclude evidence); Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n,
supra note 47. In Rivera, a magistrate judge rejected an employer's motion to exclude evidence of any
policy by the employer forbidding its employees from speaking languages other than English on the job.
1997 WL 777887. In permitting the evidence as part of a broader Title VII and ADEA suit, the court
observed that even Spun Steak recognized the relevance of some English-only rules to a finding of na-
tional origin discrimination. The court emphasized that the enforcement of English-only rules could rise
to the level of harassment, exacerbating tensions in the workplace, even if the policy on its own was not
sufficient to prove discrimination. Id.
173 Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1068-69.
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The key development in this case was the court's expression of am-
bivalence with respect to the immutability paradigm. The court initially ob-
served that our society's most discriminatory practices, such as segregated
bathrooms and water fountains, have been unobtrusive in terms of ability to
comply. 74 In other words, a worker's ability to abide by the rule is not it-
self proof that the rule does not have pernicious consequences. At the same
time, the court relied heavily on expert testimony by a linguistics professor
from the University of Pittsburgh, who testified that "adhering to an Eng-
lish-only requirement is not simply a matter of preference for Hispanics, or
other persons who are bilingual speakers, but that such restraint can be vir-
tually impossible in many cases."'75 She emphasized that bilinguals code
switch, or switch from English to their native or primary language, when
engaged in informal conversation with members of their cultural group.'76
The court credited these claims and concluded that code switching cannot
simply be "turned off."' 77
But then, even after establishing immutability, the court went on to ex-
plore the effects of the English-only rule on the dynamics of the workplace.
The rule required supervisors to monitor conversations and threaten em-
ployees with discipline, practices that could result in oppressive surveil-
lance. The court characterized the rule as a tool of intimidation and
emphasized that the rule, by definition, created a heightened risk of termi-
nation for the Spanish-speaking employees.' The court seemed to be sug-
gesting that the rule created an anxiety-tinged atmosphere for bilingual
employees, who were forced to be on guard constantly to avoid violating
the policy.'79 The court awarded the plaintiffs compensatory and punitive
damages and thus cleared a narrow path for employees seeking to challenge
English-only rules in the workplace. 8'
In addition to challenging the prevailing view that bilinguals' use of
non-English is a matter of choice, this case signals disagreement with other
courts' rejection of the EEOC's conclusion that English-only rules pre-
sumptively create a hostile working environment.'' In this same vein, the
174 Id. at 1075 (citing Spun Steak, 13 F.3d at 298 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en
banc)).
175 Id. at 1069-70.
176 Id. at 1070.
177 Id. In addition, the court emphasized that the English-only rule imposed a stigma on the Mexi-
can-American employees, which was compounded by the fact that the posting of the language policy
was accompanied by a sign advising that "[a]bsolutely no Guns, Knives or Weapons of any kind" were
allowed on the premises, thus identifying Spanish-speaking with threatening behavior. Id. at 1068-69.
178 Id. at 1075-76.
179 Id. at 1070, 1075-76
180 Id. at 1077-78.
181 Despite rejecting the hostile environment claim, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless acknowledged
that an English-only rule could become part of a larger work environment hostile to national origin mi-
norities. See Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993).
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Tenth Circuit recently reversed a district court's grant of summary judg-
ment to the city of Altus, Oklahoma, which had adopted an English-only
policy for its employees.' 82 The court found that the plaintiff employees
had produced evidence on which a reasonable juror could rely to find that a
hostile work environment existed. 83  The fact that their manager had in-
formed them of the policy in private, for fear that other employees would
learn of it and use it to harass plaintiffs, suggested to the Court that the city
knew the policy might become the source of a hostile work environment. 84
And, in fact, plaintiffs testified that they had been taunted as a result of the
policy and been made to feel like second-class citizens.'85
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the very fact of the policy could
reasonably be construed as an "expression of hostility to Hispanics," cou-
pled with the court's willingness to take account of plaintiffs' subjective
impressions, moves the Tenth Circuit, like the Dallas magistrate judge, be-
yond the Spun Steak court's grudging acceptance of the possibility that a
hostile work environment claim might be viable.'86 The Tenth Circuit thus
has suggested a viable Title VII strategy for challenging English-only rules,
albeit one that requires plaintiffs to characterize their work experiences as
ones of marginalization.
That this particular door has been left open may be influencing the
EEOC's case selection as it pursues its national enforcement strategy
against English-only rules. Indeed, in addition to this emerging dissension
in the federal courts, the EEOC continues to challenge employers' language
practices. In November 1998, the EEOC reached a $133,000 settlement
with and secured injunctive relief against two medical service providers in
the Bronx in a suit arising from those employers' English-only rules.'87 The
case began as a sexual harassment charge, the investigation of which led to
the discovery of the unwritten English-only policy, under which employees
were told to speak English at all times, apparently because a supervisor was
unable to understand Spanish.'88 According to the plaintiffs, workers were
ordered to end phone conversations in Spanish, whether the calls were per-
182 See Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1306 (10th Cir. 2006).
183 See id.
184 See id. at 1304.
185 See id.
186 See id. at 1304-05. The Spun Steak court acknowledged that an English-only rule might become
part of a larger work environment hostile to national origin minorities. See Garcia, 998 F.2d at 1489.
187 Settlement Resolves Sexual Harassment, Retaliation, 'English-Only' Policy Complaints, DAILY
LABOR, Nov. 20, 1998, at A-7 [hereinafter Settlement Resolves]; see also Press Release, U.S. Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Comm'n, supra note 47 (documenting $192,500 settlement in English-only law-
suit against Watlow Batavia, an Illinois subsidiary of Watlow Electrical Manufacturing Co., in case in
which eight former assembly line workers in suburban Chicago plant challenged their employer's Eng-
lish-only policy).
188 See Settlement Resolves, supra note 187.
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sonal or work-related.'89 And, in 1999, the Commission brought suit against
a Chicago hair salon alleging that the salon employed discriminatory rules
to "wipe out" its Hispanic hair stylists.' At the heart of the salon's prac-
tices, the EEOC claimed, was management's practice of repeatedly warning
stylists not to speak Spanish under any circumstances. 9'
Recent court victories may also explain the willingness of some em-
ployers to settle, despite the paucity of court victories for plaintiffs.'92 In a
particularly high profile case, the EEOC negotiated a $1.5 million settle-
ment in a suit against a Colorado casino alleging that it "verbally harassed
and subjected a class of Hispanic employees to unlawful 'English-only'
Rules."' 93  The language requirements had arisen informally within the
managerial hierarchy when the human-resources director, without the
knowledge of the casino owner, instructed supervisors in the housekeeping
department that English was the official language of the casino. Workers
alleged that managers and other employees shouted "English, English" at
them in the hallways,'94 creating a climate of distress and embarrassment.
As part of the settlement, the EEOC required the casino to make clear that
no blanket prohibition against the speaking of non-English governed the
workplace,'95 thereby ameliorating the isolation effects of the limitation.
In 2003, on the heels of these settlements, the New York City office of
the EEOC brought two class action suits challenging the enforcement of
broad English-only rules in the workplace. In its claim against a local out-
post of the Sephora Cosmetics franchise, the Commission bases its theory
of liability on the claim that the store deprived plaintiffs of equal employ-
ment opportunities and otherwise adversely affected their status as employ-
ees. "'96 In the complaint, employees at a New York City store allege that
they were told by management employees to speak English, including at
break times. After the employees filed charges with the EEOC about the
policy, corporate headquarters issued a nationwide memo reminding its re-
tailers of the company's English-only rule.'9 7
In March 2006, the EEOC settled the case it had brought in 2003
against the Upper East Side's multi-star Melrose Hotel, whose management
had established a rule requiring employees to speak only English at all
times, including during breaks. The Hotel agreed to pay thirteen plaintiffs
$800,000 in damages, and the consent decree that resulted from the settle-
189 See id
190 EEOC Alleges, supra note 30.
191 See id.
192 See supra notes 187-90 (discussing recent settlements in English-only cases).
193 Colorado Casino to Pay, supra note 29.
194 See id
195 See id.
196 Complaint, EEOC v. Sephora USA, No. 03 CV 8821 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2003).
197 See id at 8.
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ment prohibits the company that owned the hotel, which closed in July
2005, from adopting English-only rules for its employees.'9 8 In its original
complaint, the Commission offered two legal theories to support its claim
that the rule constituted national origin discrimination. According to the
plaintiffs, the rule not only imposed discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment, it also gave rise to a hostile work environment under which
employees had been reprimanded even for speaking Spanish to Spanish-
speaking hotel guests.' 99
In sum, these efforts of the last several years represent part of a na-
tional strategy by the EEOC to target English-only workplace rules. As
noted previously, the EEOC's position long has been that English-only
rules may constitute unlawful national origin discrimination under Title
VII.20 In some versions of its compliance manuals, the Commission has
observed that, "such rules, under certain circumstances, operate to disad-
vantage an individual's employment opportunities and to create a discrimi-
natory working environment."' ' What is more, from the EEOC's point of
view, an English-only rule may serve as a red flag indicating that other dis-
criminatory practices exist or could emerge in the workplace.2"2 As a result,
the Commission has issued guidelines stipulating that a rule requiring em-
ployees to speak only English at all times presumptively violates Title VII
as "a burdensome term and condition of employment,"2 3 and that employ-
ers may adopt rules requiring employees to speak English at certain times
only "where the employer can show that the rule is justified by business ne-
cessity."2" The guidelines require employers to give employees notice of
their rules in the form of specific instructions as to when only English may
be spoken, in recognition of the phenomenon of code switching. As the
198 See Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Melrose Hotel, Berwind
Property Group, to Pay $800,000 to Settle National Origin Bias Suit by EEOC (March 16, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/3-16-06a.html.
199 Complaint, EEOC v. Melrose Hotel Co., No. 04 CV 7514 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2004). Plaintiffs
sought a number of forms of relief, including a permanent injunction against the practice, an order to the
employer that it carry out equal employment opportunities, front pay and reinstatement, past and future
non-pecuniary losses, and punitive damages. Id.
200 See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Compliance Manual § 13V(c) (2002),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/national-origin.html.
201 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 623.2(a) (1993).
The current version of the EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 200, does not contain this language.
202 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2004) ("Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace,
from speaking their primary language or the language they speak more comfortably. . . may also create
an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation based on national origin which could result in a
discriminatory working environment."); Jaqueline M. Jacobson, English-Only Rules and the Effect of the
Business Necessity Defense on the Business Employer, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 265, 270, 282
(2001) (citing the EEOC's guideline and noting that the "EEOC assumes that the reason for the rule is a
form of national origin discrimination").
203 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a).
204 Id. at § 1606.7(b).
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EEOC puts it, "[i]t is common for individuals whose primary language is
not English to inadvertently change from speaking English to speaking their
primary language."205
So, despite the weight of the Fifth and Ninth Circuit decisions, and de-
spite having its own interpretation of Title VII, and, by extension, its exper-
tise, repeatedly questioned, the EEOC continues to pursue these suits. A
number of factors might explain this persistence. First, the EEOC could be
banking on exposure of such rules being bad business for employers who
depend on an increasingly linguistically diverse public, such as the Colo-
rado casino. Second, legal trends may be on the EEOC's side, with some
courts showing a willingness to scrutinize English-only rules, particularly
when the rules are accompanied by evidence of harassment, and some states
passing statutes prohibiting the imposition of English-only rules absent a
legitimate business justification."6 Finally, as the number of such com-
plaints increases, the variety of circumstances demonstrating the harms of
such rules multiplies, thus providing the EEOC with variations on the typi-
cal fact patterns with which to test the courts' understanding of the concept
of harm. But whatever the explanation may be, it is clear that the fight over
the English-only workplace rule continues, largely through Title VII-related
activity. At this point, then, to advance the debate, it is necessary to com-
plicate our understanding of how these rules affect the workplace and its
participants by understanding in some more detail why the parameters set
by Title VII and the EEOC are inadequate for addressing this issue as un-
derstood from the perspective outlined in Part I.
B. 7itle VII's Inadequacies
The harms claimed by plaintiffs and dismissed by courts in the Eng-
lish-only cases fall into three categories: (1) interference with the expres-
sion of one's cultural heritage; (2) entrenchment of unequal working
conditions; and (3) creation of a hostile environment. I will consider each
interest in turn, establishing where the courts go wrong in their rejection of
each one. But I conclude with the claim that each of these interests, formu-
205 Id. at § 1606.7(c). Since formulating its guidelines, the EEOC has issued one decision declaring
that a business's absolute prohibition on speaking non-English was unlawful, see EEOC Dec. No. 81-25,
1981 EEOC LEXIS 7 (1981), and one decision approving a narrowly drawn rule, see EEOC Dec. No.
83-7, 1983 EEOC LEXIS 2 (1983). The EEOC found the rule to be permissible for two reasons. It ap-
plied only to employees working with potentially dangerous substances and equipment in areas where
"constant and open communication" was required to avoid accidents and injuries to employers, and it
applied only to conversations conducted in the course of performing a job duty. See id. In other words,
under the EEOC's view, the inquiry into business necessity will always be relevant, and the concept of
necessity requires that the employer present a meaningful case, rather than a mere assertion, of neces-
sity.
206 Illinois and California have passed statutes prohibiting employers from passing English-only
rules absent an overriding business necessity, and, in recent years, the Texas legislature has considered
adopting a similar measure. For a discussion of these measures, see infra notes 271-83 and accompany-
ing text.
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lated using the frameworks provided by Title VII, fails to capture what is
ultimately most objectionable about language regulation in the workplace-
that such regulation represents a potentially destructive form of social engi-
neering. Plaintiffs in these suits are, of course, constrained by the fact that
they must fit their claims into Title VII's paradigm of individual harm. But
understanding the limitations of their claims helps expose the limitations of
the Title VII framework.
1. Expression, Immutability, and Choice.-In approaching the claim
that English-only rules interfere with the expression of cultural heritage, the
courts begin by emphasizing that Title VII does not protect the employee's
expressive interests.2"7 But the way the analysis proceeds in these cases
suggests that courts cannot help but recognize that an expressive interest-
albeit a limited one-is at stake. As noted in the previous section, when it
comes to the application of English-only rules to non-English speaking
workers, the courts acknowledge that these rules do interfere with those
workers' expressive interests. °8 The inability to use the only language one
knows translates into the harm of social isolation or dehumanization. While
the crux of the finding of liability is that this harm falls disproportionately
on a protected category of workers, the distinction between non-English
speakers and bilinguals is made not on the basis of the worker's member-
ship in that category, but on the weight of the expressive interest. In most
courts' view, the only burden with legal significance imposed by English-
only rules is the inability to speak at all.
The conception of immutability behind this distinction is complex and
a function of the expressive interest. The courts define immutability in the
language cases by freezing the inquiry at a precise moment in time:
Though a non-English speaker's language ability is not in actual fact immu-
table (most people have the capacity to learn another language), it is
thought to be constructively immutable. It would be unreasonable to expect
a non-English speaking worker, for at least some of the period of time dur-
ing which he remains a non-English speaker, to comply with an English-
only requirement, because to do so would be to silence him.
For someone who understands English, however, the refusal to comply
with an English-only rule is tantamount to a particular kind of self-
expression-not the most basic kind that makes us human, i.e., speaking to
others in a language we know, but a more rarified and therefore less pro-
tected form of communication: cultural self-expression."M The ability to
understand English, therefore, marks the divide between protected and un-
protected expressive interests. Once someone has developed the capacity to
207 See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993).
208 See, e.g., id. at 1488; Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980).
209 See supra text accompanying notes 55, 207 (discussing courts' rejection of challenges to Eng-
lish-only rules on the ground that Title VII does not protect a right to cultural self-expression).
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speak English, the speaking of another language instantly becomes a matter
of personal preference, and the rules that govern language are thus catego-
rized with other employer practices that regulate voluntary behavior." ' As
Robert Post has pointed out, these types of claims ultimately look less like
calls for fair and equal treatment and more like the assertion of a right of
personal self-determination."'
But the literature on bilingualism, discussed above, suggests that em-
ployers' regulation of language use is distinguishable from other restrictions
on expression through self-presentation that an employer might impose. In
language usage, the psychological intertwines with the social. The use of a
mother tongue, then, is both an emotional and a social act different in kind
from an assertion of a purely personal right to self-determination. As noted
in Part I, language use is simultaneously embedded in personality and inti-
mately linked to a process of socialization that is ongoing-a process that
does not end once the acquisition of a language (English) is complete. Bi-
lingualism thus operates as a kind of filter and framework for individuals'
interactions with one another.
These observations underscore that both plaintiffs and courts mischar-
acterize the employee's expressive interest as an interest in articulating or
celebrating cultural heritage. The impulse or desire to use a particular lan-
guage when speaking to particular people does not reflect an interest in
celebrating an inherited identity, or a national origin; it reflects the use of an
actual, living thing. In both its functional and symbolic dimensions, lan-
guage use signifies a decision about how best to communicate with some-
one else; language use has an emotional significance that infuses both the
decision to use it and the interactions framed by it.212
The phenomenon of code-switching only underscores that language
usage is fundamentally about making oneself understood in context, not
peppering one's speech with stylized allusions to one's ethnicity. So
whether code switching suggests that language usage by bilinguals is a mat-
ter of choice or not, it at least highlights that language usage is not a matter
of self-presentation. It is a learned social practice. The speaking of a lan-
guage ultimately represents more than an expression of an underlying iden-
210 Cf. Robert C. Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic ofAmerican Antidiscrimination Law, in
PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES 45 (Robert C. Post et al. eds., 2001) ("It seems to be important that groom-
ing and dress codes regulate voluntary behavior, for courts tend to conceptualize employees who present
themselves in ways that violate established gender grooming and dress conventions as asserting a 'per-
sonal preference' to flout accepted standards.").
211 Id.
212 Indeed, my suspicion is that the workers who have framed their interest in speaking their mother
tongue as an expression of heritage do not actually understand their language use in these terms until
after the employer has imposed the restriction and the decision has been made to litigate. The experi-
ence of being prohibited from speaking one's native tongue forces the articulation of the interest in the
most personal terms available, and the requirements of Title VII channel the grievance into the language
of heritage-based identity.
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tity, or the wielding of an emblem of culture-the forms of expression as-
sociated with other cultural characteristics.
213
2. Equality in the Workplace.-The second and third interests often
invoked by employees are two different versions of the claim that English-
only rules deny equal opportunity in the workplace. Employees' claims
that English-only rules impose unequal working conditions and create a
hostile environment thus tend to bleed into one another. Again, the courts
generally dismiss them by emphasizing that compliance with the rule con-
stitutes nothing more than an inconvenience for the bilingual worker.214
With respect to the unequal conditions claim, the alleged inequality is
typically framed as a deprivation of a privilege given to native speakers of
English-the ability to converse on the job in the language in which the
employee feels most comfortable.215 The courts deal with this type of claim
in a generally non-responsive manner. They treat the English-only rule as a
kind of time, place, and manner restriction on the exercising of this privi-
lege, in two ways. First, just as the employer may "proscribe certain topics
as inappropriate during working hours or may even forbid the use of certain
words, such as profanity," the employer may regulate the language of
speech.216 Second, courts treat the English-only restriction as a regulation
of the terms of actual job performance, which apply to all workers. In Spun
Steak, for example, the Ninth Circuit supported its framing of the issue in
this way by referring to a prior precedent in which the court had rejected a
disc jockey's disparate impact claim based on his employer's insistence that
he not use Spanish in his radio broadcasts. 17
But these responses ignore plaintiffs' equality concerns altogether.
The first time, place, and manner justification reframes the issue as a ques-
tion of civility or job performance, rather than tackling the fact that workers
who speak and prefer languages other than English are denied a privilege
monolingual English speakers simply take for granted. Whereas a regula-
tion of profanity is a burden shared by all workers, an English-only rule de-
prives only certain workers of the freedom to speak in the language they
prefer. Under the guise of addressing this concern, the courts rely on one
type of civility concern--concern for the use of profanity or substantively
213 Of course, by emphasizing the uniquely social dimension of bilingualism, I do not mean to sug-
gest that other cultural characteristics, such as hair or dress styles, are not understood by their bearers as
fundamental expressions of identity, nor do I mean to imply that the suppression of certain cultural char-
acteristics can never constitute pretextual discrimination. But both language and bilingualism are unique
in their relationship to personality formation and socialization, and the regulation of language usage,
therefore, has unique consequences.
214 See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1993); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty
Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987).
215 See, e.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487.
216 Id.
217 See id. (citing Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1412).
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inappropriate discussion-to justify a much broader form of regulation that
imposes a comprehensive limitation on the speech of workers.
The second time, place, and manner justification also elides the equal-
ity concern by conflating the employer's interest in having the substance of
the job performed in English-the legitimate interest in having a disc
jockey speak English to reach an audience of English speakers-with the
regulation of all speech in the workplace, regardless of whether that speech
relates to the employer's essential mission."' In both instances, the courts
essentially understand the unequal conditions claim as a claim by employ-
ees to say what they want. The immutability framing of the issue abets this
analysis, because it allows courts to treat bilingual employees' concerns as
matters of choice and self-determination. But this framing allows courts to
ignore the ways in which English-only rules limit the capacity of workers to
interact with one another by preventing them from using an entire compre-
hensive medium-their language. The English-only rule amounts to a sys-
tematic rejection of a pervasive form of interpersonal interaction, different
in kind from declaring uncivil words or topics off limits, or requiring em-
ployees to stay focused on the job when performing actual job functions.
The significance of such comprehensive limitations on the interper-
sonal dynamics of the workplace was clear to a different panel of the Ninth
Circuit in its 1994 Yhiguez v. Arizonans for Official English decision, in
which the court struck down the official English amendment to the Arizona
state constitution passed by the voters through a ballot initiative.219 In
Yhiguez, the court emphasized that limiting an employee's ability to speak
on the job by prohibiting the use of languages other than English was not
just coercive, but coercive in a particular way. The English-only restriction
on the public-employee plaintiff limited her capacity to do her job by sti-
fling the natural interpersonal dynamics of the workplace. The rule pre-
vented her from speaking a language other than English-something that
may well have facilitated her dealings with co-workers and the public seek-
ing services. Though the Ninth Circuit based its finding of First Amend-
ment liability on the constraints the rule imposed on state employees'
abilities to do their jobs, its concern was clearly social: the English-only
rule suddenly made the public workplace less accessible to certain segments
of the population.
Though courts have not been receptive to unequal conditions claims,
plaintiffs have been moderately more successful with the hostile environ-
218 Cf Kim Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimi-
nation, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004) (arguing that the courts' rulings in sex discrimination cases are
based not on a meaningful conception of what certain businesses require, but on broader conceptions of
the nature and type of work opportunities men and women should face and the degree of control cus-
tomers should have over the services they receive).
219 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated as moot, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). The Arizona Supreme Court
invalidated the amendment on substantially similar grounds in Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998).
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ment theory of workplace inequality.2 ° Even in this context, however, sig-
nificant inequalities in the way courts treat language use have emerged. To
be sure, in rejecting employees' Title VII hostile environment claims, some
courts have contemplated that English-only rules, under certain circum-
stances, might corrupt the dynamics of the workplace,22 ' and the Maldonado
court entertained the possibility that an English-only policy itself, and not
just the effects of the policy, "may create or contribute to the hostility of the
environment. 22 Most courts will not, however, infer "isolation, inferiority,
or intimidation" from the existence of a rule itself.223 At most, an English-
only rule will serve as a piece of evidence in a hostile environment case.
Other forms of discrimination, such as draconian enforcement or taunts by
fellow employees, must accompany the existence of the rule for a prima fa-
cie case of hostile environment to be made.
This approach, however, rejects the assumption that the EEOC has
long made-that English-only rules presumptively create a hostile envi-
ronment. As noted in Part I, this demand requires employees to come for-
ward with evidence, other than their own conclusory statements, that
English-only rules isolate. Recall the case of the Polish-speaking church
housekeeper, whose claim a federal district court rejected on the ground that
she had the capacity to comply with the archdiocese's English-only rule,224
and the asymmetry that emerged from the court's analysis of the rule. The
court was willing to assume the harm the employer claimed to be regulat-
ing-that the non-Polish speakers of the parish would be alienated by hear-
ing Polish spoken around them225 -but not the harm claimed by the Polish
employee told not to speak Polish. Whereas the intrusiveness of the non-
English language is self-evident, bilinguals, in order to prove that an Eng-
lish-only rule creates a hostile environment, must present objective evi-
dence of acts related to, but not coterminous with, the existence and regular
enforcement of the rule. The courts demand that bilingual plaintiffs prove
harm, but then reject the possibility that the primary harm imposed by the
rules is a purely subjective one. Language usage is presumed to create hos-
tile conditions, but language suppression is not. These assumptions reflect
important social circumstances, namely the dominance of English. But for
reasons I discuss in Part I, it is important to modify these assumptions with
220 See supra notes 182-95 (discussing hostile environment cases).
221 See, e.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489.
222 See Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1304-05 (10th Cir. 2006); see also id at 1306
(noting that the EEOC's rationale that an English-only policy in itself may create an atmosphere of infe-
riority, isolation, and intimidation is entitled to respect).
223 See, e.g., id
224 Kania v. Archdiocese of Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (dismissing Title VII chal-
lenge to English-only rule on 12(b)(6) motion, in light of plaintiff's failure to state a claim on which re-
lief could be granted, given the absence of unlawful disparate impact).
225 Id. at 735-36.
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other salient social realities, namely the linguistic diversity of our popula-
tion.
3. Beyond Title VII.-Ultimately, the most significant aspect of the
Title VII cases, taken as a whole, is the courts' emphasis on choice as the
decisive factor in determining the viability of a civil rights claim. The
Ninth Circuit in Spun Steak prefaced its conclusion in favor of the employer
with a citation of the Fifth Circuit's authoritative declaration: "It is axio-
matic that the language a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a
particular time is... a matter of choice."'226 The Fifth Circuit, in Gloor, had
made clear its belief that Title VII was not intended to protect characteris-
tics over which individuals exercise control, emphasizing that the civil
rights laws do not "prohibit all arbitrary employment practices," but rather
focus on prohibiting discrimination on the basis of traits that are "beyond
the victim's power to alter." '227 To the extent that courts have deviated from
this line, they have justified that deviation, in part, by problematizing the
idea of choice through reliance on expert testimony that casts doubt on the
belief that bilinguals have complete control over the language they speak.228
The idea of choice thus frames the debate over workplace language
regulation-a frame that makes sense when the English-only issue is chan-
neled through Title VII litigation. But this doctrinal back and forth and its
fixation on the nature of the choice in question is largely beside the point-
a distraction. The framework Title VII gives us for evaluating employers'
regulations for their civil rights implications is not adequate for addressing
the issue. Even if a strong argument, relying on existing law and a more
nuanced conception of choice, could be formulated to show that the courts'
disparate-impact analysis should be coming out differently, relying on Title
VII to come to terms with the English-only workplace rule will be fraught,
for a variety of reasons.
First, because Title VII lists a set of protected categories, courts must
focus their analysis on whether the people challenging a given employment
rule fall within the categories Title VII was meant to protect, rather than on
the more important bottom line, i.e., what is wrong with the employment
practice at issue. In the context of English-only rules, then, courts are
forced to grapple with whether language rules function as discrimination on
the basis of "national origin," the statutory category on which the English-
only lawsuits are based. But "national origin" is the least well understood
of the statuses listed in Title VII, in part because the legislative history does
not speak with any amount of detail to its meaning,229 but also because the
226 Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1487 (emphasis added) (quoting Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th
Cir. 1980)).
227 Gloor, 618 F.2d at 269.
228 See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
229 See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268 n.2 ("The statute's legislative history concerning the meaning of 'na-
tional origin' is 'quite meager."'); James Leonard, Bilingualism and Equality: Title VII Claims for Lan-
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concept of national origin has no obvious definition. One view in the courts
appears to be that national origin refers to where one was born or where
one's parents were born.230 When taking this approach, the courts effec-
tively rely on the idea of immutability to define the statute's terms. But the
fact of one's birthplace seems to be quite beside the point in the cases that
arise, where neither workers nor employers seem to even care whether the
former were born in Mexico, Poland, the Philippines, or the United
States.23  The absence of a statutory definition has ensured confusion in the
courts over the statute's coverage.232
Second and more importantly, the criticisms I have advanced of the
courts' analysis of English-only rules ultimately reflect profoundly social
concerns, which operate on the three levels I discuss in Part 1.233 But Title
VII is not able to capture the social effects-the associative effects--of the
English-only rule. Because of the legal constraints that have grown up
around Title VI--constraints that include not just the "national origin" lan-
guage Discrimination in the Workplace, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFOkM 57, 101 (2004) (discussing minimal
congressional debate on the meaning of national origin and the absence of indications that Congress was
concerned with cultural traits such as language).
230 The Fifth Circuit in Garcia v. Gloor, for example, noted that "[n]o one can change his place of
birth (national origin), the place of birth of his forebears (national origin), his race or fundamental sexual
characteristics." 618 F.2d at 269; see also Perea, supra note 135, at 817-21 (concluding that Title Vll's
legislative history indicates that Congress thought national origin referred to place of one's birth).
231 See Perea, supra note 135, at 839 (noting that discrimination experienced by national minorities
is based on ethnic traits, not on the fact of their place of birth); see also Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the
Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 571, 577
(1995) (observing that understanding national origin to mean place of birth is less relevant today, given
that few actors discriminate so overtly in a post-civil rights world).
232 See Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness," and Racial Hi-
erarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REv. 261, 328 (1997) (discussing this confusion); Wayne N. Outten
& Kathleen Peratis, National Origin Discrimination, 676 PLI/Lit 291, 296 (2002) ("Although national
origin as a prohibited ground of discrimination is a secure feature of the 'litany' of protected groups ...
we are today nevertheless aware of the uncertainty of its content."). It is, of course, wholly appropriate
for courts facing Title VII cases to consider whether Congress intended Title VII to apply to English-
only rules and bilingual workers qua bilingual workers. But this question, legitimate within the Title VII
universe, has so distanced the analysis of English-only rules from an inquiry into what language rules
actually mean for workers that we need an alternative framework.
233 First, they operate at the level of the interpersonal within the workplace; fear of discipline or
surveillance will restrain the bilingual worker in his interactions with fellow employees and the public.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Tex. 2000) ("On a
daily basis, the Hispanic employees of Defendant were faced with the very real risk of being repri-
manded or even losing their jobs if they violated the English-only rule, even if such non-compliance was
inadvertent. There was no comparable risk posed by the policy for Defendant's non-Hispanic employ-
ees .... "). Second, English-only rules create a structural mismatch between the workplace and the
community of which it is a part. Third, by not allowing speakers of non-English to use their language in
the workplace setting, employers make it that much more difficult for communities in which languages
other than English are spoken to sustain the linguistic ties that give them their particular character. In
other words, by eliminating a sphere of life in which non-English languages remain functional, employ-
ers speed the process of linguistic assimilation. For reasons I explain elsewhere, this social consequence
of English-only workplace rules is one we should lament. See Rodriguez, supra note 4, at 723-25.
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guage of the statute (which could be amended), but also the legal culture
surrounding the issue of civil rights (which would be far more difficult to
alter)-it has been difficult for bilinguals to make individualized claims
successfully. In any one case, absent other evidence of harassment, bilin-
gual employees will have a hard time demonstrating individualized harm,
even though it seems clear that English-only rules impose a burden on bi-
lingual individuals that the courts are discounting.
The two primary, existing critiques of the courts' reasoning in the Eng-
lish-only cases reflect the understandable tendency to view conflicts that
arise from culture clash in the workplace through the lens given us by Title
VII. Like the court in EEOC v. Premier Operator Services,"' some critics
deny that bilingualism is a matter of choice and that the standard disparate-
impact analysis should apply to English-only rules.235 Others suggest that
Title VII be amended to include language and other national origin charac-
teristics to make clear that employers may not discriminate on the basis of
those traits.236
Neither of these approaches, however, offers an adequate response to
the way the courts have framed the language cases. Both approaches keep
us focused on the essential framework created by Title VII. The first argu-
ment simply accepts the terms of the immutability debate. It is based on
what may well be an overdrawn or disprovable theory of code switching,
stretched for the purposes of undermining English-only rules, and it re-
quires courts to make particularly specific judgments about social science
evidence far outside their realm of expertise. And the second response
would not necessarily end the debate, because it would not close off the
possibility of distinguishing between non-English speakers and bilinguals
on the theory that English-only rules as applied to bilinguals do not cause
harm. In other words, the concept of "discrimination based on language"
could still be defined in terms of choice, because restricting the language
usage of bilinguals could still be treated as a de minimis inconvenience,
rather than as harmful discrimination.
Quite simply, it is time to step outside the Title VII framework. By
looking for a way through this issue that simultaneously avoids the choice
question and captures the social effects of English-only regulation, I hope to
advance two important paradigm shifts. First, the immutability of charac-
teristics should not be the touchstone of our attempts to decide which cul-
tural characteristics to protect. I consider the idea expressed by Judge
Reinhardt in his dissent from the denial of rehearing in Spun Steak-that
the ability to comply with a rule is not necessarily a measure of the adverse
234 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
235 See, e.g., Mark Col6n, Note, Line Drawing, Code Switching, and Spanish as Second-Hand
Smoke: English-Only Workplace Rules and Bilingual Employees, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 227, 251
(2002).
236 See Perea, supra note 135, at 809.
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effects of that rule-to be self-evident. 237 After all, as he points out, it was
not impossible for blacks to comply with the rule that they sit at the back of
the bus.238 This pointed example reflects the realization that the ability to
"accede" to a demand, in Yoshino's words,239 does not mean that the de-
mand does not act in some negative way on the person forced to comply.24
The issue of choice is beside the point. In stepping outside Title VII's
choice paradigm, then, I assume that requiring individuals to make certain
types of choices may nonetheless be coercive. While all choices are on
some level coerced (or at least constrained), it is important to identify when
the coercion becomes undesirable, and when the law can be used to amelio-
rate the coercion.
Second, the paradigm shift signaled in Grutter v. Bollinger24' also
should be acknowledged. In Grutter, the Supreme Court reoriented af-
firmative action jurisprudence from a backward looking search for dis-
crimination into a forward looking consideration of the social value of
racial and ethnic diversity. The move arguably rejects the constitutional
parallel of the choice paradigm, or the colorblind theory of equality. In-
deed, the courts' focus on choice in the Title VII context echoes the color-
blind conception of equality that has long been challenged by advocates and
scholars. 42 The notion that individuals have no control over certain charac-
teristics-namely race-has fed a central tenet of contemporary equal pro-
tection doctrine: that these traits are morally irrelevant. This irrelevance, in
turn, supports the principle that the state (through the Constitution) and em-
ployers and public accommodations (through statutory law) should be pro-
hibited from making race-conscious decisions, absent a compelling
justification. This colorblindness casts doubt on measures that accommo-
date racial or culture-based differences out of fear that such accommodation
might actually mask invidious discrimination.
237 See Garcia v. Spun Steak, 13 F.3d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1993).
238 See id. This analogy, of course, has its limitations. Understood in its social context, this re-
quirement was clearly imposed on the basis of race, and so this example looks more like an instance of
disparate treatment than disparate impact. But even if the requirement had been the result of a seem-
ingly neutral policy, the point remains the same: the rule humiliated blacks, and the fact that it was an
easily obeyed rule did not diminish the humiliation.
239 See Yoshino, supra note 140, at 779.
240 For other critiques of the courts' reliance on the immutability standard in trait-based discrimina-
tion cases, see Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination Un-
der Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 839 (1987) (observing that the ability to comply with a rule
does not tell us how important that trait is to the individual); Roberto J. Gonzzilcz, Cultural Rights and
the Immutability Requirement in Disparate Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195 (2003) (noting that
mutability does not mean that a person required to suppress a particular trait does not experience adver-
sity and arguing that the requirement of demonstrating impact should be done away with altogether in
disparate impact cases).
241 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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In upholding the University of Michigan's affirmative action plan in
Grutter, however, the Court offered up an equal protection analysis that
suggests a quite different way of thinking about the connection between dif-
ference and equality-an approach that begins by declaring compatible the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause and the state's interest in pro-
moting a diverse student body.243 The precise doctrinal issue in the case
was whether the state's interest in diversity was sufficiently compelling and
its use of race sufficiently limited to satisfy the requirements of the Four-
teenth Amendment, or to overcome the presumption, built into the Equal
Protection Clause through the Court's jurisprudence, that race-conscious
decisionmaking promotes inequality.2" In finding the state's practice con-
stitutional, the Court ultimately characterized Michigan's pursuit of diver-
sity not as a value to be balanced against equality, but as a value whose
pursuit actually promotes equality in two important ways. Not only does
the pursuit of diversity in the classroom add intellectual value to the life of
the University and help break down the stereotypes that entrench inequali-
ties by facilitating interaction among society's different groups, but the
visible inclusion of those groups in the student body also confers social le-
gitimacy on the University qua public institution.45
This reorientation in affirmative action jurisprudence is significant for
my purposes, because both the idea of undermining stereotypes through ex-
posure and the idea of social legitimacy conferred through diversity are
based on the assumption that recognizing certain socially salient character-
istics is valuable in shaping and filling institutions.246 By extension, then,
rendering those characteristics invisible either through exclusion or sup-
pression might actually undermine the legitimacy of certain institutions.
What is more, neither of the equality goals embodied in the diversity inter-
est depends on giving special protection or solicitude only to those charac-
teristics that are immutable and whose exclusion would therefore be more
problematic. Indeed, diversity, as the Court and the University of Michigan
both defined it, depends not only on the inclusion of racial minorities, but
also on the incorporation of students who possess a wide array of personal
characteristics, many of which are not immutable in the way race is immu-
243 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
244 See id. at 326-27.
245 Id. at 330, 332 ("[T]he Law School's admissions policy promotes 'cross-racial understanding,'
helps to break down racial stereotypes, and 'enables [students] to better understand persons of different
races'. .. . In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is neces-
sary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity
of the educational institutions that provide this training. As we have recognized, law schools 'cannot be
effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts."' (internal cita-
tions omitted)).
246 For a discussion of why the workplace should be considered one of these institutions, see supra
notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
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table.247 Whether a quality is thought to be valuable in the diversity calculus
does not depend on whether that quality is freely chosen. The characteris-
tic's value, instead, stems from its social salience. Immutable characteris-
tics, such as race, are certainly socially salient. But so are changeable
characteristics, such as linguistic or religious identity, or commitment to
public service, athletics, or music, for that matter.248
To be sure, the Court, in defining diversity, was not suggesting that
these other salient qualities should be treated the same way for the purposes
of equal protection analysis, triggering strict scrutiny, for example. And, in
authorizing universities to rely on race-conscious decisionmaking but then
declaring that such use should be limited in time,249 the Court simultane-
ously underscored the centrality of race to the pursuit of equality and rein-
forced the colorblind paradigm-both factors that highlight the immutable
aspect of race. But the end result the Court identified as compelling-the
diverse student body-will remain compelling even after race-
consciousness is no longer necessary to its achievement.
In other words, the idea that, as a matter of social equality, we should
be concerned primarily with the effects of powerful decisionmakers' actions
on characteristics that are not a matter of choice arguably has been deem-
phasized by a Court focused on a different objective-maintaining the le-
gitimacy of important social institutions given the social contexts of our
diverse demography. While the idea of choice is still relevant to under-
standing how certain policies affect different groups--e.g., we might be
more concerned with admissions policies that exclude racial minorities than
those that exclude oboe players because of the immutability factor--choice
should not be the all-important pivot around which the legitimacy of differ-
ent social practices turns. The Court's development of the diversity idea
thus helps us to see that in deciding how to treat salient differences in a
manner that promotes social equality, simple heuristics like the choice ver-
sus immutability paradigm will not always provide the best answers. The
achievement of certain compelling social objectives, such as facilitating
meaningful interaction among different social groups, will involve accom-
247 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-38 (discussing University's holistic review process).
248 The inclusion of these types of talent-based qualities helps highlight the limited use of immuta-
bility in determining which characteristics the law should protect. Musical talent, athletic ability, and
intelligence are pretty close to immutable characteristics in that we are born either with or without them.
But to observe that we cannot will ourselves to be athletically gifted does not mean that it would be im-
permissible for a coach to keep us off her squad because she would be discriminating on the basis of an
essentially immutable characteristic. In other words, calling something "discrimination" depends as
much on the social context in which the decision is being made as it does on the extent to which the ba-
sis for the discrimination is something over which the individual has control.
249 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342-43.
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modating socially salient characteristics, regardless of whether those char-
acteristics are immutable.25
In order to determine how English-only workplace rules should be po-
liced, then, it becomes necessary to leave the standard doctrinal debates
aside. When we consider English-only rules free of the constraints of Title
VII, we can face directly their harms for workers, regardless of whether na-
tional origin includes language, or whether the workers in question have no,
some, or complete control over their speaking of non-English. And we can
give direct consideration to the extent to which English-only rules have so-
cial consequences, or affect the social interests of workers, rather than fo-
cusing simply on whether they violate the individual's right to be free from
discrimination as defined by Title VII.
III. DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT THROUGH LAW REFORM
Having established the case against the comprehensive English-only
rule, and having considered why the existing Title VII framework does not
properly address the rule's real harms, it now becomes important to discuss
how the law should address the English-only phenomenon. Stepping out-
side of Title VII's boundaries permits us to reframe language policy and di-
versity management in two important ways. First, it allows us to see the
issue in more appropriate institutional and geographic terms. Second, we
need no longer be bound by the requirements of the immutability paradigm
and can instead focus on how personal characteristics relate to the critical
social and solidaristic interests implicated in disputes over workplace plu-
ralism.
A. Language Rules and Decentralization
As I have explained at length elsewhere, matters of language policy
and efforts to manage cultural diversity should be conceptualized through
the lens of decentralization-a lens that makes it possible to deal with a
complex phenomenon without resort to the blunt instrument of a uniform,
national rule."' Within this decentralized framework, there nonetheless will
be a role for Title VII to play. First, English-only rules often form part of
broader national origin claims by employees. In a claim alleging disparate
treatment on the basis of national origin-a claim that should continue to be
litigated through Title VII-the existence of an English-only rule may be
important evidence of an employer's more pervasive unlawful employment
practices. Second, the courts' intuition discussed in Part II-that English-
only rules have a legally cognizable impact when applied to workers who
250 For an analysis of how Grutter might affect the evaluation of affirmative action in the employ-
ment context, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative
Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2005).
251 See Rodriguez, supra note 4, at 720-21, 758-65.
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do not speak English-should be preserved. In other words, Title VII sets a
baseline for the treatment of language in the workplace that regards rules
tantamount to no-speaking rules for certain workers as presumptively sus-
pect; such rules erect serious barriers to the equal treatment and advance-
ment of affected workers and should therefore not be tolerated---certainly
not on a disparate basis, and probably not at all. The interest in basic com-
munication-in the ability simply to speak on the job-represents an inter-
est that is almost certainly uniform among non-English speaking workers in
the United States. Because this interest is, in a sense, "de maximus," it
makes sense to treat it as a federal norm that generally trumps the em-
ployer's prerogatives.
Though the impact of English-only rules on bilingual employees may
not be as significant as the impact on non-English speakers, that impact is
not de minimis, as the courts often assume. But unlike the interest of the
individual who does not speak English, the interests of bilinguals and the
communities in which they live are not uniform. For some communities in
some parts of the country, the interest in preserving one's native language
and in using it in the public sphere will be strong. Others might fully em-
brace the expectation of linguistic assimilation, inside and outside the
home. Different communities will have different groups competing in the
workplace. In some cities, diversity will be thick, and in others it may just
involve a single minority group. In some localities, the tensions among
groups may be high and the need for a unifying mechanism correspondingly
great. In other places, the very presence of such tensions might require
strong resistance to homogenizing legal rules. In other words, the linguistic
dynamics of any given community are sufficiently complex to require a
more nuanced decisionmaking mechanism than the one Title VII offers.
Reform efforts at the state and local level offer that mechanism. Be-
cause the nature of language diversity in the workplace is likely to differ
from region to region, it makes sense to have the issue worked out in state
and local governments, where people have a more direct stake and in-
volvement, and where the process of adapting to diversity can reflect com-
munity concerns. By resisting the temptation to resort to federal norms, a
decentralized law reform response will help ensure that the decisions made
on the subject reflect the inevitable local variations described above. A de-
centralization of the energies put into Title VII litigation and a refraining of
the issue as a state issue might also encourage regulatory competition
among states seeking to attract immigrant labor-competition that will im-
prove the quality of life for immigrants in workplaces across the country.
Though immigration remains regionally concentrated, 52 immigrants are in-
creasingly settling in suburban and rural communities outside the traditional
252 See Sudrez-Orozco, supra note 54, at 74 (noting that 85% of the Mexican immigrant population
resides in Texas, California, or Illinois).
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gateway cities,253 drawn by employment opportunities across the country.
States and, more importantly, localities may find that ensuring hospitable
work environments through policies such as prohibitions on English-only
rules will help attract the labor they need, particularly if activists put energy
behind state and locally based efforts. Finally, decentralizing this issue will
have democracy-enhancing benefits beyond ensuring a more responsive
policy process, because it offers an avenue for states and localities to par-
ticipate in the immigration debate by which they are directly affected."
Put slightly differently, continuing to frame the issue of language di-
versity in the workplace in Title VII terms would be a long-term strategic
mistake for anyone interested in flexible reform designed to adjust the law
to our changing demography. Title VII litigation offers mixed possibilities
for success; despite recent court victories and settlements for English-only
plaintiffs, continued litigation seems unlikely to truly shift the presumption
against English-only rules. Of course, a national legislative rule that estab-
lishes a presumption against the English-only practice would provide the
most comprehensive protection of workers' interests. As noted in Part II,
some commentators have suggested amending Title VII to include language
or other cultural characteristics to accomplish this objective. 55 But assum-
ing this particular issue could even make it onto the national legislative
agenda-a possibility about which I am skeptical-pursuing this course
would thrust the language issue onto the national stage, where debates over
language policy tend to be distorted and ultimately incompatible with the
normative goals I have outlined in this Article.256
Distortion occurs at the national level, because participants in national
language policy debates rapidly conflate the underlying policy issue-in
this case, whether employers should be free to regulate the language of the
workplace-with the question of whether English should be declared the
official, national, or common language of the United States. Genuine pol-
icy questions tend to be obscured quickly by grandiose posturing on the
meaning of American national identity. Attempts to define a national iden-
tity in a country as vast and diverse as this one are fraught, to say the least,
and the national identity trope ultimately stifles debate over the underlying
policy problem. One side of the debate relies on an extraordinarily general-
ized description of American society and culture (that we have been able to
253 See Waters & Jimdnez, supra note 54, at 106-07.
254 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal
Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187, 192 (2005) (arguing that if "regulations are not the result of the decisions
of the persons affected by them, then those persons have been deprived of self-rule in a way that injures
their dignity and deprives them of a political education").
255 See Perea, supra note 135, at 809.
256 In the current climate, for example, in which immigration enforcement and border protection
represent high priorities for many members of Congress, a Title VI-based reform strategy on language
issues, which inevitably would be conflated with concerns over unlawful immigration, would be mis-
guided.
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function as a nation only by outgrowing linguistic pluralism) and the other
side on multicultural rhetoric (that we are a nation of many peoples and cul-
tures). Each of these pat statements is necessarily divorced from the demo-
graphic complexity that defines and distinguishes the country's countless
multi-ethnic communities, and thus does nothing to advance the policy de-
bate.
The recent debate in the Senate over immigration reform offers a tell-
ing case in point. In the midst of the Senate's extended consideration of the
legalization of unauthorized immigrants, a potential guest worker program,
and a comprehensive overhaul of a highly technical and complex immigra-
tion system, the Senate took a detour into the realm of cultural symbolism
by passing two amendments declaring English the national or common lan-
guage of the United States.257 Immigration-related debates tend to surface
this sort of assertion of national unity through "defenses" of the English
language,258 and it is therefore inevitable that such debates will take place at
the national level, given Congress's plenary control over substantive immi-
gration law. But it can be counterproductive to pursue other language pol-
icy objectives, such as the regulation of English-only rules in the
workplace, at the national level for reasons underscored by the Senate's re-
cent foray into the language question.
Republican Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma introduced the first of
two language amendments, declaring that "[tjhe Government of the United
States shall preserve and enhance the role of English as the national lan-
guage of the United States of America." '259 But in addition to this bit of
symbolism, the amendment also contained language with potentially serious
policy consequences. Language in the amendment could be read to relieve
federal agencies and recipients of federal funds of some of their current le-
gal obligations to provide translation, interpretation, and multilingual sign-
age for persons with limited English proficiency.26° But these are the very
257 See Jonathan Weisman & Jim VandeHei, Senate Votes English as 'National Language,' WASH.
POST, May 19, 2006, at A01.
258 Another example of this phenomenon arose in a recent floor debate over a proposal by the D.C.
City Council to permit non-citizens to vote in local elections. The discussion quickly devolved into
speeches about how immigration and the "cult of multiculturalism" threaten American national identity
and security. See 150 CONG. REC. H5958, H5964 (daily ed. July 19, 2004) (statement by Rep. Tom
Tancredo) ("It is citizenship, it is the concept of a nation State that we are today debating. Whether or
not its existence can be assured, certainly we do not know, but I can guarantee my colleagues this, that
the threats to its existence are great and are exacerbated by the cult of multiculturalism and unrestrained
immigration.").
259 152 CONG. REC. S4724 (daily ed. May 17, 2006) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (introducing "Lan-
guage of the Government" amendment).
260 Senator Inhofe's amendment reads, "Unless otherwise authorized or provided by law, no person
has a right, entitlement, or claim to have the Government of the United States ... perform or provide
services, or provide materials in any language other than English." Id. The critical question raised by
this language is what constitutes "law." We can safely assume it includes existing congressional stat-
utes, such as the bilingual ballots provision of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974(e)
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services that operate as mechanisms of assimilation by helping immigrants
and other people with limited English-speaking ability function as members
of our society. Language services also enable entities that interact with
non-English speakers-such as health care providers, emergency services
providers, public health officials, police, and public schools-to carry out
their missions. In other words, the Inhofe amendment could disrupt the le-
gal basis of a system of services on which our public health, safety, and
welfare depend.
But the debate over this serious matter of language policy inevitably
became intertwined with ponderous rhetoric about the need to rally around
the English language to promote national unity.26" ' This feature of the de-
bate, in turn, arguably complicated efforts to resist the counterproductive
policy, because the policy was linked to emotional statements about com-
mon culture that are difficult for politicians to oppose.262 Indeed, the mere
introduction of a language policy matter into congressional debate can cre-
ate pressure for legislators otherwise inclined to adopt accommodationist
policy to also make symbolic statements about the primacy of the English
language, which are themselves problematic in certain contexts. Democ-
ratic Senator Ken Salazar of Colorado, for example, introduced an amend-
ment to prevent the policy damage that could have been dealt by the Inhofe
amendment, but did so with similar symbolic language declaring English
the "common and unifying language of America." '63 Without this symbolic
(1994), or the Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b)(1) (2006). But if "law" does not include ex-
ecutive orders, then Inhofe's amendment would obviate a Clinton-era executive order, affirmed by
President Bush, that requires federal agencies and recipients of federal funds "to take reasonable steps to
ensure meaningful access to their programs and activities by LEP persons." Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65
Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug. 11, 2000). Legislative history suggests that Senator Inhofe intended precisely
this outcome. See 152 CONG. REC. S4754 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) ("Here
we are making clear that there is no legal basis for Executive Order 13166 that purported to direct ser-
vices and materials in languages other than English.").
261 See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S4609 (daily ed. May 16, 2006) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) ("Our
country is made up of immigrants from all over the world, immigrants who have joined together under
common ideas, common beliefs, and a common language to function as 'one nation under God.' . . . As
we allow great numbers of immigrants ... into the country, we are overwhelming the assimilation proc-
ess and creating what some have called 'linguistic ghettos.' . . . By not requiring immigrants to assimi-
late and learn English, we are also undermining our unity and importing dangerous, deadly philosophies
that go against our American ideals."); 152 CONG. REC. S4737 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Alexander) ("This amendment is as important as any amendment which is being offered because it
helps take our magnificent diversity and make it something even more magnificent. It recognizes that
only a few things unite us: our principles, found in our founding documents, and our common lan-
guage.").
262 A number of Democrats did, in fact, oppose the amendment, but they are treading on politically
treacherous territory, and it remains to be seen whether they can maintain their positions as the immigra-
tion bill goes to the House-Senate conference committee.
263 152 CONG. REc. S4813 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (recording introduction of Senator Salazar's
"Preserving and Enhancing the Role of the English Language" amendment). Senator Salazar's amend-
ment defines law as "including provisions of the U.S. Code, the U.S. Constitution, controlling judicial
1754
HeinOnline  -- 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1754 2006
100:1689 (2006) Language Diversity in the Workplace
statement, it seems unlikely that Senator Salazar's amendment curing the
policy problems of the previous amendment would have attracted enough
votes to pass. Though the statement is essentially a truism and therefore
uncontroversial on its face, the context in which it was made gave it an ag-
gressive, divisive quality.264 It was the product of political momentum to
assert a particular conception of American identity in the midst of a difficult
and heated national debate about who has the right to live, work, and belong
in the United States.265
It is, of course, possible that state and local lawmakers will appeal to
similar rhetoric. But, as a general matter, they are less likely to feel the
need to articulate a national identity through their policy than members of
Congress, for obvious structural reasons. More importantly, because of the
regional concentration of the country's language diversity, decentralized
political processes are more likely to produce language policy that reflects
an appreciation of minority interests than national debates. For many
members of Congress and their constituents, the language question really is
just an abstraction. The idea of meaningful and pervasive linguistic diver-
sity, in the workplace or in any other institution, can only be hypothetical,
or something experienced in some other comer of the country. The regional
nature of the phenomenon means that appreciation for what is actually at
stake is not distributed evenly across the country.266 Addressing the chal-
decisions, regulations, and Presidential Executive Orders," see id, and thus cures the potential dangers
of the Inhofe amendment.
264 To be sure, Senator Salazar sought to address the potential divisiveness of the law by defining
English as the common language, which suggests merely that it is the language most people speak in
common, rather than the national language, which equates the nation, the entity called the United States,
with English. But these subtle shifts in language are arguably not sufficient to alter the core, hegemonic
message of the amendment.
265 For a more detailed discussion of official English laws, see Rodriguez, supra note 4, at 752-54.
See also Cristina M. Rodriguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward a Comprehensive The-
ory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 138-40 (2001) (discuss-
ing the absence of a need to declare English the national language).
266 Of course, by suggesting that it would be counterproductive to have a national language policy, I
do not mean to suggest that a discussion of language policy should not occur across the country, or that
any one city, state, or region would not learn from what has been attempted elsewhere. I emphasize
only that the workplace debate, in particular, and linguistic and cultural diversity issues, in general, will
be better addressed by decisionmaking bodies that are more likely to be working from lived experience
with linguistic diversity, rather than those able to approach it primarily through abstraction and generali-
zation.
To be sure, one of the basic benefits of centralization is coordination. If it really were the case that
the absence of a national language policy meant that no common language would exist in the United
States, then tackling language policy regionally, as opposed to nationally, might not make sense. But, as
I have explained elsewhere, perhaps the biggest canard perpetrated by the official English movement is
the notion that the status of English as the common American language is in danger. First, sociologists
of the current wave of immigration have documented that the three-generation pattern of linguistic as-
similation that has obtained throughout most of American history is still at work. Second, the social
dominance of English in the United States is hardly imperiled, not because of any official English decla-
ration, but because of powerful market forces, global in scope, that make knowledge of English critical
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lenges posed by linguistic diversity in the workplace by introducing lan-
guage-related amendments to Title VII, for example, would generate a con-
gressional debate that reflects these distortions and could result in codifying
them into national rules.
The appropriate lawmaking response to the rise of the English-only
rule, in light of Title Vii's limitations, thus will be state and local legisla-
tion designed to restrain employer discretion to impose language rules on
the workplace. As noted above, by placing my faith in a decentralized deci-
sionmaking process, I make the predictive judgment that localities are more
likely to produce the substantive results I seek, and in a manner that in-
volves the relevant players in the decisionmaking process.267 Again, local
processes are more likely to reflect the interests of minority language com-
munities. Local bodies are more likely to have an incentive than a central-
ized government to take into account the community and individual
interests of minority groups, because those groups' power will be more
concentrated. More concretely, the movement for non-citizen political par-
ticipation has proven to be far more viable on the local level,2 and the
process of organizing immigrants is easier and generally more effective at
the local level. Of course, the dramatic demonstrations held this spring in
cities across the country by immigrants and advocates seeking to influence
congressional debate over immigration reform highlighted the very real
possibility of national, concerted action with the power to influence the
course of national debate.269 Moreover, because Congress controls immi-
gration policy, immigrants and their advocates must organize and lobby at
the national level. But such national action is difficult to sustain. And,
more importantly, when seeking to advance the social, economic, and cul-
tural interests of immigrants (as opposed to addressing matters of substan-
tive immigration law), advocacy organizations are likely to find more direct
influence and success at the local level, where stakes are smaller and often
more concrete than at the national level.27
not just to economic and educational advancement, but also to daily living in the United States. See
Rodriguez, supra note 265, at 138-40.
267 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190,
192 (2001) (defending significant local autonomy and arguing that regional interests are best addressed
through cooperation among distinct localities rather than through centralization).
268 See RON HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS IN
AMERICA 41-55 (2005).
269 See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, In the Streets, Suddenly, an Immigrant Groundswell, N.Y. TIMES,
March 27, 2006, at A14 (reporting on the immigration rallies and their potential political influence).
270 See, e.g., Emilie Cooper, Embedded Immigrant Exceptionalism, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 345, 367
(2004) (underscoring the importance of advancing immigrants' welfare interests at the state level in light
of successes in California, attributed in part to the "smaller scope" of the campaign and "the ability of
advocates to respond to the unique political environment within the state"); Rebecca Smith et al., Low
Pay, High Risk. State Models for Advancing Immigrant Workers' Rights, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 597, 602 (2004) ("At the state level, authorities often have greater appreciation of immigrant
workers' contribution to the local economy. They often have closer experience with the kinds of abuses
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On the workplace issue in particular, state lawmakers already have be-
gun picking up the slack from the federal civil rights regime. In 2001, for
example, the California legislature passed a law regulating employers' au-
thority to adopt English-only rules. In several hearings held during the con-
sideration of the legislation, supporters characterized their efforts as
addressing an issue growing in importance "along with the number of em-
ployees in California who speak languages other than English."27' Com-
ments also noted that the "lack of enforcement of federal EEOC guidelines"
and the ambiguities engendered by conflicting federal court interpretations
as to what types of English-only laws are permissible made state action ad-
visable.2 A response from the state legislature, it was thought, "would
provide a clear state policy on the issue," giving guidance to local employ-
ers and state courts.273
The California law amends the state's Government Code to make it
unlawful for an employer to "adopt or enforce a policy that limits or prohib-
its the use of any language in any workplace" unless the restriction was jus-
tified by a business necessity and the employer had notified the employees
of the circumstances under which the language rule applied.274 In addition
to creating a presumption against English-only rules, the statute defines
business necessity narrowly. The employer must have an "overriding le-
gitimate business purpose such that the language restriction is necessary to
the safe and efficient operation of the business. '275 In addition, the language
restriction must "effectively fulfill[] the business purpose it is supposed to
serve," and the employer must show that no alternative practice exists "that
would accomplish the business purpose equally well with a lesser discrimi-
natory impact. '276 In other words, the interests the employer can invoke to
justify his rule are limited, and they must satisfy a stringent tailoring re-
immigrants suffer, and a better understanding of the duty of agencies and police authorities to protect all
local residents."). For a detailed discussion of the various steps local and state governments can take to
protect the interests of immigrants, including securing equal employment rights and language access
services, see generally Smith et al., supra.
271 See Workplace Language Policies: Bill Analysis of A.B. 800 Before the Cal. Assembly Comm.
on Labor and Employment, at 2-3 (April 18, 2001), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-




274 See Act to Add Section 12951 to the Government Code, Relating To Employment Discrimina-
tion, 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. 295, § 2(a) (codified at CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1295 1(a) (Deering 2006)).
Comments in the legislative history of the Act noted the "lack of enforcement of federal EEOC guide-
lines," and observed that because the federal courts have been varied in their interpretation of when an
English-only policy is permissible, "a state statute would provide a clear state policy on the issue and
give guidance to state courts regarding English-only policies." See Bill Analysis of A.B. 800, supra
note 271.
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quirement that contrasts noticeably with the way business necessity is de-
fined for the purposes of Title VII.
The legislative history of this measure reveals a number of motivations
for responding to a growing employer practice with a clear presumption
against that practice. Some of the same claims made by Title VII plaintiffs
and rejected by the federal courts were raised by participants in the process.
Arguments that have failed to carry the day in the Title VII context were
given effect by the California legislative process, which was unconstrained
by the highly developed, existing federal legal regime. For instance, in ad-
dition to seeking clarity in the law, the Attorney General of the state echoed
the expressive claims made by some Title VII plaintiffs, observing that
"employees generally should not be forced to relinquish their fundamental
rights of free expression when they pursue a livelihood." '277 The record also
contains testimony from the ACLU employing language similar to the
EEOC guidelines: "Forced suppression of one's native language," the
ACLU observed, "creates an oppressive and intimidating workplace." 7 '
Relying on complaints concerning English-only rules received by other
civil rights organizations, the ACLU also emphasized that permitting lan-
guages other than English to be spoken in the workplace can be good for
business. Not only is it the case that bilinguals often communicate more ef-
ficiently in their native language, but it also hurts morale to burden employ-
ees with the threat of monitoring for improper language use.279
In 2004, the Illinois legislature passed similar legislation, amending the
state's Human Rights Act to prohibit employers from restricting employees
from speaking non-English in communications "unrelated to the em-
ployee's duties.2 2" An employer in Illinois may not, for example, prohibit
an employee from discussing a previous night's television program in a
language other than English.' Among the reasons given by the legisla-
tion's sponsor to support its enactment was his view that protecting em-
ployees' freedom in this way would enhance their quality of life and unify
277 Bill Analysis of A.B. 800, supra note 271, at 3.
278 Workplace Language Policies: Bill Analysis of A.B. 800 Before the Cal. Assembly Comm. on
Judiciary, at 5 (April 24, 2001), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_0751-
0800/ab 800 cfa_20010423 102622_asm comm.html.
279 Id. at 4-5 (noting complaint received by employees at a tax service provider in San Jose and
emphasizing that "[e]mployees complain that the pace of their work is slowed when they are forced to
speak to a client in a non-English language and then speak in English to a co-worker who speaks the
same non-English language").
280 2003 Ill. Laws 217. The statute defines language to mean native language and to exclude "slang,
jargon, profanity, or vulgarity." Id. A similar bill, establishing that an employer "commits an unlawful
employment practice if the employer requires an employee who is bilingual or multilingual to speak
only English while at the workplace," was introduced in the Texas legislature but did not become law.
See H.B. No. 3379, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003).
281 See New Illinois Law Declares Blanket "English-Only" Work Rules Unlawful Discrimination,
EMP. L. UPDATE (Matkov Salzman, Chicago, I1.), Jan. 2004, at 1.
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people of varied backgrounds, presumably because of the mutual respect for
one another's practices reflected in the law.282
In pointing to these laws as models, I recognize that state and local
governments may not all go the way of Illinois and California. It may well
be that drives to pass legislation prohibiting English-only rules mirroring
the Illinois and California legislation will fail, as has been the case in
Texas.3 More seriously, when state and local governments engage in de-
bates over how to manage the effects of immigration-cultural or other-
wise-they may produce outcomes that undermine the worldview I outline
in Part I. In the most recent of the English-only cases, for example, a fed-
eral court, relying on Title VII, questioned an English-only policy imposed
by the city of Altus, Oklahoma, on its employees.284 While it seems highly
unlikely that local or state legislatures would adopt laws requiring private
employers to adopt English-only rules, state and local governments may
pass English-only laws governing the language usage of their own employ-
ees, imposing the same dynamics on public workplaces that I criticize in
Part I.
Moreover, some of the most notorious measures in recent memory lim-
iting immigrants' access to public services and restricting the use of non-
English in the public sphere have been passed by state and local voters.
California's Proposition 187,285 Arizona's restrictive English-only law even-
tually struck down by the Ninth Circuit and the Arizona Supreme Court,286
and the bilingual education bans passed in states such as California and
Massachusetts2 87 all reflect the fact that substantive outcomes inconsistent
with the normative positions I have taken can emerge from state and local
processes. The state and local voters living in parts of the country where
immigration and language diversity are concentrated are more directly af-
fected by the cultural consequences of immigration, which sometimes leads
to particularly vehement expressions of English-only or anti-immigrant sen-
timent-sentiment that might otherwise be muted at the national level.
282 See State of Illinois, Senate Transcript, 93rd Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess., Mar. 20, 2003, at 79-80,
available at http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans93/09300022.pdf ("[T]his piece of legislation
undoubtedly brings this country more together, . . . but more importantly it unifies the people of the
great County of Kane in places like Batavia and Aurora and all the Latinos and Asians and other folks
from foreign countries that live in our home districts. This only enhances the quality of life for all those
people that we represent in our home districts that work in the restaurants, that work cleaning the hotels,
that work cleaning our offices, that work in the factorias, that work in the tire shops ... .
283 H.B. 3379, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003) (no committee action was taken).
284 See Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006).
285 See 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West).
286 Yfiiguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (striking down Arizona's
English-only Amendment on free speech grounds), vacated as moot, 520 U.S. 43 (1997); Ruiz v. Hull,
957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998) (invalidating the amendment on similar grounds).
287 See, e.g., Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Comment, The Bay State Buries Bilingualism: Advocacy
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But a decentralized strategy will be preferable nonetheless. Restric-
tionist sentiments are more likely to be counterbalanced at the local and
state levels than at the national level by a pragmatism and compassion that
stems from familiarity with immigrants, minority groups, and their con-
cerns. Second, issues like language restrictions in the workplace, which
may be of little consequence at the level of national political debate, will re-
ceive more attention at smaller levels of government. Indeed, as empha-
sized above, discrete cultural issues quickly become subsumed by abstract
and counterproductive national identity debates when raised at the national
level. And, finally, both public opinion and public policy at the state and
local levels will be easier to repeal, modify, or expand than national legisla-
tive rules, meaning that the debate over these issues is less likely to be over-
taken by inertia or disinterest at the lower levels of authority. In the end,
pursuing a vindication of the interests I assess in this Article through federal
channels would represent a misallocation of time, energy, and resources.
B. Devising Workable Rules for Employers
In Part I, I assumed for the sake of argument that English-only rules
take the form of blanket rules applied to all hours of the workday and all
parts of the workplace. This type of blanket prohibition, however, does not
cover the full range of real world practice. What is more, the states that
have passed laws restricting the English-only practice permit employers to
adopt English-only rules if justified by business necessity.288 In developing
a law-reform response to the English-only rule, it is therefore important to
consider whether rules narrower than blanket prohibitions should be permit-
ted, and to define the interests employers might legitimately invoke to jus-
tify such rules. In other words, what types of English-only rules should be
allowed to pass legal muster, and under what circumstances can employers
adopt them?
I already have identified two candidates for narrowly targeted rules: a
disciplinary rule that addresses a pattern of behavior through which non-
English-speaking employees harass and isolate fellow workers through their
use of language, and a uniform requirement that employees engaged in
common tasks address each other in a mutually intelligible language, which
in most workplaces will involve the use of English." 9 In this section, to
flesh out the interests employers might invoke to justify English-only rules,
I consider the three primary rationales employers have advanced in litiga-
288 See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text (discussing the business necessity justification
permitted by the California statute prohibiting English-only workplace rules); see also Salzman, supra
note 281, at 1 (noting that the Illinois Department of Human Rights, the agency that investigates com-
plaints concerning the new law, provides that narrow language restrictions can be justified by business
necessity but that the agency's rules do not provide definitive guidance on this question).
289 See supra note 132 and accompanying text and Parts l.B.2-3.
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tion to defend their rules.290 First, some employers claim the rules are nec-
essary to promote safety and efficiency in the workplace. 29' Second, em-
ployers often justify the rules as means of establishing harmony among
workers.292 And, finally, employers have made the claim that English-only
rules are necessary to ensure customer satisfaction. 93
But before considering each of these rationales, I note that I assume,
for the sake of argument, that most employers who adopt language restric-
tions do so because the rules promote profitability and not as the result of
irrationality or prejudice. To the extent that employees would feel harmed
enough by an English-only rule to leave a workplace where a rule has been
imposed, the employer will internalize this cost. But while I do not take a
position on the rationality of existing English-only rules, I examine criti-
cally the reasons employers have given for adopting them. My aim is to
provide guidance for other employers who might be contemplating English-
only rules, as well as for legislators considering how to define a business
necessity justification, and personnel and activist organizations seeking to
advise employers on when to adopt such rules.
This guidance will be particularly important because, even in circum-
stances where individual employees would not feel sufficiently aggrieved
by an English-only rule to seek another job (signaling to the employer that
an English-only rule might be profitable), the social consequences I de-
scribe in Part I could still result from an English-only rule. Employers have
no reason to take into account the effects of their language rules on relations
in the workplace that do not affect their bottom line, much less on commu-
nities and relationships outside the workplace. Consistent with the burden
shifting framework I propose in Part I, my claim is that our policy goals
should include ameliorating these social consequences, even if it means cut-
ting into the employer's business prerogatives.
To the extent that this interference compromises efficiency gains em-
ployers might make by adopting English-only rules, that disruption should
only be temporary. The customer and employee complaints that typically
290 The arguments offered by employers to justify their English-only rules parallel the claims usu-
ally made by proponents of English as the official language: the institutions of a multiethnic society, for
efficiency's sake, require a conmmon coin of conversation; an official language will create an affective
bond among people of diverse backgrounds and therefore promote not only social harmony, but also ad-
herence to a common objective. In addition to advancing their own economic interests, then, employers
who adopt these practices act as proxies for the public, responding to public attitudes by regulating the
behavior of participants in the workplace.
291 See, e.g., Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1299 (10th Cir. 2006); Garcia v. Spun
Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993); Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1042 (9th Cir.
1988).
292 See, e.g., Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1299; Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483; Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at
1042-43; Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 939 (E.D. Va. 1995); Kania v. Archdiocese of
Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 736 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
293 See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 1 (discussing Dunkin' Donuts affair); see also Lichter & Wald-
inger, supra note 12, at 163-64 (discussing customer aversion to "foreign" tongues).
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lead employers to adopt English-only rules stem from an undifferentiated
anxiety over conversations in languages English-speakers cannot under-
stand. But, over time, the shift in presumption I propose will perform an
educative function. Consistent exposure to the unfamiliar eventually will
transform what seems hostile and uninviting into the usual and the custom-
ary.
29 4
1. Managing the Workplace.-Like the state interests in national se-
curity or public health, safety and efficiency of job performance are invoked
as the quintessential interests of the party imposing restrictions on the be-
havior of those he governs. But like the categories of national security and
public health, the idea of job safety and efficiency is often invoked talis-
manically, or in a manner that discourages courts from inquiring into the ac-
tual link between the challenged rule and the asserted interest. In truth, the
category of "safety and efficiency" encompasses many different needs that
should be understood as distinct, but that courts often conflate in their as-
sessments of English-only rules.
As noted in Part I, even the EEOC, whose position long has been that
the existence of an English-only rule is sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, recognizes that safety concerns can justify the impo-
sition of an English-only rule on the workplace. The Commission, for ex-
ample, has approved a rule as applied to employees working with
potentially dangerous substances and equipment in areas where "constant
and open communication" was required to avoid accidents and injuries to
employers.295 Critical to its finding, however, was the fact that the rule ap-
plied only to conversations conducted in the course of performing a job
duty.
296
The specificity of the EEOC's opinion suggests-rightly, in my
view-that "safety" cannot simply be invoked. The concern for safety must
be demonstrated, and the rule must be tailored to meet the purported need.297
294 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (discussing the learning effects that requiring
employees and customers to hear languages other than English will have).
295 EEOC Dec. No. 83-7, 1983 EEOC LEXIS 2 (1983).
296 Id.
297 The EEOC's expectation that a tailoring requirement be met reflects its conclusion that the inter-
ests affected by English-only rules are in the heartland of what Title VII protects. Though the federal
courts rarely, if ever, reach the business necessity stage of the analysis because of their conclusion that
bilinguals cannot even make the prima facie case, the courts' assessments of the employer's interest
clearly and directly inform their analysis of the impact question. See supra notes 157, 164-66 and ac-
companying text (noting that courts conclude no prima facie case has been made but address employer's
interests in the process of evaluating plaintiff's claims nonetheless). Perhaps because the courts do not
officially reach the business necessity phase of the inquiry, they tend to accept the employer's proffered
interest without engaging in the kind of tailoring analysis reflected in the EEOC's opinions. Several
commentators have taken the courts to task for failing to treat the business necessity question as any-
thing but a rubber stamp of the employer's litigating position. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak, 13 F.3d
296, 296--98 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc); Matsuda, supra
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In other words, the presumption is against a general prophylactic language
rule; a specific safety concern cannot be addressed by a general prohibition
on the speaking of non-English. Underlying this expectation of tailoring
rests a key insight: a reviewing body must attempt to understand the cir-
cumstances of the workplace in order to determine the legitimacy of the
safety interest. Indeed, it is not altogether clear that English-only rules al-
ways will promote safety; in a linguistically mixed workplace, both the
ability to communicate in multiple languages and the freedom to do so in
response to emergencies that arise might well be more conducive to worker
safety than a prohibition on the speaking of languages other than English.
The efficiency defense, while conceivably related to the promotion of
safety, is, at its core, a claim that the employer should be free to determine
what is required for optimal job performance. The concern for efficiency
takes at least one of two forms: the employer claims either that the use of a
single language is necessary for the employer to run the business effec-
tively, or that supervisors must be able to monitor employee performance,
which in turn requires that employees speak a language the supervisor can
understand.298
Both of these rationales relate directly to the completion of the em-
ployer's essential mission, and neither explanation relies on a generalized
interest in regulating the interpersonal dynamics of the workplace. On their
face, then, these rationales are the most compelling. At the same time, em-
ployers often justify blanket prohibitions with reference to safety and effi-
ciency but without an explanation of how the rule is actually linked to the
professed goal. In these cases, the safety and efficiency rationale operates
as a kind of cover for the less compelling claim that the employer should be
free to structure workplace social dynamics in a broader sense.
With respect to the first conception of efficiency, the employer is on
his strongest ground when the performance of the actual job function re-
quires the speaking of English. In Jurado v. Eleven Fifty Corp., for exam-
note 118, at 1356 (proposing an inquiry into the nature of the particular job at issue in accent discrimina-
tion cases).
298 Variations on these justifications were used to defend the policy in Spun Steak. 998 F.2d 1480,
1483 (9th Cir. 1993). The employer in Spun Steak claimed to have adopted the English-only rule for a
variety of reasons. Id. As noted above, the employer believed the rule would promote safety, because
the use of Spanish distracted certain workers when they were operating heavy machinery. Id. The em-
ployer also noted that the rule would enable the USDA inspector in the plant, who only spoke English,
to exercise his oversight functions. Id. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the employer adopted the
rule in response to complaints that certain workers used Spanish to harass and insult co-workers with
racist comments. The employer thus adopted an English-only rule in the course of exercising what the
Ninth Circuit referred to as his prerogative to define the privileges of employment narrowly, id. at 1487,
or according to the terms the employer thought would best resolve tensions in the workplace. I discuss
the racial harmony dimension of this justification in more detail below. See infra notes 312-17 and ac-
companying text. The point to note here is that the racial harmony justification is related to the em-
ployer's interest in defining the terms of employment to ensure that his business runs smoothly, or
without the tensions among workers that might cause disruption in the workplace.
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ple, the Ninth Circuit rejected a disc jockey's claim that Title VII protected
his freedom to inject Spanish into his radio broadcasts.2 99 In the court's
view, the employer's ability to reach an English-speaking audience with
appropriate programming overcame any interest the disc jockey might have
had in speaking Spanish on the job.3"0 The English-only requirement in this
particular case was easily defensible, not only because it related directly to
the performance of the job, but also because the rule was limited to job per-
formance itself and had no effect on the use of non-English in the work-
place generally. Often, however, courts conflate the legitimate interest in
having the substance of the job performed in a particular way with the in-
terest in regulating the interpersonal dynamics of the workplace-a form of
regulation whose connection to the successful completion of the job mis-
sion is hardly apparent. t In other words, as scholars have pointed out in
the sex discrimination context, the courts' willingness to accept the em-
ployer's justification often has little to do with a "meaningful conception of
what certain businesses actually require," and more to do with courts' more
general intuitions about employees' legitimate expectations and the legiti-
macy of customer preferences.3"2
The second conception of efficiency-that supervisors must be able to
understand the conversations of their employees-makes pragmatic sense.
Particularly when more than one non-English language is spoken in the
workplace, the connection between having a common workplace language
and an employer's ability to monitor what goes on in the workplace seems
solid. There is therefore no complete answer to this justification.
But under my burden shifting framework, its rationality is also not a
sufficient reason to think of this justification as the ultimate trump. First, as
I explain in Part I, the link drawn between the need to supervise and the
need to have a blanket English-only requirement assumes that conversation
in the workplace takes one monolithic form-a form where all conversa-
tions are relevant to job performance and must be understood by everyone
in the workplace.3 3 It also suggests that the employer, through his supervi-
sors, must be able to understand what employees say at all times. In reality,
interactions in the workplace are more layered: many conversations happen
299 813 F.2d 1406, 1411(9th Cir. 1987).
300 See id.
301 See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993). In observing that privi-
leges of employment, such as speaking in a certain language on the job, are within an employer's discre-
tion to define, the Ninth Circuit cites Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp. Id. (citing Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1412).
Though the court cites Jurado for the proposition that the bilinguals, who can comply with English-only
orders, suffer mere inconveniences as opposed to the denial of equal opportunity, id. at 1487-88, by cit-
ing Jurado, the court conflates the employer's interest in having the central job function carried out in
English with the employer's interest in the regulation of workplace conversation more generally.
302 See Yuracko, supra note 218, at 212.
303 See supra Part I.B.3.
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at once, and those conversations include the personal and private, the job-
specific, and everything in between.
What is more, the same employers who impose English-only rules also
hire workers for their ability to speak to customers in other languages, or at
least permit employees to use non-English with customers.3" This inconsis-
tency suggests that the supervision claim reflects not only an interest in
workplace efficiency, but also a desire to control the social dynamics of the
workplace. Indeed, the claim that supervisors must always be able to un-
derstand employee conversations suggests the arrival of the Panopticon in
the workplace. The claim is tantamount to banishing privacy altogether,
because it suggests that all types of conversations must be understandable
and therefore subject to being overheard by supervisors.0 5
The need to oversee the workplace effectively, while real, should not
be understood as totalizing. A presumption against English-only rules will
not deprive employers of their ability to supervise the workplace. Such a
presumption may create incentives for employers to hire bilingual supervi-
sors.3"6 But the recent employment trends highlighted at the outset of this
Article suggest that it would not be unreasonable to expect employers to
make this type of adaptation.3"7 The fact that the American workplace is
full of employees who do not speak English at all suggests that employers
find ways to handle the oversight problems engendered by language barri-
ers. Given the employer's ability to adapt, then, such regulations reflect
304 See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1043 (9th Cir. 1988); Garcia v. Gloor,
618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1068 (N.D.
Tex. 2000); Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 938 (E.D. Va. 1995).
305 Cf Matsuda, supra note 118, at 1397 (arguing that when certain accents are deemed inappropri-
ate for the workplace, a power move is being made: the employer's policing of workplace differences
reflects a need to control the workplace by demanding that others control themselves when they speak).
306 These incentives may disadvantage the monolingual English speaker. But general incentives
toward bilingualism are, on balance, a positive social development-as employers themselves are in-
creasingly recognizing in the hiring decisions they make-because they foster exchange and interaction
among society's various groups. What is more, such incentives are particularly important in employ-
ment contexts where workers who do not speak English are often employed-not just for the business
itself, but for the health and safety of the worker. Finally, creating incentives in the direction of multi-
lingualism as opposed to monolingualism serves a broader social agenda whose articulation is beyond
the scope of this paper, but which is implicit in my emphasis on tolerance and burden shifting through-
out. See Rodriguez, supra note 4, at 719-40.
307 In suggesting this possibility, I am aware of the fact that such incentives will advantage one type
of worker (the bilingual) at the expense of another (the monolingual English speaker). While this devel-
opment may be salutary for immigrants and their descendants (census figures suggest that nearly one in
five residents of the United States speaks a language other than English, see Shin et al., supra note 93),
it may also have class and race implications that undermine the goal of securing an integrated work-
place. Ultimately, this risk will be a cost that the reform I suggest might impose. But I believe it is a
justified cost that can and will be remedied by changes in attitude with respect to language education for
all people, not just those with limited English proficiency. Indeed, it is probably not a coincidence that
two-way bilingual education programs have emerged in places such as Miami-Dade County, where em-
ployers increasingly view bilingual ability as a basic job qualification. See Rodriguez, supra note 4, at
764-65.
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reasonable constraints on employer discretion, or reasonable costs to expect
an employer to bear. The existence of a presumption against English-only
rules ultimately will encourage employers to think more carefully about the
dynamics of their particular workplace when crafting language regula-
tions.0
2. Protecting the Interests of Co- Workers and Customers.-The sec-
ond and third rationales typically invoked to defend English-only rules-the
promotion of workplace harmony and responsiveness to customer prefer-
ences for hearing only English-have less to do with the effective perform-
ance of particular job functions than with managing the interpersonal
dynamics of the workplace. 3 9 The employer, when he relies on these justi-
fications, makes claims that are difficult to assess about morale and subjec-
tive preferences. And it is in these instances that the employer engages in
what I call private language regulation. These regulations may well con-
tribute to his profit margin by keeping certain workers and segments of the
public happy, but they do so by perpetuating public anxieties I have argued
should be resisted. 0
When relying on the workplace harmony justification, employers claim
that employees who speak only English feel intimidated when they hear
languages they do not understand, or worry that they are being talked about
or disparaged by other employees?" This interest also has been articulated
as a concern for workplace civility, or the concern that the act of speaking a
language in the presence of those who do not understand it is somehow of-
308 See ACLU Found. of N. Cal. et al., Guidelines and Questions for California Employers Consid-
ering the Use of Workplace "Speak-English-Only" Rules (2002) [hereinafter Guidelines for Employers],
http://www.aclunc.org/language/guidelines.pdf (instructing employers on how to craft their language
rules in order to comply with California's 2002 statute prohibiting English-only rules absent an overrid-
ing business necessity). Of course, by advocating such constraints in service of what I believe to be a
compelling social agenda, I am by no means claiming that employers should not be allowed to demand
that English-speaking employees speak English to their supervisors, or in other contexts such as group
meetings, or when employees are engaged in tasks that involve others who do not speak their non-
English language. In other words, English-only rules limited to particular contexts will be more likely to
survive a searching business necessity inquiry than the more common blanket rule.
309 The Society for Human Resource Management has noted that common issues for employers "in-
clude complaints from employees who fear they are being mocked when co-workers speak in languages
they don't understand; [and] customers who are frustrated by employees with heavily accented English."
Society for Human Resource Management, Issues Brief: Language Policy in the U.S. (Nov. 1999),
http://www.shrm.org/trends/briefs/language/language5.asp; see also Guidelines for Employers, supra
note 308.
310 See Rodriguez, supra note 4, at 726-28 (discussing the value of being challenged by the unfa-
miliar).
311 See, e.g., Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 2006); Garcia v. Spun
Steak Co., 988 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the employer adopted the English-only rule
in response to complaints that bilingual workers were harassing and insulting co-workers in Spanish,
and thus to promote racial harmony); see also supra notes 96-99, 120; infra notes 312-17 and accom-
panying text (discussing cases in which employer relied on this type of justification).
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fensive.31 2 Most courts regard this concern for employee morale in the face
of cognitive dissonance as a legitimate and enforceable norm 313 The work-
place harmony justification, ultimately, is the micro-version of the claim
that a multilingual society requires a national official language to keep peo-
ple united in common cause. Employers adopt English-only rules not only
to preempt the potentially alienating effects of multilingualism in the work-
place, but also to ensure good relations in the workplace.
As I acknowledge in Part I, employers should be free to promote coop-
eration among employees and protect employees from harassment." 4 To
these ends, targeted disciplinary rules, or requirements that workers en-
gaged in common tasks use a common language, will be permissible.315 But
courts have permitted the harmony justification to sweep much more
broadly. As is the case with arguments for official English in government
institutions, the workplace harmony justification assumes that employees
(citizens) are engaged in a single conversation that must occur on the same
terms, or that each transaction in the workplace (the polity) is a discrete one
to which all workers (all citizens) must be parties. But again, as I explain in
Part I, life in the workplace, like life in a diverse and decentralized society,
consists of a multitude of overlapping social interactions, where multiple
linguistic transactions occur simultaneously, sometimes involving the same
person or people. As Mari Matsuda emphasizes in her work on accent dis-
crimination and Title VII, the legitimacy of an employer's interest in pro-
moting workplace harmony turns on the character of the workplace and the
tasks performed within it. 16 The fact that most workplaces are character-
ized by layered conversations warrants skepticism of broad language re-
strictions justified by generalized harmony claims.
The final, frequently invoked justification for the English-only rule is
the desire to cater to customer preferences-a defense used by employers
primarily in the service sector. On the one hand, this interest would seem to
belong in the heartland of employer discretion. Title VII caselaw very
clearly acknowledges the employer's authority to define the image he
would like his business to project. In 2004, for example, the First Circuit
rejected a Costco clerk's demand that her employer exempt her from its pol-
icy barring facial jewelry.317 She argued, as a member of the Church of
312 Kania v. Archdiocese of Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 736 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
313 Cf Post, supra note 210, at 35-39 (observing that certain gender norms, such as the proper stan-
dards of grooming and dress, are seen as "significant and uncontroversial" by those who "implement[]
the law," such that courts in Title VII cases permit employers to enforce such norms through their rules,
even though those norms might perpetuate gender stereotypes).
314 See supra Parts I.B.2-3 (discussing the potential civil rights implications of permitting linguistic
diversity in the workplace).
315 See supra note 132 and accompanying text and Part I.B.3 (offering these types of rules as poten-
tially valid forms of regulation by employers).
316 See Matsuda, supra note 118, at 1369.
317 See Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004).
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Body Modification, that her religion required her to wear facial piercings.
The court concluded, however, that the accommodation she sought would
"adversely affect the employer's public image," and that the employer had
"made a determination that facial piercings, aside from earrings, detract
from the 'neat, clean and professional image' that it aims to cultivate.""3 8
As one scholar has observed, these "reaction qualifications," or criteria im-
posed by the employer based on his or her prediction of how people will re-
act to the presence or absence of the qualification, "are crucial to a wide
spectrum of jobs."3 9 Because many modem day business transactions de-
pend on interpersonal interaction, "the entire point of many jobs is to elicit
the appropriate reaction."32
Of course, the law does not permit employers to anticipate all negative
reactions by customers. Title VII very clearly limits the employer's author-
ity to decide that negative customer reactions to race or gender (at least in
some contexts) justify a refusal to hire members of the disfavored groups,
or a decision to place all employees of a particular race in positions with
minimal customer contact. An employer cannot decide to project an all-
white image of his business. Through Title VII, the courts thus have devel-
oped a set of expectations for customers-that their preferences, whether
widely shared or idiosyncratic, bear some rational relationship to otherwise
legitimate expectations.'
Though courts appear willing to permit the regulation of customer
preferences, it remains difficult to generalize from existing cases about
which reaction qualifications fall on the permissible side of the line. As le-
gal scholar Kim Yuracko has shown in the gender context, not only do
courts not treat all customer preferences alike, but it also can be difficult to
discern a principled pattern in these cases. Other students of the workplace
have explained this line-drawing difficulty by pointing out that "moral in-
tuitions about counting reaction qualifications do not seem to follow any
easily identifiable pattern and may not even produce high consensus re-
sponses among morally reflective persons." '322 According to Yuracko, a
court's willingness to permit an employer to give effect to customer prefer-
ences through his workplace policies correlates closely to how serious or
weighty the court believes the customer preference to be. 23 Customer con-
318 Id. at 136.
319 Alan Wertheimer, Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences, 94 ETHICS 99 (1983).
320 Id. at 100 ("Reaction qualifications refer to those abilities or characteristics which contribute to
job effectiveness by causing or serving as the basis of the appropriate reaction in the recipients.").
321 But even this line, which seems clear, in reality offers a rather fuzzy boundary. American Air-
lines' policy prohibiting its flight attendants from wearing corn rows, for example, has been upheld as
within the employer's discretion, despite the fact that the plaintiff's preference for the hairstyle corre-
lated with her race. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that an
employer policy prohibiting the wearing of comrows was not a violation of Title VII).
322 See Wertheimer, supra note 319, at 103.
323 See Yuracko, supra note 218, at 190-93.
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cerns that are central to one's sense of self, or to personal integrity, such as
the preference to be attended in an assisted living facility by someone of the
same gender, are more likely to be protected than concerns for less personal
matters.324 Yuracko ultimately contends that the more closely connected a
preference is to the idea of "human flourishing," '325 the more likely a court
will be to regard it as a preference to which customers are entitled.
Amidst this confusion, the question remains: Should the fear that cus-
tomers will be turned off by the speaking of non-English by service em-
ployees constitute a business necessity justification? The contours of the
answer will depend, in part, on whose perspective we adopt in assessing the
question.
The employer may well believe he has an interest in creating a "safe"
space for his clients-a space that he creates in deference to customer pref-
erences. But a rule that applies to all employers will prevent any single
employer from losing business to discriminating competitors. And the idea
that an employer will lose business if his employees speak languages other
than English in front of customers is a dubious proposition in any case, be-
cause creating a linguistically safe space will be difficult. Most employers
would not impose language constraints on their customers, meaning that a
safe space would be hard to secure in any case. Indeed, given that an em-
ployer would run into serious § 1982 problems were he to attempt to control
the private conversations of his customers-recall Hernandez v. Erlenbusch
and the Oregon tavern326-- the imposition of an English-only rule on em-
ployees is an underinclusive means of achieving a safe space. In the end,
English-only rules tend to arise in multilingual environments where em-
ployees have been hired in many cases precisely for their ability to serve
non-English speaking customers.327
As for the customer, he may have a substantial interest in actually be-
ing served in a language he understands, but nothing in the framework I
propose prevents the employer from requiring his employees to do business
with the customer in a particular language. But it is hard to see the weight
of the customer's interest in being shielded from hearing other languages,
or of his interest in understanding what others in his environment are saying
when he is not a direct participant in the conversation. The customer does
not inhabit the workplace in the same manner as the employee, and the for-
mer's ability to form social relationships with the people around him is
much less likely to be affected by service workers' use of languages he does
not understand. The thinness of this interest becomes all the more apparent
if we think of the legitimacy of customer preferences in terms of their con-
324 Id. at 191-96.
325 Id. at 201-02.
326 See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
327 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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nection to human flourishing, which is unlikely to depend on being shielded
from hearing languages one does not understand.
The social interest in requiring people in their capacity as consumers to
accept a certain amount of cultural dislocation is, in my view, of far greater
significance than the customer's personal comfort. 28 The expectation that
people adjust to the demographic changes around them should be at its
highest in public settings where people engage in free activity, such as
workplaces where consumers and the service provider interact. The asym-
metry problem I discuss in Part II-the assumption that the speaking of
non-English is alienating to English-speakers, but that the reverse is not
true-is at its most correctable in the commercial setting. Laws of the kind
I advocate would establish the expectation that customers tolerate all of the
linguistic preferences around them, thus spreading the burden of not under-
standing across the population. Given that the public's interest in private
language regulation is so weak, it makes sense to preclude employers from
acting as proxies for the public if such restraint can advance important so-
cial objectives.
It should be clear that the framework I propose would not rob employ-
ers of all discretion to regulate language use in the workplace. Rules that
relate directly to safety and efficiency will generally be permissible, as long
as the employer does not conflate job performance with interpersonal inter-
ests. While prophylactic rules in the name of workplace harmony should be
subject to serious, subjective inquiry that takes into account the layered in-
teractions of the workplace, language-based disciplinary measures may well
be within the scope of the employer's legitimate discretion. Finally, lan-
guage regulation in response to customer preferences will almost never be
legitimate, unless the regulation is of the primary, transactional interaction
between the customer and the service provider.
My hope, ultimately, is that the Dunkin' Donuts affair will be typical-
that misunderstandings will be clarified by open communication and com-
munity-inspired tolerance, rather than through the heavy hand of the law.
We want to limit our imposition of legal constraints on the workplace, not
only because employers must be allowed to use their judgments to run their
businesses, but also because relationships in the workplace should be fluid.
But advancing associative interests in the workplace, in many cases, is in
tension with the interest in preventing culture clash, which manifests itself
in similarly heavy-handed efforts by employers to regulate social behaviors.
In these instances, the background principles of the law have a role to play
in shaping employer behavior. This influence will operate not only, and not
even primarily, through litigation, but through the creation of default pre-
sumptions that will filter through to employers in the form of guidelines by
personnel organizations like the Society for Human Resource Manage-
328 For a discussion of the burden shifting idea I advance, see supra notes 95-105 and accompany-
ing text.
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ment329 and activist organizations like the ACLU, who have already helped
define guidelines for employers seeking to manage the language diversity in
their workplaces.33
C. Association and Workplace Pluralism
In addition to helping us understand language dynamics in the work-
place, the English-only cases point toward a framework with the potential
to resolve other workplace-related conflicts that involve personal character-
istics similar to language usage. The association versus expression dynamic
that the English-only cases reveal could be applied to draw lines separating
the sorts of behaviors that deserve the protection of the law from the charac-
teristics that should remain wholly within the discretion of employers. The
principle of association, as I define it here, is not simply about the individ-
ual's desire or need to express something about his or her identity, but
about his or her ability to maintain important social ties-an interest that
justifies regulation.
This distinction between expression and association, by narrowing the
universe of protected traits, will help combat the commonly lodged critique
that the use of the law to protect cultural traits will flood courts with a litany
of claims to special status. What is more, prioritizing the associative over
the expressive will help avoid the other commonly invoked negative conse-
quence of essentialization, or the process of assuming that cultures or social
groups can be reduced to certain core characteristics. " ' In my view, this
fear is actually overblown. To suggest that a trait is correlated with a
group, or is important expressively to many members of a group, does not
assume that every member of that group possesses the characteristic, nor
does it imply that to be an authentic member of the group, one must express
him- or herself through that characteristic. But by focusing on the associa-
tive side of the distinction, we move the debate out of the context of identity
and its performance and into the realm of the interpersonal and communal,
where regulation is on firmer ground.
While a full accounting of how the association principle might help re-
solve disputes similar to the English-only case is beyond the scope of this
Article and a subject for future work, we can at least speculate at this stage
about how some of the most well-known types of cases might come out. In
the expressive category, I would place characteristics such as hair and dress
329 See Society for Human Resource Management, supra note 309 (noting that "[e]mployers must
balance productivity and safety concerns with the needs of diverse groups of employees who speak a
variety of languages").
330 See, e.g., Guidelines for Employers, supra note 308. The recommendations made to employers
to help ameliorate language conflict in the workplace include encouraging the employer to familiarize
herself with EEOC guidelines, to consider offering English classes to employees for whom English is
not their first language, and to work with educators to include foreign language classes in core curricu-
lums. See id.; see also Society for Human Resource Management, supra note 309.
331 See generally FORD, supra note 140.
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style. I do recognize that the choice to express oneself through such charac-
teristics may well reflect an individual's declaration that he identifies him-
self with a social or cultural group-that he understands those forms of
expression to be required for full acceptance into that group. Stated in more
general terms, expression and association are not unrelated concepts, but
rather sit at two ends of a spectrum, with the former being essential to the
latter. That said, characteristics like hair styles, while suggesting points of
commonality that might draw individuals to one another, do not facilitate
interpersonal interaction in any direct sense, nor do they directly connect
their individual bearers to others.
Other behaviors that more closely resemble associative characteristics
might include organizing prayer groups or Bible study, or engaging in the
proselytizing of fellow workers. These are both practices that seek en-
gagement with others in the workplace but that are also essential to sustain-
ing a pre-existing community outside the workplace. Of course, like non-
English language usage, such behaviors may be experienced by co-workers
as intrusions or as harassment. The case of religion is particularly vexing,
because it takes us into the realm of deeply held personal beliefs, or of con-
science, in a way language does not-a factor that cuts both in the direction
of giving religion more protection, as well as in the direction of protecting
people from religion. But the associative nature of many religious practices
is arguably a reason to take seriously the idea that the law should protect at
least some religious interests of employees, for the reasons suggested by the
language cases. Enhancing people's ability to interact socially and to sus-
tain communities and communal ties, particularly in the marketplace, is a
legitimate concern of the polity. The practices or behaviors that facilitate
this process deserve our attention.
CONCLUSION
A close look at English-only rules and the Title VII litigation to which
they have given rise reveals that employees have important solidaristic, as-
sociative interests, both in the workplace itself and in the intersection of the
workplace with the community at large. When we think about whether to
protect employees' cultural or personal characteristics in the workplace, it is
these interests, rather than individual employee's freedom of expression,
with which the law should be concerned. Title VII, however, provides
workers with no realistic mechanism for articulating social, associative in-
terests. While this defect may be lamentable, a federal legal approach to
this issue would be misguided in any case, and the preferable form of action
would be to create a presumption against English-only rules through state
and local regulation. In the end, understanding the associative dynamics of
the English-only workplace rule will help shape a coherent approach to
managing the cultural consequences of immigration. The burden shifting
framework I propose will help us come to terms with how unprecedented
levels of immigration are reshaping our social and political spaces by re-
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quiring all members of society to treat these changes as the normal condi-
tions of their everyday lives.
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